Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

384. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, May 3, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with the Prime Minister of Thailand on Thursday, May 9

What We Want

1. Status of Forces Agreement

In order to regularize the legal status of our 47,000 servicemen in Thailand, we have since late 1966 been negotiating with the Thai a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Thai sensitivity to certain aspects of our initial proposals regarding jurisdiction caused the Thai late last year to reject them, and on February 1 we submitted a shorter SOFA draft intended to meet their principal objections. They have indicated informally that our new draft is much more acceptable, and preliminary discussions of some of its provisions are already under way. We expect formal negotiations to resume shortly.

Meanwhile, local political pressures have led the Thai to insist with increasing urgency on assuming jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen accused of crimes involving Thai citizens or property. An Air Force sergeant has been tried, convicted, and sentenced to a fine, and other cases may come to a head in the next few weeks.

We are concerned at the prospect of U.S. military personnel being tried in Thai courts without the protection of a SOFA and fear that Thai termination of the de facto immunity previously accorded our servicemen may remove Thai incentive to make concessions necessary for the conclusion of a mutually acceptable SOFA.

Our Embassy has submitted to the Foreign Ministry a note calling for joint consultations and listing the procedural and legal safeguards which we feel must protect any American serviceman subjected to Thai legal processes in the interim before the SOFA is signed.

Recommended U.S. Position

Emphasize to the Prime Minister and particularly Foreign Minister Thanat (who will handle the negotiations) that we believe a SOFA is the best basis for avoiding or resolving jurisdictional problems. Express our satisfaction that preliminary discussions have started, and press for early agreement. Express the hope that in the interim the established practice of Thai forbearance in jurisdictional matters will be maintained. Thai trials of U.S. servicemen in the absence of a SOFA would create risks of domestic U.S. political problems which could restrict our negotiating flexibility.

2. Balance of Payments Program

Thailandʼs foreign exchange holdings have built up in recent years due partly to U.S. security expenditures. We hope to neutralize the effect of these expenditures on our balance of payments problem by having the Thai Government shift more of its reserves into longer term special Treasury bonds. The President will probably have already raised the question with the Prime Minister. A State-Treasury team will go to Bangkok soon to discuss details with Thai financial officials.

Recommended U.S. Position

Express our appreciation for past Thai cooperation in keeping their reserves in dollars. Thailandʼs growing economic and financial strength should enable the Thai Government to enter into the same type of close cooperation in the financial field that we have engaged in previously in our political, economic and military relations. We would therefore appreciate the support of the Prime Minister and his colleagues for the measures which our Embassy and the Washington team to Bangkok will be discussing shortly for neutralization of U.S. security expenditures in Thailand.

What the Thai Want

1. Vietnam

Thai leaders are most anxious to get at first hand our high-level thinking on where we are headed in the war in Vietnam and in the negotiations. (Thanom and Thanat will be seeing Secretary Clifford and will get a JCS briefing on the military situation in Vietnam.) In the past there has been some Thai criticism that we have not done enough to make Vietnamese forces and programs effective. Thanat has offered to speak to Thieu and Ky about cooperating more closely. The Thai can also be expected to be wary about negotiations with the Communists. They will probably press for full consultations, and if full-scale peace negotiations eventuate, participation. (This latter is by no means certain; Thanom told the press in Brazil on his way here that the Thai would see how the contacts developed and then decide whether to participate or not.)

Recommended U.S. Position

a. Give Thanom a full, frank exposition of our thinking on negotiations—the course of the efforts to make contact, our objectives in the Paris talks, and the basis of our position in any subsequent discussions. Press for full Thai support for these efforts.

b. In view of recent improvements in South Vietnamese perform-ance, and the fact that the Italians have recently braced SVN leaders on the need to work together, we believe Thanatʼs approach at this time might appear to be “ganging up” on the Vietnamese leaders.

2. U.S. Commitment

Thanom and his Ministers will be seeking to make their own assessment of the U.S. political scene as it will affect the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia in general and Thailand in particular. The Prime Minister has asked that some U.S. Air Force units remain in Thailand after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Finance Ministry officials have indicated concern over the possibility of rapid reduction in U.S. war-related spending in Thailand, which could have significant adverse repercussions on the Thai economy.

Recommended U.S. Position

a. Stress the Constitutional basis for the firmness and continuity of our SEATO commitment to Thailand and give the Thai leaders your frank assessment of the position of the leading candidates on U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia and Thailand.

b. Assure Thanom that we will consult on the phase-down of U.S. units in Thailand and on the economic impact of reduced U.S. military spending in order to provide for as smooth a transition as possible.

3. U.S. Support for Thai Counterinsurgency Programs

The Thai have been making progress in countering their insurgency, although major problems remain, particularly in North Thailand. They are reasonably satisfied with the amount and kind of our support for their counterinsurgency effort, but may seek accelerated delivery of MAP and AID equipment.

Our Mission in Bangkok has been studying Thai and U.S. resources, demands against these resources, and burden-sharing. This study indicates in general terms that the Thai are capable of allocating even greater resources than they are now devoting to rural areas threatened by Communist insurgency. The amounts will have to be worked out in Bangkok.

Recommended U.S. Position

a. Compliment Thanom on the success of the Thai approach to the insurgency problem, combining civic development with police and military security measures.

b. Assure him of our continuing support for the Thai counterinsurgency program and of our efforts to expedite deliveries.

c. Tell Thanom we welcome the increasing amounts his Government has been devoting to rural development and counterinsurgency. Express the hope that even greater resources will be made available. (We will be discussing this in greater detail with Thai Budget Bureau Director Renu, who will be with the Prime Minister.)

4. Press Criticism

As you are well aware, Foreign Minister Thanat is sensitive to comments from American press and other sources which he regards as critical of Thailand and of its support for U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. There have been no recent articles to arouse his ire since your last meeting with him in January, but we understand there may be some Time and Newsweek articles stimulated by this visit which could include critical comment.

Recommended U.S. Position

That you handle this in your usual effective manner.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, PM Than-om Kittikachorn Visit Briefing Book, 5/8–9/68. Secret. Drafted by Spear, cleared by Aldrich, Devine of DOD/ISA, John R. Burke of EA/VN, Louis A. Cohen of EA/RA, and William W. Thomas, Jr. of EA.