4. Scope Paper Prepared for the ANZUS Council Meeting1


U.S. Objectives

To help the Governments of Australia and New Zealand to demonstrate to their people that the United States considers the ANZUS Treaty highly significant and that we give full importance to the views of the two countries as expressed in the Council. To demonstrate our common concern for the security of the Southwest Pacific and, through the Council Meeting, to underline the closeness of our association and the importance we attach to Australian and New Zealand participation in Free World efforts in the Far East.
To indicate to the Communist Bloc and to potentially unfriendly nations that ANZUS is a going concern and to demonstrate that the ANZUS partners are deeply concerned over the general security situation in Southeast Asia.
To obtain Australian-New Zealand reactions to our policies, both present and projected, and to put across jointly to them our views.
To express our gratification that both countries have increased their outlays on defense and to express the hope that this trend will continue. To express our understanding of Australian and New Zealand commitments to Malaysia and to express our thanks to both countries for their commitment of military forces to South Viet-Nam.
To reaffirm to Australia and New Zealand our intention of continuing our policy towards Communist China until such time as the Chinese Communists abandon their policy of directing subversion and aggression against Free World nations. To reaffirm our determination to continue supporting the Government of the Republic of China.

Australian Objectives

While expressing general understanding and support for U.S. objectives in the Far East, Australia is likely to press for a further spelling-out of U.S. views on how far hostilities are likely to spread in Viet-Nam, particularly in view of the recent commitment of an Australian battalion there. Regarding Malaysia, Australia may want a reaffirmation of the obligations assumed by the U.S. in the Kennedy-Barwick Memorandum of Understanding of October, 1963 (Tab “D”).2

Australian Minister for External Affairs Hasluck has recently informed our Embassy in Canberra that he considers it essential to achieve the maximum coordination possible of the efforts of the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand in Southeast Asia. Hasluck continues to be greatly concerned at the possibility of conflict between Australiaʼs commitments to the U.S. and to the U.K. and Malaysia, and would very much like to see them coordinated in some way. We believe that quadripartite coordination is a desirable objective, but we have some reservations about the form in which such coordination might best be effected. We will prepare a contingency talking paper for your use should Mr. Hasluck raise this question.3

New Zealand Objectives

The New Zealand Government, which has encountered relatively greater domestic opposition than Australia to the commitment of troops to South Viet-Nam, will probably emphasize the desirability of pressing on to a negotiated settlement in Viet-Nam. New Zealand may raise a formula for the entry of Communist China into the General Assembly of the United Nations in addition to Nationalist China, should the tide of voting turn against us in the U.N. (This question has already been raised by New Zealand in the ANZUS Discussion Group Meeting.)


Opening statements of 15–20 minutes by each principal (e.g., covering Sino-Soviet relations, Commonwealth Prime Ministersʼ meeting, Second Asian-African Conference, India-Pakistan relations).
Security situation in Southeast Asia (with special relation to situation in Indo-China States, Indonesian “confrontation” of Malaysia, Chinese [Page 8] Communist threat to the whole area). Briefings (15 minutes each) on Viet-Nam and Laos by FE; on Indonesian “confrontation” of Malaysia by Air Chief Marshal Scherger.
Chinese Communist representation in the U.N.
Nuclear testing and disarmament (including the nuclear umbrella concept and the implications of Chicom and French testing).
ANZUS Discussion Group.
  1. Source: Department of State, S/S-Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2530. Secret. Drafted by Conlon on June 14 and cleared by William Bundy and Rusk.
  2. See footnote 3, Document 1.
  3. See Document 5.