Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

36. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State¹

Canberra, April 6, 1968, 1200Z.

Secto 44. Eyes only for the President from the Secretary.

Following are the highlights of an extended talk I had with Prime Minister Gorton, a portion of which was attended by his Deputy Prime Minister McEwan, Foreign Minister Hasluck and Defense Minister Fairhall.

1. Gorton sent you his warm regards and expressed deep sympathy for the tragic burden thrown upon you and upon the United States by the assassination of Martin Luther King.

2. He expressed some question in his mind about whether a visit by him to Washington would be an intrusion upon you following your announcement not to be a candidate.² I told him that I thought your announcement should not make any difference, that I knew that you were anxious to have a good talk with him and that I would discuss the matter further with you upon my return. He said that the tentative timing (sometime in the latter part of May) has been complicated somewhat by changes in the plans of Prime Minister Ghandiʼs visit to Australia.

3. I think our talk smoothed out any ruffled feathers he might have had about whether he was consulted in a timely fashion about your speech of last Sunday.³ I went into some detail about the decisions you faced about additional troops to Viet-Nam, the call-up of reserves and the need to demonstrate that Hanoi was the obstacle to peace rather than Washington. My impression is that his original irritation was due to (a) the fact that this was his first experience with a change in bombing patterns while it was at least your ninth and that the other chiefs of government have gotten used to the idea; (b) he himself was in New Zealand and was not informed until several hours after he might have been had he been in Canberra; (c) because of transmission procedures our Embassy in Canberra did not have a full official text which it could give the Prime Minister before he began hearing excerpts from it through the press, and (d) his opposition leader Whitlam tried to make the most out of the notion that the United States had adopted Whitlamʼs policy at the expense of the government.

4. Gorton made it clear that he knew that the United States was carrying the overwhelming part of the burden and that Australiaʼs contribution did not give him a license “to throw his weight around.” I think we can give special attention to bilateral consultation with the Australians that will remove any remaining shadow on that score.

5. I briefed him privately on the state of play in the Crocodile Series⁴ and he expressed satisfaction.

6. I raised with him the troop issue and told him that as a minimum Australia and New Zealand should put their heads together and round out their forces with additional support troops to take the place of Americans who were serving the ANZAC forces in a supporting role. Having checked with Sharp and Saigon I specifically mentioned artillery reinforcements and a truck company as examples. I pointed out that it is a serious burden for United States forces to have such a high percentage of its total manpower in Viet-Nam engaged in general logistic support to everyone elseʼs forces. He replied “I have heard what you said” but refused to make any commitment. I had already worked on the Foreign and Defense Ministers on the same point as well as on Keith Holyoake in New Zealand. Gorton thinks he has some political problems about increasing his forces but I pointed out that we all do. We will have to follow up on this further. The less said publicly about asking Australia for more troops the better chance we can get them.

7. I ran into strong reservations about the non-proliferation treaty ranging from basic misgivings about giving up the nuclear option to worries about the fear of limitations on development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.⁵ The general line of questioning was very similar to that we have heard from the Germans. I am taking up with the State Department the possibility of sending an expert technical man out to talk with their Atomic Energy Commission people on a good many points on which we ought to be able to satisfy them. I threw the book at them on the prospects in the event proliferation and pointed out that if Australia ever had to live next door to a nuclear armed Indonesia they would curse the day they refused to give up the nuclear option. There are elements in their Atomic Energy Commission and in their military who are raising the principal problems. Hasluck clearly thinks Australia should sign but my guess is that it will take some time before Australia gets around to that point.

8. The Australians are much preoccupied by the longer range results of the British withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Now that Harold Wilson has achieved his basic purpose of getting his own “little Englanders” to stand still for his far-reaching domestic economic measures, the Australians believe that we ought to press Wilson to back away from his announcement of withdrawal and think hard about further delays and a more significant presence than originally contemplated. I will follow up on this on my return.

9. I found Gorton helpful, friendly and staunch as reflected in Australiaʼs participation in the three conferences we held in New Zealand. But Gorton is a new Prime Minister, with a reputation as a lone wolf in political circles, and apparently inclined to reach snap judgments and personal conclusions before he has considered the full advice of his more experienced colleagues and his departments. He will take a bit of handling but sees the general situation in the Pacific and Australian national interests pretty much as did Holt.

I will have available a more detailed account of my talk with Gorton upon my return.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUSTL–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Rostow sent this telegram to the President on April 7 and there is an indication on the source text that the President saw the telegram. (Note from Rostow to Johnson, April 7; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Australia, Vol. III, Cables, 6/67–1/69.
2. In telegram 144251 to Canberra, April 9, Johnson responded that he hoped that Gorton could visit Washington in May 1968 and that Johnsonʼs recent announcement about his personal plans in no way diminished the need for close consultation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL AUSTL–US)
3. Johnson announced on March 31 that he would not be a candidate for reelection and he was limiting the bombing of North Vietnam. The text of the address is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–1969, Book I, pp. 469–476.
4. The code name for Harrimanʼs direct peace negotiations with North Vietnam.
5. Reported on more fully in Secto 43 from Canberra, April 6. (Department of State, S/S-Conference Files: Lot 68 D 182, CF 275)