Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

228. Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, January 10, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Possible U.S. Statement on Territorial Integrity of Cambodia

For over a year the United States has confronted the issue of whether to make a declaration affirming U.S. respect and/or recognition for the territorial integrity of Cambodia within its present borders. During most of this period the issue has been considered in the context of a possible resumption of diplomatic relations. In the last week the issue has come up in the additional context of the Bowles mission. Ambassador Bowles himself has asked what flexibility he might have on a statement if this became a significant element in his discussions. At the first meeting in Phnom Penh on January 9, Prime Minister Son Sann made a general reference to the matter in saying “A primary consideration of Cambodiaʼs foreign policy concerns the recognition of Cambodian borders.” In a subsequent meeting, he or Prince Sihanouk might bring the border question directly into the conversation and ask what kind of declaration the United States would be prepared to make as part of whatever arrangement we might work out concerning ICC operations and VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory. We should be in a position to respond promptly if this occurs. Ambassador Bowlesʼ initial instructions were understandably reserved on the issue of a border statement, but we believe the United States enjoys considerable flexibility about this whenever it may become useful to engage in discussion of the subject with Cambodia.

In essence, a U.S. declaration would state that the United States respects the sovereignty, independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia within its present frontiers and recognizes the inviolability of these frontiers. Such a statement says two things. First, it says that we respect the territorial integrity of Cambodia within its present frontiers—without defining what those frontiers are or committing ourselves to the precise borders claimed by Cambodia. A declaration in the form outlined above would not commit the United States to any position on the precise location of boundary lines where those lines may be subject to dispute. It would commit the United States to oppose any large-scale irredentist claims. Some claims of this nature were advanced by the Diem regime a number of years ago and were reciprocated by equally flimsy claims on the part of Cambodia.

Second, such a declaration would say that we recognize Cambodiaʼs lawful frontiers, whatever they may be, to be inviolable. This would certainly be construed as an undertaking not to change Cambodiaʼs frontiers by force. This is the sense in which Sihanouk and declaring governments have used the term “inviolable”. Recognition of inviolability of frontiers could also be asserted to mean that incursions across these frontiers into Cambodian territory would not be made unless there was a legitimate basis for doing so under the United Nations Charter. One such basis, recognized by Article 51 of the Charter, is the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. Prince Sihanoukʼs recent statements regarding possible U.S. incursions into Cambodia to pursue NVN/VC forces operating illegally there seem to recognize this self-defense exception to the inviolability of Cambodiaʼs borders. In making any statement that included the concept of inviolability, we would want it made clear to all—Sihanouk included—that inviolability does not, of course, imply an obligation not to cross a border temporarily when there is a legitimate reason—such as self-defense—for doing so.

In summary, a declaration respecting Cambodiaʼs territorial integrity and recognizing the inviolability of its frontiers would commit us to no more than is already in the United Nations Charter.

Some arguments have been advanced against a U.S. declaration on Cambodiaʼs territorial integrity. First, that Australiaʼs experience with such a declaration was unsatisfactory. If Sihanouk should try to interpret a U.S. declaration as supporting his claims as to the precise location of boundaries, we could, of course, do what Australia did and make it plain that we support the territorial integrity of all countries in the area. Indeed, if any U.S. declaration were to grow out of the Bowles mission, we could let the Cambodians know very clearly what our interpretation of the statement was. We might wish to preface the declaration with an explanatory clause designed to show that it constituted one particular application of a general principle. For example, we could include in our declaration the statement that it was being made “in accordance with the Principles of the United Nations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter”.

The suggestion has also been made that a U.S. declaration would offend Thai and South Vietnamese sensitivities on the issue of borders. In the case of Thailand, this seems particularly unlikely. Foreign Minister Thanat has said that Thailand has no border disputes with Cambodia—apart from the question of the Temple of Preah Vihear, as to which he made a reservation to the 1962 decision of the International Court of Justice that has no effect. In the case of South Viet Nam, it may be noted that there has been no reaction from Saigon to the various statements made by other governments concerning Cambodiaʼs territorial integrity. Such statements have been made by France, Singapore, Australia, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Japanese have now told us that they will probably make such a statement within the next few days.

Moreover, there might be the following disadvantage in refusing to make a statement on Cambodiaʼs territorial integrity if the issue should be pressed by the Cambodians: our refusal could be taken as implying that the statements made by a number of other countries do endorse Cambodiaʼs claims as to the precise location of its boundaries in areas where there are disputes—principally the boundary with South Viet Nam.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 CAMB. Secret. Drafted by Meeker, Salans, and Aldrich. Copies sent to Harriman and Bundy.