Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

379. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

Washington, January 27, 1968, 0435Z.

105995. Harriman/Bundy Talk with Thanat.

1. Prior to Secretaryʼs meeting with Thanat, reported septel,² Harriman and Bundy met with him the previous evening. The following were highlights.

2. Cambodia. We described in detail the Bowles mission and went through the current difficulties including the latest incident. We focused on the prospects for ICC expansion, noting that we did not suppose this could do more than ease the problem and spotlight the NVA/VC violations, and giving the current state of Indian indecision and Soviet and Polish negativeness. Thanat seemed to have no problem with the mission or with the objective of ICC expansion, although he was obviously most doubtful that much could be accomplished in this way. He seemed to agree that Sihanoukʼs behavior might conceivably indicate that he thought the wind was blowing in our direction, but clearly felt that any real change in his position would be a long process. We mentioned the question of resumption of relations, making clear that we had the problem under consideration and that the legal effect of possible declarations appeared acceptable and certainly was not designed on our part to state any position on the frontier problems. At the same time, we noted that we would not be acting rapidly in this area and that we continued to feel that US representation in Cambodia might involve embarrassment and conceivably less effectiveness than we had through the Australians. Thanat remarked that he had no problem with our resuming relations with Cambodia, but he said this lightly and we do not suppose that it gives a final reading on Thai reaction to any specific form of declaration and particularly to how Sihanouk might interpret such a declaration publicly—which is of course near the heart of the problem.

3. SOFA and Thai Force Increase. We mentioned briefly the Presidentʼs conversation with Thanom³ and said we thought that mutually agreed timing had just about been worked out. Thanat showed no desire to pursue this. We also mentioned that you had put a new and shorter SOFA draft before the Thai and that this went as far as we reasonably could on the jurisdictional problem. Again Thanat showed no disposition to pursue this, and Ambassador Bunchana [Atthakor] indicated he was generally informed.

4. US Press Criticism of Thailand. As usual, Thanat gave this quite a whirl, and we tried to reassure him that the over-all image of his country was excellent and that he should not take occasional errors or even malevolence too seriously. He did not seem any more persuaded than ever.

5. US Opinion. Thanat expressed familiar doubts whether a “dove” sentiment was gaining and whether the US public really understood the stakes in Southeast Asia. We gave him our clear judgment that the Presidentʼs position had been measurably strengthened in the last three months and that his critics were making little headway and the more extreme ones were discrediting their cause. Thanat responded by referring predictably to Senator Kennedyʼs television show and to what he saw as bias in a great deal of US television and newspaper comment. We conceded that the “doves” were vocal, but reiterated our judgment that our position was on the whole steady and that if anything the swing in public opinion was in a “hawk” direction.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 THAI. Secret: Priority; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Bundy and cleared by Harriman.
2. Thanat met with Rusk on January 26, from 10:35 to 11:20 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) They discussed the Pueblo incident, Vietnamese peace negotiations, Cambodia, U.S. opinion on the war in Vietnam, U.S. troops in Thailand (Thanat praised the conduct of U.S. troops and noted “this was not a problem”), SEATO, and repercussions of the U.S. balance of payments problems on Thailandʼs reserves which were mostly in U.S. dollars. (Memorandum of conversation, January 26; ibid., POL THAI–US)
3. See Document 374.