Office of the Historian

132. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

JCSM–799–64
Washington, September 16, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Future Military Operations in Laos (U)
1.
Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–27, 643/64, dated 3 September 1964,2 subject as above, which requested comments and recommendations on Ambassador Unger’s proposals for the employment of Lao ground forces (FAR and Neutralist) during the next six months in operations designed generally to consolidate control over the Royal Lao Government’s zone of influence.3
2.
It is noted that Ambassador Unger predicates his proposals on two assumptions: (1) no ceasefire, and (2) no major enemy offensive. The concept of employment of the Lao forces as proposed by Ambassador Unger is as follows:
a.
First phase (September–November)—consolidate the gains of Operation Triangle; clear out Pathet Lao (PL) pockets (1) south and west of Luang Prabang, (2) north and northeast of Vientiane, and (3) in the western portion of south Laos from Savannakhet to the Cambodian border; and conduct operations to place pressure on the PL in the vicinity of Tha Thom and improve defenses against an enemy advance south towards Paksane.
b.
Second phase (November–February)—following the cleanup of the first phase, troops in south Laos move to a line east of Phalane, Nong Bua Lao (but west of the PL base at Muong Phine), 15 kilometers east of Saravane and Attopeu, and south to approximately 20 kilometers of the Cambodian border.
3.
The above concept closely parallels the actions approved by the President for implementation and the concepts for selected offensive actions provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4.
Analysis of the proposed actions indicates that they are within the capabilities of the Lao forces. The opposing orders of battle in south Laos are: FAR—30 battalions with artillery and air support and Pathet Lao/Viet Minh (PL/VM)—14 battalions (10 PL and 4 VM). Since the concepts of July 1963 were prepared, Lao forces have achieved a somewhat improved posture, particularly as a result of the augmented and battle tested Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), but also as a result of enhanced esprit, increased training, and US assistance. This improved posture does not, however, extend to the point that the FAR or Neutralist forces can be relied upon when confronted by North Vietnamese.
5.
The operations envisaged would serve to keep pressure on the enemy, would tend to inhibit the Lao from initiating actions in the north beyond their capability to handle, and could well have a diversionary effect in support of South Vietnamese cross-border operations into Laos.
6.
Operations of the RLAF, which are essential to success, should not involve such a commitment that they cannot respond to a PL/VM attack elsewhere, such as toward Thakhek. It is noted that Ambassador Unger mentions the establishment of a special Air Operations Center (AOC) at Savannakhet. It is considered that the proper air control agency in south Laos should be an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) at Savannakhet, subordinate to the AOC at Vientiane, the latter allocating aircraft consistent with the over-all priorities for the air effort in Laos.
7.
Operations in southern Laos will require coordination with COMUSMACV and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), and with CAS operations. It is noted that RVN liaison in Laos has been established and that the Army Attaché has recognized the need for liaison [Page 271] with COMUSMACV. The ASOC at Savannakhet should be the air control agency in Laos with which the AOC at Tan Son Nhut could coordinate to achieve integration of air actions in the Laos corridor in the event VNAF/Farmgate/US air strikes therein are mounted from South Vietnam.
8.
The degree of US participation and assistance is not clear. The US Army Attaché’s message CX–450, DTG 010250Z September 1964,4 which amplifies the Ambassador’s message, indicates that US advisors will be required at three command posts and also in a logistical and artillery advisory capacity.
9.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the concept outlined herein and recommend that:
a.
The United States support these modest operations in view of the gains to be expected.
b.
Ambassador Unger be queried on the anticipated military personnel and equipment requirements discussed in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, above, and the degree of US participation and assistance required, in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can address these requirements.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 D 7425, Laos 381 (9 Apr 64) Laos Operations. Secret.↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. In telegram 387 from Vientiane, August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)↩
  4. Dated September 1. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 D 7425, Laos 381 (9 Apr 64) Laos Operations)↩