112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

55. Joint State/Defense message. Ref: Vientiane 101 and 102.2

1.
Vientiane’s 102 delayed in transmission. In meantime we had reviewed whole status Operation Triangle with eye to elements changed since we decided to support operation (Deptels 1267 and 1270).3 We fully agree operation well past point of no return and no thought here of changing our decision.
2.
Nonetheless, believe it would be helpful for you to have points that emerged here:
a.
Military situation in operational area itself appears slightly less favorable to anything like full success. Delay has advanced us further into rainy season than Kouprasith and Kong Le originally thought desirable (our June 26 telecon)4 and our analysis photography Route 13 and Route 7 indicates PL have number fairly tough defensive positions and may well have had time to add considerable mining and road block obstacles. We had always realized condition of roads would probably prevent forward movement of artillery after opening phase and that T–28’s would be relied upon, and July experience would suggest that T–28’s would generally be able to operate successfully but may have periods where weather prevents. Our information does not support King’s concern of significantly larger number of PL/VM battalions, but as suggested Embtel 101 there does seem to be possibility some reinforcement through countryside from Sam Neua area or possibly by limited airlift observing radio silence.
b.
On other hand, defense of Muong Soui has clearly been strengthened and we here would suppose it could now be held unless PL/VM bring to bear considerably larger forces than now appear to be deployed directly east of Muong Soui. Artillery balance now appears favorable with Thai in place, and our estimate is that T–28 attacks have had major effect on friendly morale and have also impaired PL supply operations. [Page 234] Also advance of rainy season impairs additional buildup and tends to limit scale of attack.
c.
Although we of course fully anticipated your need for increased attache personnel, number now assigned to Muong Soui plus plan to have both one AARMA and one AIRLO with each advancing column does add up to somewhat greater US exposure than we had fully taken in at time operation approved.
d.
Fact that PL/VM have been lying low opposite Muong Soui, plus Reuters and NCNA stories, have made it far more difficult maintain rationale operation is really defensive in support of Muong Soui. We note line proposed your second para. Embtel 1025 and agree and will fully support here by taking position that operation is defensive even if Muong Soui is not attacked. We of course hope further disclosures plus Lao tendency play operation up can be kept to minimum. However, at best international appearances now likely be somewhat worse than we had hoped when operation approved.
e.
It follows from point (d) above that PL/VM might consider they would be in pretty defensible international position if they retaliated sharply either at Muong Soui or perhaps against Attopeu or elsewhere, thus raising chances of such action in areas where we would have great difficulty countering it without major moves. As you know, we have been reluctant to be drawn into major escalation of Lao fighting at this point and have also been concerned that major operations would throw off any possibility of Polish-type negotiating track and perhaps sharply increase pressures for an immediate Geneva conference. British have been fully briefed and have not expressed concern, but we cannot be sure how they would react if ante raised, and Indian and Soviet positions would certainly be doubtful. We take French sabotage for granted.
f.
Fact that RLG has managed to carry out operation to this point and particularly to strengthen Muong Soui defenses while carrying out continuing effective T–28 attacks may have somewhat diminished need for clear-cut prestige victory to maintain neutralist and rightist morale and avoid excessive rightist pressures on Souvanna.
3.
We repeat above factors do not in our judgment indicate that operation should not proceed or that we should consider changing our decision to support it. At the same time, however, we believe that increase in international risks and difficulties does warrant consideration our making effort to impress on Lao, and say also to Thai, that we [Page 235] believe operation should be carried out in a controlled manner.6 As we see it from analysis your reports, even limited success would do a great deal to assure maintenance of Lao morale and support for Souvanna’s position, while an effort that does not take into account need to maintain adequate defensive posture might weaken the now relatively secure defenses of Muong Soui and lead to a military reverse which the PL/VM may be in a pretty strong position to argue was simply in retaliation for an unprovoked government offensive.
4.
If Vientiane generally concurs in above analysis you are authorized draw on points under paras. 2 and 3 above and with Souvanna and appropriate Lao generals, while of course continuing to assure our support on agreed lines. Bangkok should await Vientiane reaction and report whether approach made and if so review status with appropriate RTG officials in same manner. We understand both Vientiane and Bangkok have already made clear limits our contingency actions as defined Deptel 1267.
5.
As to last para. Embtel 102,7 possible differences in approach based on high visibility Operation Triangle as compared to tendency both by third countries and Communist side regard Corridor as separate problem as to which long-standing violations of Accords pretty well accepted on all sides. Recent increased VC activity in northern areas SVN may also make action Corridor areas both more urgent and more defensible.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy; cleared with McGeorge Bundy, Trueheart, and McNaughton; cleared in substance with Rusk and Forrestal; and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Bangkok and repeated to Saigon, MACV, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. In telegrams 101 and 102 from Vientiane, July 15 and 16, the Embassy estimated that enemy strength inside the Operation Triangle area was three Pathet Lao battalions with North Vietnamese cadres. The Embassy was guardedly optimistic about the operation and urged that the Department put aside its concerns and support it. (Both ibid.)
  3. Documents 104 and 107.
  4. See footnote 3, Document 104.
  5. In this paragraph, the Embassy suggested that neutralist pockets around Muong Kassy and Sala Phou Kou could be induced to ask for relief from Pathet Lao pressures, reminding international public opinion of the defensive nature of the operation and the fact that the neutralists had just as much right to be there as the Pathet Lao.
  6. In telegram 126 from Vientiane, July 20, the Embassy stated it was “on the same wave length” as the Department on Operation Triangle except for the idea that it should be carried out in “controlled manner.” Lao lethargy, lack of organization and follow-through might well make the operation too “controlled,” that is piecemeal and only a minimal success. In telegram 64 to Vientiane, July 20, the Department responded that what it meant by “controlled manner” was that the operation should not expose the RLG/neutralist troops to destructive counterattack by the PL/NVN forces. (Both Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
  7. In this paragraph the Embassy asked why the Department of State was not as concerned about South Vietnamese cross border operations in the Laos corridor as it was about aiding the Lao in defense of their own soil.