Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

85. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, January 12, 1967, 1218Z.

8822. For Bundy. Ref: State 116180.²

1. I can understand that the prospect of another SEATO Council meeting in Washington does not offer great appeal. I can also understand that Thanat might well see special advantages to a meeting of troops contributing nations where he could concert with his Korean colleague on the evolution of a “directorate” for the SEA war. Nevertheless, I am firmly of the opinion that a troop contributing conference would not and could not take the place of the SEATO Council meeting which is already scheduled for April.

2. Not only we but the other SEATO countries contributing forces to Vietnam have repeatedly cast our commitments to Vietnam in the context of our SEATO obligations. We will have to do this again and again. The Secretary will have to emphasize this relationship again in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 16th and 23rd. The Thai will shortly be making a public statement regarding the U.S. use of Thai bases, and this statement will be predicated upon Thai and U.S. obligations under the SEATO Treaty.³ It would be difficult to find a formulation to explain the postponement of an already announced conference of countries participating in the fundamental constitutional structure upon which our position in Vietnam rests. It would be additionally difficult in view of the military advisorsʼ already scheduled meeting to immediately precede SEATO Council meeting.

3. We have come through some difficult times in SEATO and the organization has been strained by the French and Pakistani performance. But we have correctly maintained the position that SEATO plays an important fundamental role in the pattern of security in Southeast Asia. This policy, I think, has been fully vindicated by the presence in SVN of forces from all fimy [four?] SEATO Pacific members. There is growing confidence in Asia that, in the face of our joint determination, Chinese Communism will not be allowed to extend further to the south. This is no time in my opinion to risk any signal which might be interpreted as wavering on our part either by our friends or by our enemies.

4. There is perhaps much to be said for a conference of troop contributors, but, I believe, it should be treated as a separate conference from that of SEATO countries and should not be allowed to appear to substitute for it. The date of the SEATO conference is set and it is widely known that it will take place in April. In setting the date we have taken the position that postponement would pose great administrative problems for us. Under the circumstances I think that a postponement of SEATO in favor of a troop contributors conference would suggest that we are already in the process of scuttling SEATO. I would find it most difficult to imagine a formulation which could adequately explain why this step was taken.⁴

Martin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SEATO 3. Secret; Exdis.
2. In telegram 116180 to Bangkok, January 11, the Department asked for Martinʼs comment on Ruskʼs idea as expressed to Foreign Minister Thanat of Thailand of scheduling a meeting of foreign ministers whose countries contributed troops to the fighting in South Vietnam in place of the SEATO Ministerial meeting which could be postponed. (Ibid.)
3. Apparent reference to a statement made by Thailand on March 22 about U.S. Air Force use of the Thai Air Base at U Tapao; see Document 342.
4. The Department agreed with “general thrust” of Martinʼs “observations on holding SEATO meeting in April, but since the date had not been announced, there was an opportunity to discuss with Thanat the relationship of the troop contributors meeting with the SEATO meeting. (Telegram 119654 to Bangkok, January 16; Department of State, Central Files, SEATO 3)