366. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)1
Dear Bill:
There is something I want to add to the record of my conversation with Pote Sarasin which was conveyed to you in Embassy telegram 4815.2 Pote was quite emphatic in saying that the Thais (and he appeared to be speaking for the leadership here) do not wish to have U.S. ground, combat forces in Thailand even if Thailandʼs security problems grow greater in the future.
He made it clear that this would not apply, of course, if there were an overt Chinese aggression, but in situations short of that Thailand would wish to handle its problem itself without assistance from us in the way of ground forces. Nevertheless, they would probably look for our help with air support and it might also be logical to set up, perhaps in Korat, an American logistic support base to back up the Thai combat effort.
Pote surprised me by going on to say that “we” think it might have been better had U.S. ground combat forces not gone into Vietnam. He stated this as a conclusion reached after some consideration of how the war has developed there and explained that the Thais are persuaded that the American presence has resulted in a reduction of Vietnamese effort and a disposition to leave the fighting to the U.S. He also expressed concern about the growing tendency for the war to become an “American” war and the danger that it even could become a war primarily between Vietnamese and Americans. He emphasized how much use the Communists are able to make of the size and nature of the American involvement, particularly against the background of the earlier experience with the French.
Needless to say, I tried to disabuse Pote of some misconceptions about the situation in Vietnam and also to bring home to him the grave choice we had to face in the spring of 1965 when there was real danger of Vietnamʼs being split into separate parts and its population centers threatened by the Communists. At the same time I acknowledged the dangers of putting our ground forces into Vietnam and told him we shared completely the Thai view that they should do the job themselves here.
[Page 814]I mention all this particularly because of the concern that I know is felt in Washington about our becoming involved in combat with ground forces in Thailand. It also emphasizes, as I see it, the wisdom of our helping the Thais as far as they can make effective use of our help to build up their own strength so that they will in fact be in a position to defend themselves against all but the ultimate threat. As Pote himself said, he would expect American Congressmen to see the advantage of helping with relatively modest amounts of equipment and other support now so that Thailandʼs own soldiers will be in a position to fight their countryʼs battles and a call for U.S. combat assistance will never be made except in extremis.
Pote made clear that he knew he was touching some delicate nerves and that I should be absolutely assured neither he nor anyone in the Thai Government had any intention of making any indelicate or damaging statements. For obvious reasons I am sure you will want to hold this letter very close but at the same time you may feel it worth while to inform a few key individuals of what I believe is an authentic reflection of the thinking of some at least of the Thai leadership.
Yours,