I had the attached paper prepared on receipt of my copy of your
memorandum of May 1 to Bill Bundy on Laos and the possibility of moving
some forces into Thailand as a signal to the Pathet Lao and to
Hanoi.2
As our review indicates, a mere “show of force” in Thailand without a
specific objective would not appear to have the proper effect on the
Communists, but would reduce reaction time if those forces were to be
employed.
Attachment
Washington, May 13, 1964.
Memorandum From the Director, Far East Region
(Blouin) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (Solbert)4
I–35889/64
SUBJECT
- Alternatives for Movement of U.S. Forces to Thailand
In response to your note concerning Mr. Forrestalʼs memorandum of May
1, alternatives for the possible movement of some forces into
Thailand have been reviewed.
[Page 580]
U.S. plans provide for detailed actions for such contingencies. These
plans, on which you have been briefed, provide for phased actions by
U.S. forces. Actions range from deployment from forward areas into
the most important strategic areas of Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, to
the deployment of major units from the Pacific and CONUS to defeat external aggression
by North Vietnam or by Communist China.
As in the past, actions can be taken to signal the Pathet Lao and
Hanoi against resorting to military aggression. The actions planned
in the event of insurgency in Laos would satisfy the maximum
requirement for stabilization. The forces listed in this phase of
the plans could equally well be positioned at locations on the Thai
side (Ubon and Udorn), as in their planned positions.
An outline of the forces readily available is provided in the
enclosure. If more detailed proposals are desired, we should prepare
a memorandum for the Chairman, seeking additional JCS views.
A review of fairly recent actions of a “signal” nature may assist in
visualizing an outline of possible moves. In 1962, an Infantry
Battle Group (minus) (now referred to as a “Brigade Task Force”) of
some 2,000 men was engaged in training exercises in Thailand
following exercise “Air Cobra.” On the fall of Nam Tha, Laos, these
units were left in Thailand and additional forces were moved in. The
additional forces included a Tactical Fighter Squadron of four
F–100ʼs for an operational visit, a Marine Air Wing, the offloading
of the Amphibious Ready Group in Bangkok and airlifting them to
Odorn, and elements of the Ninth Logistic Command. About 6,400
personnel were involved. These forces remained in Thailand until the
Laos situation had been normalized sufficiently to warrant their
withdrawal. It should be particularly noted that a delay of about
one full week was experienced in obtaining Thai agreement for these
forces to go in.
In 1963, consideration was given to an early movement into Thailand
of those forces earmarked for SEATO exercise “DHANARAJATA”. The forces under
consideration were an Infantry Battle Group, an Airborne Battle
Group, one Tactical Fighter Squadron, a reconnaissance squadron and
supporting logistic elements, totalling about 5,000 men. Although
reluctant to agree, Dawee conceded to their coming in about ten days
early and remaining for two or three weeks after the exercise,
provided a big show was not made of it. His reluctance was
attributed to the known resistance of Thanom and Thanat to U.S.
forces there. Movement of the forces commenced two weeks early and
major units were in place by the starting date of the exercise.
Upon the conclusion of the exercise, 1700 troops including an
Infantry Battle Group with artillery and engineer units remained for
three weeks as a show of force, participating in three route
reconnaissance marches in the vicinity of the Laos border. There
were no incidents.
[Page 581]
In early 1963 a joint US/Thai amphibious exercise “Jungle Drum” was
conducted in the Sattahip area.
As a matter of interest and possible use in planning, time and cost
estimates for the movement of a Battle Group from Hawaii to
Thailand, worked up in 1963 were as follows:
- Air (MATS), 23 sorties by C–135 aircraft—6 days. Using 12
C–135 aircraft, the move could be made in three days at a
cost of $622,135.
- Sea (MSTS), 13 to 15 days from availability of shipping in
Hawaii—$448,000. The latter figure includes an estimate of
costs for diversion of other cargo.
In light of the history of prior actions of a similar nature, it
would appear that this tactic has been used too many times in the
past to be of further effectiveness. In this regard, we are inclined
to agree with the Ambassador that a deployment into Thailand merely
as a show of force without an operation convincingly designed to
halt the Communists would be of doubtful effect. Informal liaison
indicates that the JCS may also
consider such movement to be of little value without a specific
further objective. There is no question but that deployment of
forces into Thailand would shorten reaction times.
F.J. Blouin
5
Rear Admiral, USN
