41. Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State1
ABSTRACT
Australia is about to take a major decision which will affect her role in Southeast Asia for years to come. The choice is likely to be among three alternative strategies: one, continental and off-shore defense; two, Australian forward involvement solely in support of U.S. commitments and presence; three, becoming more involved regionally, independently of the U.S. presence, in political, economic and military terms.
Each of these strategies now commands considerable support in Australian official and governmental circles. The best alternative from the U.S. standpoint is Strategy Three: It would see Australia taking greater responsibility in Southeast Asia and filling a part of the vacuum caused by the British withdrawal after 1971. The United States cannot influence Australian interests, but she can make Strategy Three a more attractive alternative for Australia by:
- —responding positively to an Australian request to clarify the application of ANZUS to Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore;
- —setting up more frequent periodic consultations with Australia on Pacific security and foreign policy problems;
- —taking financial and economic steps which would ease Australian balance of payments difficulties over the next few years, such as increasing U.S. offshore procurement in Australia, reducing barriers to Australian exports to the U.S., and increasing the authorization for Export-Import Bank loans beyond the currently authorized $25 million.
[Here follow a table of contents, “I. Introduction, II. Australian Alternative Strategies, III. Evaluation of Alternative Strategies, IV. Implementation of Preferred Strategy, V. Conclusion,” and an Annex entitled “Model Language for Up-Dating of ANZUS Understanding of October 1963.”]
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Australia, Vol. III, Cables, 6/67–1/69. Secret. There is no indication on the source text as to who drafted it.↩