Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

316. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 52–66

Washington, July 1, 1966.

COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

The Problem

To assess the threat of Communist insurgency in Thailand over the next year or two.

Conclusions

A. Communist-supported insurgency in Thailand does not constitute a present danger to the stability of the Thai government or a near-term threat to its control over any large section of the country. The guerrilla forces are small and their operations are generally confined to remote and relatively sparsely-populated areas.

B. Nevertheless, the insurgency will probably expand further in geographic scope and intensity over the next year or two.² Its growth will be due primarily to continuing direction, guidance, and support by the Chinese Communists, and to the political and economic vulnerabilities which exist in certain parts of the country, especially the Northeast.

C. In coping with insurgency the Thai government has the advantage of a generally loyal and contented population. Dissidence is not a serious problem in the most populous areas of the country. The government now recognizes the growing dimensions of the threat in the Northeast and the potential threat in the North and the Malay South, and has undertaken major political, economic, and security measures to deal with the situation.

D. Much remains to be done in terms of organization of security forces and in the field of political action before government programs become fully effective. However, barring a collapse of non-Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam, we believe that the problem will remain manageable and that over time the Thai government with US assistance will be able to maintain reasonable levels of security in the Northeast and other possible trouble spots. But a long and costly effort will probably be necessary.

[Here follows the 12-page Discussion portion that includes a map of “Major Ethnic Groups” in Thailand and tables of Thai military force strength (127,700), major Thai police and paramilitary force strength (45,800), and U.S. forces in Thailand (24,470) as of June 23, 1966.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, NIE 52–66. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A covering note on the source text indicates that the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and the NSA prepared this estimate. It was approved on July 1 by all the members of the USIB except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A table of contents and a map of Thailand indicating areas of “Communist Activities and Major U.S. Military Bases” are not printed. In a June 29 memorandum to Hughes, Allen S. Whiting of INR/RFE stated that CIA/ONE initiated this estimate primarily “to put the intelligence communityʼs seal of approval on conclusions that have already become the basis for policy decisions.” Whiting described those agreed conclusions as, “that there is an insurgent threat in Thailand, that it is likely to expand somewhat in the next year or so but not to the point of menacing government stability or control, but that, notwithstanding its present and potential limits, insurgency will be quite an expensive nuisance.” Whiting stated that the DIA was most worried about Thailand becoming “another Vietnam,” but it backed down when challenged by the rest of the intelligence community. (Ibid.)
2. On July 20 McNamara sent a memorandum to Vance referring to this conclusion and its further exposition in the body of the paper. He asked: “Who in our Government is responsible for directing a program to prevent the insurgency from expanding in the next year or two, and who is responsible for correcting the deficiencies in the National Police which is assigned such a major role in counterinsurgency?” McNamara suggested that this issue should be considered by the Senior Review Group. A note on the source text indicated it was to be discussed with Ball, Helms, and Gaud on apparently a more informal basis. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Thailand 370.64)