In view of the seriousness of the situation in Vietnam and recent
Communist gains in Laos which have combined to heighten apprehension
among our Asian allies regarding our willingness to take effective
countermeasures, I believe that some urgent thought should be given to
improving Thai capabilities and bolstering their resolve to stick with
us in the days ahead. I do not suggest that a few million dollars added
to the MAP will do the trick. On the other hand, when the Thais learn
that the FYʼ64 level is some $30 million
less than the last two years, they are bound to react rather strongly.
This would be most unfortunate at this juncture, and I think we should
be prepared to advance a series of proposals designed to reassure the
Thais of our continued interest in their security.
The attached paper was prepared with these thoughts in mind. I believe
that you will find it useful in discussions in Hawaii regarding
Thailandʼs role in the present crisis.2
Enclosure4
INCREASED ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND
Recent reports from our Embassy in Bangkok warn of growing Thai
apprehension over their vulnerability to attack by regular Viet Minh
or
[Page 585]
ChiCom units and their
close alignment with the U.S.5 An
irresolute or weakened Thailand would add unreasonably to our
problems in South-east Asia. Moreover, recent developments in Laos
and Vietnam clearly call for bringing Thai conventional forces up to
combat strength and for other measures needed to give key Thai
leaders cause to value rather than doubt their commitment to the
West.
Irrespective of whether we deploy troops to Thailand again, the Thai
Army of some 80,000 men is an important element in the balance of
power equation in the area. By Asian standards it is well armed,
led, and trained. Many of its officers and non-coms experienced
combat in Korea. Thai forces could provide an effective
counterweight to Viet Minh cadres or regulars operating in Laos or
possibly even Vietnam, if brought up to strength and properly
supported.
In the past, the Thai Army has concentrated on conventional ground
defense tactics, although recently some attention has been given to
counterinsurgency. The chief weaknesses of the Thai forces are
insufficient combined arms and field training of units larger than
battalion and lack of an effective logistics system to support
sustained combat operations of a conventional type. However, at
present, they are given the capability of conducting regimental and
battalion sized delaying actions along the Mekong and in the north
against ChiCom or Viet Minh attacks, assuming appropriate U.S.
logistical support.
The present Thai defense budget, of some $82 million, which is about
2.5% of GNP, supports a total of
120,000 men. However, it does not provide adequate allowances for
field training, for civic action programs, or for recruits needed to
bring regular units up to combat strength.
In order to enhance their military capabilities and to minimize
chances of their deserting the Western camp—either from fear of
being abandoned first or from a simple calculation of opposing
military strength, urgent consideration should be given to the
following specific actions:
- 1.
- Inform the Thais of our willingness to suspend all further
MAP transfers, chiefly POL, for the duration of the crises
in SEA—some $1.2 million is scheduled to be transferred in
FY65. The Thai reaction to our deletion of these so-called
commercial consumables from the MAP was extremely bitter and
not yet dissipated.
- 2.
- Indicate willingness to negotiate a new MAP package
covering the next several years—this should include
equipment and training to cover those deficiencies most
relevant to improving the capability of Thai forces to
defend the border areas or to intervene in Laos, if
required. It should also contain specific increments of
force maintenance, such as construction or consumables,
necessary to induce the Thais to train, man, and deploy
their forces more effectively, e.g., agreeing to assume
responsibility for providing POL and/or providing additional
funds for construction in certain exposed areas, if the
Thais provide sufficient funds to bring their regular units
up to strength, for field exercises (per diem) and better
maintenance of U.S. equipment. Such an agreement would go
far to dispel Thai suspicion regarding the firmness of our
commitments to their security and provide them with a more
reliable basis for their own budgetary planning over the
next several years.
- 3.
- We might also propose to deploy on a “permanent” basis one
or more battalion combat teams plus stocking additional war
materiel should the Thais insist that the situation calls
for such additional commitments, an.
- 4.
-
AID should accelerate and
augment its plans for improving the Border Patrol and other
paramilitary forces, such as the Police Aerial Reinforcement
Unit (PARU) and the
Provincial Police.
These steps in themselves may not be sufficient to induce the Thais
to take whatever measures our mutual interests may require to save
the rest of Southeast Asia from Communist domination, but they do
represent certain minimum measures which might be taken now as
evidence of our willingness to act in the face of clear and present
danger to the vital interests of our allies.
Additional MAP funds required to fulfill these agreements could be
obtained from either larger transfers from AID accounts in FY64–65 or deviations from other
programs judged less urgent—as we have done for Vietnam and Laos
over the past several years.
In any event, it is not too soon to prepare a “second line of
defense” in Asia in the event of a complete collapse of the
Neutralists and FAR in Laos and/or a
Communist victory in South Vietnam. The Thais and Filipinos may be
constrained to accommodate to a new balance-of-power in SEA, but, at
a minimum, can be counted on to defend their own independence with
whatever means are available.6
