Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

308. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, February 15, 1966.

DTG 141920. Eyes only for the President from the Vice President and Ambassador Harriman.

1. As I promised in my earlier cable today (Embtel unn, cite 140552Z).² This is further comment on our meeting last evening with the Prime Minister, his two Deputy Prime Ministers, and his senior Cabinet Ministers—Foreign Affairs, Defense, National Development, and Interior. We had already been informed through our intelligence sources of the concern expressed in the Cabinet meeting last week over the Honolulu Conference. Foreign Minister Thanat said that although their fears had been allayed by Ambassador Martinʼs reassurances and your own two recent letters to the Prime Minister, they thought it would be useful to tell me of their concern that we might be contemplating negotiations which would recognize the Viet Cong as a legitimate participant in its own right in some future conference and that we might be contemplating putting pressure on the Republic of Vietnam to accept the Viet Cong in a coalition government. Needless to say, both Averell and I completely reaffirmed Ambassador Martinʼs prior assurances that you would never permit any sort of solution which would turn South Vietnam over to the Viet Cong. I am sure they have accepted this fully but it is startling to realize how much damage is done in this part of the world by the Lippmann columns, the Mansfield report on Cambodia, and particularly Wayne Morseʼs recent statements accusing the Philippines of contemplating sending “mercenary” troops to Vietnam and accusing the Thai of violating international law by permitting us to use their bases to bomb North Vietnam, all of which were mentioned by the Prime Minister. We again made clear that only you speak for the people of the United States and that the people of the United States do fully support the course you are pursuing despite the vocal complaints of a small minority.

2. We then turned to a discussion of the recent upsurge in the terrorist and insurgency activities of the Communists in Thailand. We received a very frank and full report of these activities and of the measures the Thai are taking to meet them, with particular emphasis on the establishment of the new suppression command under General Praphat, the Deputy Prime Minister. We believe that, within their present capabilities, they have moved effectively and aggressively to meet this challenge. At the same time they have reorganized to accelerate their activities in the fields of community development, health, education, and welfare, which they have long realized is a necessary part of suppressive action. But they pointed out they now face an acute problem of resources. Although for almost a decade they have consistently devoted more than 60 percent of their current income for badly needed social and economic development projects and wish to continue this percentage, they cannot do so unless they receive external help to move more rapidly to counter the present stepped-up subversive campaign which is being mounted against them from the outside. This subversion and terror is all part of the Communist attack in S.E. Asia. North Vietnamese troops invade Laos and North Vietnamese and Chinese trained Communist agents infiltrate Thailand in ever increasing numbers. They kill village chiefs, teachers and other leaders just as they began in South Vietnam.

3. Both Averell and I questioned them sharply on the use of their own resources and we are convinced that with the attempts they are making to improve the internal allocation of their own resources, it will be necessary to support them in certain critical fields if they are to move as rapidly and effectively as the situation demands. We both feel, as we believe does Bob McNamara, that it would be a very great mistake for them to cut back on the percentage of the resources they are presently allocating to social and economic development projects. These projects are a vital part of their defense against Communist success. We therefore believe that the action program recommended by Ambassador Martin to the CI Special Group should be implemented fully and rapidly with the full cooperation of all Washington agencies, and we hope that you will so direct.

4. On the immediate situation in the northeast, a primary and vital requirement is for additional helicopter lift to permit the rapid deployment of government forces to engage subversive groups when they are located. General Praphat, with the endorsement of the Prime Minister, specifically requested the immediate provision of the H–34 helicopters in the MAP FY-66 and FY-67 program. These total 22. With this requirement is a priority on pilot training both in Thailand and in the United States. General Praphat said that he recognized our production difficulties and the time required for pilot training. He hoped that both could be expedited, but he emphasized that the need was urgent and immediately present. He therefore said that he had requested in a letter of February 7 to General Stilwell, COMUSMACTHAI, that the U.S. provide immediately one TOE helicopter company, complete with supporting personnel and equipment to furnish direct support to the Communist suppression headquarters. General Praphat said that it would not be desirable for this unit to be identified as U.S. military and that therefore it should be given appropriate cover.

5. The need was also expressed for 12 light Bell 47–J–2A helicopters for use on the border.

6. It was stated that an urgent requirement existed for 30 fast light river craft, with suitable armament to patrol the Mekong and its tributaries to interdict Communist infiltration.

7. To work with these river craft, it was requested that 20 light aircraft, O–1, L–19 type, be furnished with compatible radio equipment.

8. General Praphat specifically pointed out that there was an urgent requirement for M–16 rifles since it was difficult for the Thai to compete with their M–1ʼs against the Communists who are equipped with the Chinese equivalents of the M–16ʼs.

[Here follows the beginning of paragraph 9, which is missing from the source text.] assistance in the provision of training center for special forces troops.

10. Ambassador Martin advises that General Stilwell has already underway request through military channels for the M–16 rifles and for the training center.

11. We believe these requirements to be modest and thoroughly justified and we hope that you will direct that they be promptly met, not only because of the evident, urgent, immediate need of the Thai for this assistance, but because of its effect on our whole position in Southeast Asia for which the continued forthcoming cooperation of the Thai is essential.

12. I am sure you are well informed of the extraordinary degree of Thai cooperation. It is reassuring. Without any specific agreement other than the basic 1950 Military Assistance Agreement, the Thai have nevertheless gone to extraordinary lengths in their cooperation with us. To be sure, they seek to preserve a posture of independence. The Thai will not, except in the event of an overt Chinese aggression, give blanket authority to U.S. military forces to use Thai bases and facilities. They required the daily approval of flights departing from their bases for strikes in other countries. Nevertheless they have taken the unusual step of in effect delegating to Ambassador Martin the authority to extend these approvals in their behalf with notification given to them later on, which avoids any possibility of a leak prior to the actual bombing of the target. Ambassador Martin informs me that not once in the hundreds of times that he has gone to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister for authorizations to conduct our operations has there even been a quid quo pro between such approvals and the amount of our assistance to them. Indeed, as the Foreign Minister said last evening, “we have no intention of putting our hands in your pocket. We simply want to know whether you can provide us these items which we rather desperately need at the moment.”

13. We believe these requests should be met and we further believe that the MAP ceiling which has been requested by General Stilwell for FY-67 in the amount of $70.7 million is realistic and should be approved. Frankly, Iʼm deeply concerned over the step-up of terrorism and Communist infiltration into Thailand. This coupled with the intensified Communist activity in Laos demands our urgent attention and action.

14. On the civilian side, the impression we gained today in a quick look at the A.R.D. program leads us to believe this activity should be substantially accelerated. Though well conceived, program is too limited to meet increasing pressures. Signed Hubert H. Humphrey and Averell Harriman.

Martin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. There was no time of dispatch on the source copy, which was received in the Department of State at 4:39 p.m. on February 14. The DTG used here is from telegram 1618 from Karachi, Document 309. Vice President Humphrey was in Thailand February 12–15—with a brief trip to Vientiane, Laos, on February 14. Humphrey was on a trip of East and South Asia and he visited in addition to Thailand and Laos, South Vietnam, Pakistan, India, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Korea. Memoranda of Humphreyʼs conversations with Foreign Minister Thanat en route between Udorn and Bangkok on February 13, and with Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn at 7 p.m. on Sunday, February 12, prepared in Bangkok by Deputy Chief of Mission James M. Wilson, Jr., are ibid., POL THAI–US.
2. Not found.