249. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Presidentʼs
Special Assistant (Rostow)1
Washington, September 24, 1968.
Here is a memorandum plus a study on Cambodiaʼs boundary problems.2 The memorandum was written as a result of my request
for information on this subject. You may be far more knowledgeable than
I, but I thought you might be interested to glance over this
material.
Attachment
Washington, September 24,
1968.
Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence
Agency
SUBJECT
- The Cambodian Border Problem
- 1.
- Cambodiaʼs continuing effort to secure international
recognition of its frontiers is essentially an attempt to get as
many major powers as possible at least morally committed to the
continued existence of Cambodia as a nation. To Prince Sihanouk (and many other
Cambodians) the central theme of modern Cambodian history has
been that of unrelenting pressure on Cambodian territory by the
neighboring Thai and Vietnamese. To virtually all Cambodians
this is an emotionally charged and very real issue. Militarily
weak and so far unable to secure boundary treaties or agreements
with Thailand and South Vietnam, Sihanouk has come to rely on diplomacy among the
major powers as the best means to safeguard Cambodian territory
against the Thai and Vietnamese encroachments he believes will
inevitably follow the end of the war in Vietnam, whoever
wins.
- 2.
-
Sihanoukʼs genuine
concern for Cambodiaʼs territorial integrity is overlaid and
complicated by other facets of the mercurial Princeʼs complex
personality. He almost certainly believes that Ho Chi Minh is
eventually going to win the Vietnam war and unify Vietnam under
Hanoiʼs rule. Though Sihanouk is apparently convinced that the
leaders of any unified Vietnam, once free of pressing internal
concerns, will probably try to establish suzerainty over (or
dismember) Cambodia, Sihanouk seems anxious to build as much good
will capital as possible with Hanoi. He also has a strong
personal dislike for the Saigon government which dates back to
the Diem era. Sihanoukʼs
sensitivity on the border question is constantly irritated by
the inevitable border incidents—real or imaginary—between allied
forces and Communist units using Cambodian territory for refuge,
sanctuary, or staging purposes. Anxious to build his capital
with Hanoi, acutely aware of Cambodiaʼs military weaknesses and
personally piqued at the US and Saigon, Sihanouk turns a blind eye to
the full extent of Communist use of Cambodian territory and
consistently employs a double standard under which he holds the
Government of Vietnam and its allies (i.e. the US) primarily
responsible for any border incidents or violations which
allegedly occur.
- 3.
- To a dispassionate observer (which Sihanouk is not), settlement of the existing
border conflicts between Cambodia and its neighbors, South
Vietnam and Thailand, would appear to be a relatively easy legal
and cartographic task (though actual demarcation on the ground
would be difficult so long as hostilities persist in South
Vietnam). The areas in dispute are small, sparsely populated,
and of little intrinsic value. The dispute with Thailand centers
on the ownership of a politically sensitive temple site known as
Preah Vihear, which is in Cambodian hands as a result of a 1961
World Court decision. The Thai want at least a share in its
administration. Sihanoukʼs border problems with South Vietnam are
more numerous and result from differing interpretations of
French maps and documents demarcating the boundary.
- 4.
- In Cambodian eyes, there are at least eight areas in dispute
with South Vietnam, including certain small islands in the Gulf
of Siam, but Cambodia is constantly adding to the number,
apparently in response to the course of military operations by
allied forces. (Several of the disputed areas have been the
scene of heavy fighting in recent years.) The areas in dispute
include a few square miles in Cambodiaʼs northeastern salient, a
few square miles west of Duc Co along Route 19, a few square
miles west of the Chu Pong Mountains in the upper Ia Drang
region, a 21-square-mile area southwest of Duc Lap, a small area
northeast of Bu Dop, and another northwest of Loc Ninh. There is also a recent
Cambodian claim to a fairly broad area along the northern
frontier of South Vietnamʼs Tay Ninh Province; a sensitive
region and the site of major Viet Cong bases. Farther south in
the Mekong Delta, the Cambodians have a few minor [Page 549] claims along the
courses of the Mekong and its numerous distributaries. In the
Gulf of Siam, Cambodia is concerned lest it lose control of
certain disputed islands which screen its ports of Kep and
Ream.3
- 5.
- Even in aggregate total, Cambodiaʼs disputed border areas are
of little or no intrinsic value to either party. Attempts at
settlement are greatly complicated, however, by the deep-seated
animosities among the nations and personalities primarily
involved, which show few signs of abating in the near future.
Any US move to meet Sihanoukʼs demands on the border question,
therefore, would almost certainly produce unfavorable
repercussions in Bangkok and Saigon.
- 6.
- Another problem for the US is Sihanoukʼs inflexibility with regard to the
wording of the statements he is seeking on the border question.
He demands respect for and recognition of the sovereignty of
Cambodia “within the limits of its present frontiers.” He
rejects as inadequate any formulation which merely recognizes
the “inviolability” of Cambodiaʼs present frontiers. In essence,
Sihanouk considers unacceptable any third country endorsement of
Cambodiaʼs frontiers which does not at least by implication
favor Cambodia. The US, United Kingdom, and Japan are the only
major powers that have not already satisfied him on this score
and there are signs that the Japanese are on the verge of making
the kind of statement Sihanouk is seeking.
- 7.
- For Sihanouk, in short,
the border issue is at least as much one of emotion as one of
substance. Even if the US should make a statement conforming to
Sihanoukʼs
wishes—and, for that matter, even if Thailand and South Vietnam
actually settled the legal and cartographic issues
involved—border incidents and alleged violations would be
certain to occur so long as Cambodiaʼs relations with its Thai
and Vietnamese neighbors remain marked by reciprocal hostility
and, particularly, so long as the war continues in South
Vietnam.
