Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

312. Telegram From the Ambassador to Thailand (Martin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Bangkok, May 7, 1966, 1230Z.

6327. Eyes only Under Secretary Johnson.

1. In your considerations today² of some of the issues which will be vital to the direction Thai policy takes in the future, I venture to place before you and the Secretary the following observations. Although they contain little not already reported, perhaps they will make small contribution in cutting through the many irrelevancies to the root of the matter.

2. My primary immediate concern is rotary air lift for Thai counter-insurgency forces. This problem divides itself into these primary segments.

A. Provision of 10 CH34ʼs already programmed and funded in FY 66 Thai MAP.

(1) Last summer, I requested and received authority to announce to Thai basic level and major investment hardware items. I told Thai of basic level but delayed announcement hardware items until Stilwell could review program. He did and these 10 CH34ʼs were significant item in lists he presented to Thai. Upon receipt OSD funding approval, Thai were notified as we were authorized to do.

(2) In August I frankly told Thanom US dissatisfied with performance RTAF and we saw little chance improvement under Marshal Boonchoo. I was told on my return, Thanom called him in and told him he must go. After emotional scene and copious tears, Thanom gave him one more chance. Boonchoo has been on the wagon ever since. Drunk or sober he is not exactly the greatest leader that ever lived. But the change did snap RTAF out of doldrums and all qualified professional observers attest to the dramatic improvement.

(3) Deficiencies in rotary air lift capability were dramatically impressed on Thai in Phu Phan range operation at turn of year. Thai do not—and I repeat with emphasis—do not want US directly involved in insurgency operations any more than is absolutely essential. They have scrapped all precedent to produce maximum number pilot trainees for both US and local training. The 10 CH34ʼs which have been committed by US in FY 66 are essential for this training and no juggling of statistics across the river can obscure this fact. Additional to these critical practical considerations is the rather simple matter of the USG honoring its promises. As you know, I cleaned up all the old broken promises which had accumulated after your departure and before my arrival, raised enough hell with JUSMAG to insure we promised absolutely nothing we were not absolutely sure we could deliver. In this specific case, I made very clear point with Pentagon that if I was given authority I requested to announce these items to Thai, I must have absolute assurance the commitments would be meticulously honored. This just must be done.

(4) The only remaining problem is the source. I understand reluctance to withdraw anything more from Europe. But there is a simple solution—borrow if necessary from SVN. I know there is a statistical shortage in CH34 requirements. But “requirements” are regarded much more realistically in the field. Westy understands the urgent necessity here, and I am sure out of the 2200 he has he will let me have ten.

B. (1) The second segment of this problem is the problem between now and January when Thai will be able to carry major burden themselves. In 27 April letter from Bill Bundy he said: “Our delay and repeated requests for additional information have, I am sorry to say, been due in part to the negative reactions triggered in many quarters by the very fact that your latest requests came to Washington in such dramatic fashion, and carried to many people here the flavor that high-level visitors had been subjected to a heavy assault by the Thai which seemed to go beyond realistic needs as we saw them”.

(2) I would have thought a few words from him could have dissipated any such reaction. As you and the Secretary recall Honolulu was a rather dramatic affair which caused certain concerns here. I cabled Secretary at Honolulu asking if you might come here to put conference in proper perspective. (In addition to official reasons Jennifer and I would have both been delighted to see you.) Instead of you alone, I got instead the Vice-President, Harriman, Marks, Valenti, Hand, and Cooper accompanied by 50-odd representatives of news media.

(3) Their arrival coincided with reappraisal of Thai after Phou Phan sweep (2A3 above). Rotary lift to multiply effectiveness of scarce manpower by greater mobility was obviously first priority. Thai have great and growing disinclination to have US directly involved. But there is simply no other way to keep pressure on insurgents in interim until Thai pilots and choppers available without asking for our assistance in unmarked helicopters. They did so, not stridently or with suggestion of quid pro quo, but with seriousness and dignity and quiet closing of subject by Thanat: “We are not trying to put our hands in your pocket. We simply want to know whether you can give us this assistance we rather desperately need at the moment.” While I outrank the Vice-President here and did the honors including the toast to the King, etc. I do not know that I should have over-ruled his instructions to address his report to the President. I thought I was skating on rather thin ice when I had message sent through State rather than Army SS channels as directed thinking Ben Read would do what seemed appropriate on routing. In any event, although I could do very little to curtail “dramatics” inherent in visit, I do not really see what this has to do with merits of objective judgment on realistic needs. Recent reporting seems to conclusively establish that even with complete fulfillment of JCS recommendation we could still effectively utilize more.

3. In addition to “dramatics” and “need”, I understand it is argued that this interim help would be too visible. This is not the case. From Udorn we are now dispatching all manner of helicopter lift. USAF unmarked rescue craft, Air America support operations for Laos, USAF support for certain MACV, SOG operations with which you are familiar. This is simply not a problem. Another factor allegedly is that providing this help will slow down Thai efforts to help themselves. The exact contrary is true. I would suppose the “realists” argue against additional commitment. With enormity of US air strength in N.E., I would think we should rather be thinking in terms of protecting that investment by assisting in every way possible the acceleration on Thai momentum in their campaign to contain and eliminate subversion now.

3. I am well aware that we are going through the periodic exercise of “failure scenarios” and the climate of defeatism. The Secretary may remember the early days in G–2 when Col. Truman Smith who had been our military attache in Berlin simply refused to credit the fact that the Russians were beginning to chop up some of his former clients panzer armies. The analogy is not exact but I sometimes fear we become so captivated with the logic of this type of scenario, that we overlook hard objective facts that might disturb the even flow of the logic.

4. I do not for a moment discount the hard days ahead but I believe we are on the verge of breaking the back of the Communists capability to mount or sustain regimental or battalion sized engagements. By this time next year we could be very well back at Geneva or, far preferably, we will have seen repetition of Greek and Malaysian pattern where hostilities gradually tapered off into a manageable police problem.

5. It seems to me that it would be a very grave error to lose the momentum we have so painstakingly built up here. For reasons which as far as I can see are either wholly irrelevant or based on ancient misinformation.

6. I have carried this as far as I can alone, I have given all the information we have. I believe it should permit favorable decision to be made on basis of objective evaluation of all factors involved. I hope that decision will be made by the Secretary, or if this not possible, that it will be taken to the President.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 THAI. Secret; Eyes Only. [text not declassified]
2. Apparent reference to a meeting which eventually took place on May 17. See footnote 2, Document 313.
3. Printed from an unsigned copy.