46. Memorandum of Conversation1

US/MC–3

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE NINTH COUNCIL MEETING OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

Manila, April 13–15, 1964

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • The Secretary of State
    • Mr. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
    • Ambassador Graham Martin, SEATO Council Representative for the United States
    • Laurin B. Askew, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok
  • SEATO
    • Mr. Konthi Suphamongkhon, Secretary General

SUBJECT

  • SEATO Matters

The Secretary General expressed his deep appreciation for the Secretaryʼs support for his appointment as Secretary General of SEATO. He noted he was in the process of consulting the SEATO Council Members concerning the question of the Vietnamese observer at the Council meeting. He described in some detail his recent call on French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville following the latterʼs arrival at Manila. Konthi and French Council Representative Achille Clarac had thereupon explained that observers had been present at almost every Council meeting except the last one in Paris. They went on to describe to Couve the courtesies extended in the past to observers; namely, attendance at the public opening session, participation in social functions, briefing by the host government, and private calls on each of the Council Members. Konthi explained that since the Foreign Minister of Viet-Nam was coming as observer (Konthi had not at that time learned of the substitution of Lien for Quat), the question had been raised whether the Foreign Minister [Page 116] should not be extended the additional privilege of making a statement to the Council. Couve objected vigorously to any such procedure. According to Konthi, Couve said that at the public opening session the Vietnamese observer could be treated just as any other guest, but that he was opposed to having the Vietnamese speak.

Konthi said Couve had observed that Viet-Nam officially was a neutral country under the 1954 Geneva Accord. Konthi rebutted by noting that South Viet-Nam had been made a protocol state of SEATO later that same year, and, in fact, at French request.

Konthi told the Secretary that in discussing this subject with British Council Representative MacDermot the latter had suggested the possibility of a special private meeting of the Council Members to hear the Vietnamese observer, such a meeting not to be part of the regular Council schedule. Ambassador Martin noted that this might run the risk of giving impetus to a “rump” SEATO, and Konthi said Couve could refuse to attend. The Secretary remarked that possibly the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs could arrange such a meeting quietly.

Konthi observed that New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake appeared to have no serious objection to a statement by the Vietnamese but Holyoake had felt the point should not be pressed if one of the Member Countries were violently opposed.

The Secretary said that he had no objection at all to a statement by the Vietnamese to the Council, but that for the time being it might be best to proceed with arrangements for the participation of the Vietnamese observer in the public opening session in accordance with normal past practice. The Secretary mentioned that Foreign Minister Quat probably would leave the public session immediately after the address by the President of the Philippines. Mr. Bundy noted that the Vietnamese observer group was circulating two memoranda to the SEATO Delegations in Manila and that they appeared not to contain any seriously controversial points. Konthi said he had not yet seen the Vietnamese memos.

The Secretary suggested Konthi explain to Foreign Minister Quat that there was no precedent for an observer to address the Council but that of course Quat should go ahead and see the Members bilaterally. Moreover, the memos had served as an expression of Vietnamese views.

Konthi said the French Foreign Minister also had objected to Konthiʼs classified report to the Council.

The Secretary observed there had been some press speculation on the possibility that Viet-Nam and Malaysia might seek membership in SEATO. Konthi said he had been asked that question by reporters and had replied that application for membership was at the initiative of the applicant not of the Treaty Organization. He told the Secretary he had no reliable indication Malaysia was interested in membership, although [Page 117] some political parties in Malaysia had introduced the issue into the election campaign. Konthi said he doubted Viet-Nam would ask formally for SEATO military assistance.

Konthi also described briefly a conversation he had had with Admiral Evenou, French Military Advisor, who had stated that France was unable to commit forces to SEATO defense plans because of large outlays required in Algeria and for the French nuclear program. Konthi said he asked Evenou why France insisted on a nuclear program when there was little hope it could ever amount to much in relation to American nuclear power. Evenou replied that France could not rely on U.S. assistance in time, to which Konthi replied that the United States already had saved France in two world wars without any advance commitment whereas France now had a strong American defense commitment in the form of NATO. To Mr. Bundyʼs comment that Konthi apparently had gotten his revenge for the AFP story, Konthi responded that he had been “terribly misquoted” and went on to describe that AFP had taken his statements out of context and otherwise distorted their meaning. Mr. Bundy assured him that the other press services had reported the statement correctly and that Foreign Minister Quat had indicated he understood the situation.

Konthi said he had not had an opportunity to see Thai Foreign Minister Thanat recently, had heard that Thanat initially proposed not to attend the Manila Council meeting for fear of causing trouble with the French, but that Prime Minister Thanom has instructed Thanat to attend and not be afraid of tangling with Couve.

Returning to the question of observers, the Secretary expressed the hope that suitable arrangements could be worked out quietly in advance and asked Konthi to let him know if there were any serious problems. The Secretary noted that Foreign Secretary Lopez as host could play a useful role. Konthi replied that he could not see how Couve could object to following past practice.

The Secretary said he was looking forward to Konthiʼs prospective visit to Washington and confirmed that President Johnson would be happy to receive the Secretary General at the White House on May 25.

In response to the Secretaryʼs query concerning the state of affairs in Thailand, Konthi said that, unfortunately, there had been considerable publicity over the private affairs of the late Prime Minister. This, he continued, had absorbed a good deal of public attention but the Thai were still very concerned over Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam. Konthi said there continued to be evidence of Communist activities in the northeast, and mentioned that the Mobile Development Unit program was going forward and being extended to the south of the country. Ambassador Martin observed that owing to recent Indonesian infiltrations in South Thailand where remnants of the Malayan CTʼs were still at large, Thai [Page 118] Deputy Defense Minister Dawee had visited Kuala Lumpur and revived the Thai-Malayan border cooperation arrangement.

The Secretary commended Konthi for his report to the Council noting that it would surely stimulate discussion. Konthi said that this had been his purpose since he felt there had been too little discussion in SEATO of serious issues affecting the Treaty Area. He asked the Secretary if he did not also feel that such matters as the French neutralization proposal should be discussed by the Council. The Secretary agreed, noting, however, that the French initiative was still a phrase, rather than a policy, and that he hoped in the course of discussions to find out what it meant.

Konthi observed that Couve had told him the French neutralization proposal applied to Laos, Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. In response to the Secretaryʼs query, Konthi said he was quite sure Couve had said “South Viet-Nam” and had made no reference to North Viet-Nam. Mr. Bundy observed that in Tokyo French Premier Pompidou had stated the proposal applied also to North Viet-Nam, and Konthi observed that this might have been said because of “our” reactions to the initial French initiative. Konthi went on to recall that when he cited the case of Laos as a rather poor example of the results of neutralization, Couve affirmed that he favored real neutrality in Laos and that this meant General Phoumi Nosavan would have to go. Konthi noted he had previously asked Ambassador Martin whether the French were acting against the United States and Thailand in Laos. Ambassador Martin explained we had no confirmation that information gained in the SEATO Military Planning Office was being used by the French in Laos against us. Konthi said Prime Minister Thanom had received reports that the French were actively working to eradicate U.S. and Thai influence in Laos.

The Secretary said he proposed to explore with the French these various problems in some detail while in Manila. He added that he was not at all discouraged about the situation in Southeast Asia and felt that if all free countries having a commitment in the area would pull together there would be no serious problem.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SEATO 3. Confidential. Drafted by Askew and approved by S on April 16. Rusk attended the SEATO Council meeting in Manila, April 13–15.