Office of the Historian

113. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, July 23, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Situation in Laos

In response to your request for a summary of the general problem treated in Vientiane’s 138 (attached):2

1.
Unger’s cable is a comment on CINCPAC’s recommendations3 to the JCS for stepped-up U.S. actions in conjunction with Operation Triangle.
2.
These recommendations largely parallel a package sent to Secretary McNamara by the JCS on June 27 and July 9.4 McNamara has taken no action as yet on the JCS recommendations, pending the slow and unsteady unfolding of Operation Triangle.
3.
In addition to measures urged for the defense of Muong Soui (provision of additional C–123’s and Caribou, logistic support, Air America pilots for T–28s, napalm, and reconnaissance support), the JCS recommendations included preparations for the following “contingency operations in Southeast Asia”:
(a)
Air strikes by U.S. aircraft against appropriate PL/VM targets in Laos.
(b)
Defense of the Mekong cities, using appropriate U.S. forces in conjunction with Thai forces.
(c)
Low-level reconnaissance and air strikes by U.S. aircraft against appropriate private targets in North Vietnam.
4.
Both State and DOD are informally agreed that insofar as these recommendations look to increased U.S. involvement, they should be deferred for the present. Given the relative speed with which we can deploy our forces if necessary, we have decided on no advance deployment. We are opposed to the use of U.S. pilots.
5.
As you know, the chief question of the day has concerned the use of napalm against enemy positions on Phou Kout hill near Muong Soui.5 In order not to jeopardize British efforts to keep the Polish proposal alive, we have “suspended consideration” of the use of napalm at Phou Kout.
6.
We are attempting to meet Unger’s needs without resorting to American pilots by arranging for additional Thai pilots; and we are locating and earmarking additional transport aircraft.
7.
Meanwhile, Operation Triangle may possibly move into high gear tomorrow or Saturday when our boys encounter their first enemy road blocks.

JCT
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XII, Memos, 7/64. Top Secret.↩
  2. Dated July 22, not attached. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)↩
  3. Transmitted in CINCPAC telegram 180313Z, July 17. (Department of Defense, OSD Historian’s Files, Secretary of Defense’s Cable File, Tiger, Oplan 34 A, etc., July 1964)↩
  4. For the June 27 package, see Document 103. The plan is also outlined in JCS telegram 7146 to CINCPAC, July 29. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. I, Muong Soui—Operation Triangle, 6/64–7/64)↩
  5. In a memorandum to William Bundy, July 23, Assistant Legal Adviser for the Far East Carl F. Salans suggested it would be a mistake to use napalm in Laos. It was an escalatory step out of proportion to the conventional measures employed by the PL/NVN forces and would weaken the case that the operation was defensive. Salans also worried over bombing errors resulting in attacks on nearby small villages. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–10 LAOS)↩