243. Letter From Senator Mike Mansfield to Secretary of State Rusk1
Dear Dean:
I have given further thought to our conversation this morning. It seems doubtful that a letter from me to Prince Sihanouk on the subject would be useful at this time. There may be a chance, however, that in certain circumstances, it might be constructive for me to write him in connection with the setting up of an I.C.C. border patrol.
The circumstances, as I see them, would be the following:
- 1.
- If we were to seek a satisfactory settlement of the recent naval incident. I should think that the amicable return of the ship might involve willingness to give assurances that future violations of the border by our forces, except in hot pursuit, would properly be a subject for disciplinary action as well as for apology and prompt compensation for damage. It may also involve a readiness to face up to the border question and go as far as Australia and other Western countries have gone in this connection.
- 2.
- If we were to call to Sihanoukʼs attention, through Australian or other diplomatic channels, our concern over the tangible evidence of the Viet buildup in Cambodia. We might request that the Prince ask for an I.C.C. investigation of the locations which our intelligence has pinpointed. Sihanouk has said, I believe, that he is prepared for investigations of specific allegations. If the buildup is as extensive as the intelligence suggests, I doubt that it could be hidden from an I.C.C. group.
- 3.
- If a tactful request for an investigation is refused by Sihanouk and we were prepared to bring the matter to the U.N. or, alternatively, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were prepared to call for a convening of the Geneva Conference of 1962. In this fashion, it ought to be possible to press for an immediate and impartial investigation.
In the above fashion, I believe we could establish a firm basis for pressing for a permanent I.C.C. patrol on the border. To call for the patrol, however, without these preliminaries, is not likely to be productive. On the contrary, the call is likely to embarrass Sihanouk and, therefore, to intensify his hostility without any benefit to us. After all, he has already had a very cold reaction from Viet sources when he cautiously let it be known after the Bowles mission that he was weighing the proposition for an I.C.C. patrol. To press again may well be seen by him as an effort to compel Cambodia to side with us.
[Page 539]If circumstances permit you to move along the lines of the three points listed above, there could emerge a situation which would be conducive to my making the kind of proposal which you suggested. In any event, I should be happy to hear from you further, if I can be of any assistance.
With best personal wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33–4 CAMB–US. No classification marking.↩