287. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1

1409. In reflecting on our recently concluded Baguio discussions2 it has seemed increasingly plain to me that our Thai MAP policy needs [Page 616] some very careful rethinking and a fundamental reorientation in Washington if we are to have any real chance of doing for ourselves here the many essential things we now so clearly need to do in our own interests. I start from a basic premise, which has become I believe, crystal clear to perceptive and discerning minds over the past months: That is the fact that Thailand is now increasingly an integral and vital part of our current operational military complex in SE Asia. Yet, despite the complete comprehension of the members of the Special Group, working level attention to Thai MAP problems seems still to assume Thailand is not involved. Quite the contrary is true.

The Thai contribution is one on which we have had to rely more and more for the conduct of our operations in Laos and South Vietnam. Quite aside from the long list of extraordinarily sensitive activities which the Thai permit us to carry on here and also quite aside from the indirect contributions in artillery, T–28 pilots and “hardnose” operations in Laos, the virtually unrestricted use of Thai bases for US aircraft in Barrel Roll and Rolling Thunder operations has become a pivotal factor in the success of our stepped-up military efforts in SEA. I note, for example, that over half the US aircraft flying in the recent Rolling Thunder missions were from Thai bases.

Our dependence on Thailand, moreover, will clearly increase markedly over the next few months, as witnessed by an ever-growing list of new US requirements for forces and facilities here. In addition to known requirements for reconnaissance aircraft and three additional fighter squadrons spread over four bases, we now have word of an intensive building in logistics support facilities for all three US services and further communications requirements, all of which are immediate in their urgency and all directed not at Thai requirements or desires, but specifically at improving our unilateral security posture and the prosecution of our operations in Laos and South Vietnam.

At same time Thailand itself is increasingly becoming a target for Communist penetration which is in turn related in no small way to what is going on across its borders to the east. While the immediate internal situation is controllable, a major element in determining the success of our joint programs designed to effect that control is the wholehearted support of key elements and personnel in the Thai Government. This is true for both our military and civilian programs. As we said many times before, the key to our ability to persuade the Thai to grant our many requests and to maintain their ready cooperation is our willingness to bring them into the picture, to deal with them as full and equal partners and to make them feel an integral part of what is going on. This has worked well and, for the moment, it would be difficult to conceive of a more cooperative government. Effective diplomacy and a persuasive American mission can continue on present momentum for the immediate [Page 617] future. But in order to continue this effective Thai cooperation we must also be willing to provide necessary and continuing support in the form of US assistance appropriate to current circumstances and clearly in our own interests to provide.

Despite the foregoing, we seem for some reason to insist upon treating Thailand in many ways, so far as MAP policy is concerned, as totally divorced from the SE Asia operational problem. I note in this connection that our old friend Tim Hoopes in his forthcoming trip (DEF 07233),3 which we welcome, will look at Thailand along with all other FE countries except Laos and SVN. In Baguio I was informed that South Vietnam and Laos MAPs are treated separately from other FE country MAPs and afforded absolute priority in funding. But as was brought out vividly and effectively during our discussions, any increased requirements for Laos and SVN under current DOD policy must come out of CINCPACʼs over-all MAP allocations, meaning an inevitable compression of other FE country programs, in which Thailand presumably must share under current ground rules.

This “business as usual” approach to Thai MAP is also reflected in other ways, nowhere perhaps more strikingly than in the handling of our urgent requests for Washington consideration of increases in the FY 1965 and 66 MAP applications for Thailand. (Embtel 1274 and CHJUSMAGʼs 050645Z Mar 65 to CINCPAC.)4 By the time I left Baguio not even our preliminary requests (now refined as indicated in the cited messages and supported by CINCPAC) had reached responsible levels for consideration in the JCS and ISA. Nor do we know where we stand on higher level consideration of Project 22 and the JUSMAG force objectives study of last November on which these recommendations are based. While I hope Hoopes will look at the latter study carefully before he comes out, I nevertheless feel we cannot afford to treat it in a routine manner at home when so much is at stake here.

It seems to me, accordingly, that immediate and serious consideration should be given to doing two things. First, and most urgent from our point of view, is to put the Thai MAP in the same special category as Laos and SVN in simple recognition of the basic fact that our activities here are an integral and inseparable part of the war going on in SE Asia. Secondly, if funds are not otherwise available, immediate favorable consideration must be given to the need for a supplementary MAP appropriations during this fiscal year and appropriate increases in FY 66 to meet the special needs of SE Asia, including Thailand. Without such action we are all in grave danger of being starved to death as we try with [Page 618] artificially constricted assets to meet the ever-increasing and voracious appetites of our neighbors.

Martin
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–3 US–THAI. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to the White House, DOD, JCS, and CINCPAC.
  2. The Far Eastern Chiefs of Mission conference held in Baguio, Philippines.
  3. Not found.
  4. Telegram 1274 from Bangkok, March 5, is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–THAI; CHJUSMAG 05645Z, March 5, has not been found.