Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

392. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 9, 1968, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Negotiations (Part I of IV)

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The President
  • Mr. Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
  • Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy
  • Ambassador Leonard Unger
  • Mr. Moncrieff J. Spear, Country Director, Thailand
  • Mr. David Edminister, Department of State—interpreter
• Thai
  • Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn
  • Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
  • Minister of National Development and Economics Pote Sarasin
  • Lt. General Sawaeng Senanarong, Secretary General of Government House
  • Ambassador Bunchana Atthakor

Paris Conversations

The President said that, based on a speech made by Foreign Minister Thanat, our position at Paris would be that the provisions of any peace settlement should be monitored by the Asians themselves. He hoped that Thailand would approach other Asian states such as Japan and Indonesia with regard to the role of the Asian monitors. The Prime Minister asked “Which states?” The President replied Ambassadors Harriman and Vance would be in touch about this after the talks had started and we had consulted our other allies.

The President said that the Thai had found out the night before at the White House dinner how close together we all were—like one family. He noted he had visited Thailand three times and wanted to come again. Foreign Minister Thanat asked him to do so. The Prime Minister then thanked the President for all his kindness, and referred to the useful talks which he had had with Secretary Rusk regarding the Paris talks and ways and means of keeping in close contact. He referred to the Secretaryʼs assurances about the United States negotiating position and expressed the full confidence of the Royal Thai Government in U.S. conduct of the talks.

Three Cautions

The President then cautioned the Prime Minister on three points:

1. The North Vietnamese thought that we lacked the will to carry the struggle in Viet-Nam to a successful conclusion. It was necessary to tell our people that now was the time to put all our resources into the fight and “move the whole stack in”.

2. The North Vietnamese would also be seeking to divide us here in the United States, hoping to win in Washington what they were unable to get on the battlefield. They would refer to corruption in South Viet-Nam, say our allies were shirking their duty, etc. To curb this divisiveness, the President said he had decided to forego seeking another term of office so that he would be freed for the balance of this year to devote his full interest to the struggle in Viet-Nam and negotiations. He had appealed to all candidates not to involve the war in the political campaign. He felt that he had been able to “cool it” a good deal.

3. The enemy was further seeking to divide us from our allies—frightening the Koreans with the prospects of a second front, using similar tactics against Thailand, and trying to convince the Vietnamese that the United States would sell them out. The Communists would also seek to twist the Prime Ministerʼs visit and try to get a fight going in the family. The President hoped we would all be on guard against these tactics.

The press, the President noted, wanted good headlines. If the allies were getting on well, this was not news. But if, for example, there was a story that the Prime Minister had made a mistake or he, the President, had made a mistake, or that our troops were going to be pulled out, this would make the headlines. But, as he had said last night, the Prime Minister shouldnʼt believe such stories.

The Thai could be confident that the President would devote the remainder of his time in office to getting an honorable peace; he was not about to run out on his commitments, his principles, or his friends. Therefore, the Prime Minister should get his 11,000 troops to Viet-Nam just as fast as he could. Our allies are the only friends we have, so we must trust them. One could criticize every country, but it was more important that we spend our time criticizing our enemies, not our friends.

The Prime Minister replied that he fully agreed with the President regarding enemy attempts to sow suspicion and dissension. The Thai would not allow themselves to be duped. At the same time, they were apprehensive about “some in our ranks”. The President, mentioning Senators Fulbright and Kennedy, said he shared this apprehension. The United States, after all, had more of these critics per capita than the Thai.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. VII, 8/67–7/68. Secret. Drafted by Spear and cleared by Bundy. The meeting was held at the White House from 5:11 to 5:36 p.m., according to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Ibid.) Part II, a separate memorandum, was an account of the President congratulating Thanat on his birthday; Part III concerned the increased Thai use of fertilizer and the need for sulphur that Johnson promised to obtain for Thailand from major U.S. producers. (Ibid.) Part IV is Document 393.