Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

131. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, September 13, 1964, 4 p.m.

448. After hearing report from Embassy Vientiane representatives at meeting COMUSMACV September 11,² I am persuaded, despite certain unresolved questions, it should be possible to move ahead quickly with limited but probably useful land and air operations in corridor.

1) Land operations. Shallow penetration raids (20 kms) in central area (toward Chavane), Rte 9 area (as well as Leaping Lena Teams in Rte 9 area) and probing operation in the southern area near Cambodian frontier by company-sized units do not in my mind require any clearance by the RLG. We would assume they could be carried out as soon as the VN ground and support units are in state of readiness. Here we are thinking of minimum indispensable air support which would be based on RVNAF for all supply, evacuation and emergency operations over Laos, as was agreed on at Saigon. This would envisage US advisor role limited to accompanying Leaping Lena Teams in airplanes (jump masters), but not on ground.

2) Air operations. Thus far lack of specific instructions has inhibited us from pressing RLG on initiation T–28 strikes in corridor, but if Washington desires, believe we can persuade RLG military to agree that individual strikes can be started on this quite soon, although large scale concentrated program will probably have to await Souvanna’s return from Paris. His reaction would probably depend on degree of agreement there among Lao factions. We would probably have to give RLG assurances of adequate support if such actions brought about sharp enemy response that appeared beyond capability Lao armed forces to withstand. We might also be asked give RLG further support in northern and PDJ operations. Souvanna would probably prefer see air attacks against corridor targets extended over period of time, perhaps three to four weeks, rather than massive attack designed to eliminate all targets within three or four day period. As for difficult targets, particularly several bridges in the corridor area, these might be left to Yankee Team “suppressive missions” which could be got underway shortly. I do not think it would be necessary for me to tell Souvanna Phouma that such Yankee Team strikes were being undertaken if number of aircraft engaged in any such operation were kept within pattern present Yankee Team flights. For example, flights of perhaps four “escort” fighters could be readily passed off as suppressive strike.

3) [7 lines of source text not declassified]

Suggestions outlined above for corridor operations clearly do not meet all military desiderata, but have advantage that they could be undertaken almost immediately. More effective military program could run into significant political difficulties (reviewed in previous messages) and delays. In undertaking this program we should recognize that operations outlined above are designed to provide shot in arm to VN armed forces as well as further signal to enemy of seriousness our intentions. On other hand, cutting off corridor so that passage of personnel and materiel from north to south would be substantially reduced or eliminated is generally accepted, I believe, as being beyond capabilities GVN, to say nothing of RLG military, even with any US support at level we understand currently envisaged. Please instruct.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, Saigon,DOD, and MACV, and passed to the White House and CIA.
2. See footnote 5, Document 130.