Office of the Historian

230. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1

New Delhi, January 12, 1968, 1653Z.

Unnumbered. To the President and Secretary of State.

1.
By the time you receive this cable you should have on your desks all our reports from Phnom Penh including my personal estimate of the situation.2 The purpose of this special message is to express my conviction that we should do whatever we reasonably can to re-establish normal diplomatic relations with Cambodia. There are a number of advantages:
A.
A small but experienced US Mission in Phnom Penh would help to hold the line in regard to the agreement we have just reached and perhaps gradually open door for broader understanding and ultimately even cooperation.
B.
Cambodiaʼs apparent willingness to establish normal relations with USG would be clear signal that Sihanouk, an astute Asian political [Page 511] leader, no longer assumes that the Communists may force the US out of East Asia.
c.
The restoration of normal relations with Cambodia would also have reassuring effect not only on our friends and neutrals overseas but on the American people.
d.
Sihanoukʼs change of direction would arouse bitter attacks by Chinese, NLF and NVN and possibly Soviets which would further promote favorable US image as a nation eager for peace.
2.
At present the administration is often charged, however unreasonably, with a rigid and uncompromising view in regard to negotiations in Southeast Asia. This criticism could be significantly eased if we could announce in reasonably near future that we have not only reached an understanding with Sihanouk in regard to the ICC role in curbing Viet Cong-NVN infiltration but also have restored normal diplomatic relations with Cambodia.
3.
On several occasions the Prince, Son Sann, and the C-in-C General Nhiek Tioulong, as well as others, urged me to maintain close contact with Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimny in New Delhi. With your approval it should be possible for me over next few weeks quietly to determine basis on which normal relations could be established. If understanding is reached through Nong Kimny, I could return to Phnom Penh and complete negotiations with the Prince.
4.
I realize that such a move would be frowned on both in Bangkok and Saigon. However, I cannot see why we should allow two countries which are totally dependent on USG for their survival to veto a policy decision which would significantly promote national interests of USG as well as their own security.3
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB–US. Secret; Eyes Only; handled as Exdis. A copy of this telegram was sent to the Johnson Ranch as CAP 80311, January 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia 5E (2)a, 1/68–10/68)↩
  2. Telegrams reporting on the progress of Bowlesʼ Mission are ibid., POL 7 US/Bowles. For Bowlesʼ assessment, see Document 229.↩
  3. Printed from an unsigned copy.↩