Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

226. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas¹

Washington, January 3, 1968.

CAP 80079. Subject: Bowlesʼ Mission to Cambodia.

Sihanouk has put a 24-hour hold on the announcement of the mission for “technical reasons.”

Following are the instructions to the Bowlesʼ mission. The cable has been personally cleared by both Rusk and McNamara.

There is ample time for any changes you may direct.

The instructions look good to me.

Subject: Substantive Instructions for Bowles Mission.

1. Following substantive instructions are for personal use of Ambassador and his group, and at Saigon, Bangkok and Canberra should go initially to Locke, Westmoreland and Calhoun, and to Unger and Cronk only. We expect to send instructions tomorrow to Saigon and Bangkok as to those parts that should be the subject of coordination in respective capitals, and would welcome your suggestions in this regard to reach us by tomorrow morning. However, instructions themselves should be held in closest confidence at all times.

2. Subject any further amendments that may be decided here, following is text of instructions. In view of our close ties to the Australians and our probable continuing dependence on their channel, we would expect to share whole of instructions with them, subject to any comment you may have.

Begin Text.

A. Review of U.S. Policy

3. The basic U.S. policy toward Cambodia remains recognition of its sovereignty, independence, neutrality and territorial integrity. We do not seek to engage Cambodia in the war in Viet-Nam, nor do we seek to expand the war to Cambodian territory. It is evident to all, and has been publicly recognized by Prince Sihanouk, that the U.S. has been acting with great restraint. It wishes to continue to do so.

4. Whereas the United States Government does not speak for the Government of South Viet-Nam, we have every reason to believe that U.S. respect for the sovereignty of Cambodia, as expressed above, is adhered to by the South Vietnamese.

5. It has been increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain a policy of respect for Cambodiaʼs position in the face of continuous and intensified violation of Cambodiaʼs sovereignty by the VC and NVA forces. It is our concern for the consequences if our position in Viet-Nam were to continue to be jeopardized by Viet Cong utilization of Cambodian territory, that has led us to propose careful consideration of meas-ures to meet the needs of the situation.

B. General Approach

6. We should convey to Prince Sihanouk from the outset the seriousness with which the United States views the problems resulting from VC and NVA use of Cambodian territory. Sihanouk should not be left under any illusion that we would be satisfied with lip service paid to the problem nor would we accept promises that cannot be translated into reality. Our general stance should be one of firmness and realism.

7. It is important that Sihanouk have a clear view of what the United States Government believes is going on inside Cambodia, and the depth and extent of our growing concern. We cannot afford to leave Sihanouk with the impression that having gone through the exercise of talking about the problem and making a few gestures toward translation into practical measures, we would then be satisfied to abandon our often expressed concern over the misuse of his territory.

8. We believe that Sihanouk has agreed to talks because he is genuinely concerned about the imminent possibility of large-scale U.S. military action against VC/NVA forces in the border areas of Cambodia. Without threatening Cambodia, we do not wish to diminish his concern. Additionally we do not wish to foreclose any future courses of action which we may feel are necessary. We would not be prepared to deny ourselves the right to take action in Cambodia simply because he has agreed to discuss the problem The talks themselves are not sufficient. There has to be some definite indication of practical and useful results in respect to measures to inhibit the enemyʼs unauthorized use of Cambodian territory.

9. Our general approach envisages the following possible results consistent with our objectives: a) expansion of the competence of the ICC to deal with border violations; b) increased Cambodian efforts to deal with the problem; and c) some reasonably clear indication of what unilateral U.S. activity Sihanouk is prepared to allow on Cambodian territory to meet a direct threat from enemy forces.

C. Nature of the Problem

10. The United States has submitted under cover of its note of December 4,² evidence of the increasing use of Cambodian territory by VC/NVA forces. That material is only a small part of a larger body of evidence. We are also prepared to provide additional evidence along these lines, establishing without question the growing reliance of the enemy on Cambodian sanctuary and base areas.

11. We do not accuse Cambodia of complicity with Viet Cong and NVA forces. We are willing to regard enemy activity in Cambodia as a mutual problem subject to reasonable solution. Moreover, we believe that Cambodia can take measures both through its own efforts and through the efforts of the international control commission to restrict such misuse of its territory. We are aware that at times the Cambodian Government has been able to prevent unauthorized use of its territory. We welcome this and urge that such efforts be increased. We are also aware that Cambodia has expressed its willingness to have the International Control Commission fulfill its functions with greater efficiency. It is to this proposition that we now wish to address ourselves in some detail.

D. Focus on the ICC

12. The United States seeks an impartial and effective means of establishing the facts along the border. We have consistently supported the Cambodian Government in its expressed desire to make the ICC a more effective instrument for protecting the neutral status of Cambodian territory.

13. Frontier and territorial violation by the VC/NVA forces can be detected and observed by the ICC if it is given the equipment, information and the direction required. The need for more facilities and equipment, more personnel, and more efficient impartial operating methods, has been recognized by interested parties. We have already offered assistance in the form of helicopters and stand ready to consider sympathetically any further request for material assistance which would increase the effectiveness of the ICC operation. We do not restrict our offer of assistance to helicopters but would be prepared to consider requests for other types of communication and transportation equipment useful in the task.

14. There may be some question as to the willingness of the international commission to receive material assistance from the United States directly. We do not see anything in the terms of the agreement that would prevent such transfer. However, if it becomes an issue we would be prepared to provide the equipment on loan to the Cambodian Government for subsequent transfer to the commission.

15. The Government of Cambodia has on a number of occasions expressed the desire for the assistance of the ICC in monitoring activity along its borders and main ports of entry. Past ineffectiveness of the ICC is not simply a consequence of insufficient equipment but also stems from inadequate operational procedures. We see the need for a number of changes. For example, we hope the commission will establish fixed posts in key areas, institute procedures for random investigations of suspected violations, and aggressively follow up on information supplied to the commission. The ICC should be urged to conduct investigations at its own initiative, as well as in response to specific requests.

16. The important thing is for the commission to accept its responsibilities for proper administration of those aspects of the agreement with which it has been charged in the past and with which it may be charged in the future. The improved effectiveness of the ICC depends importantly on administrative and facilitative decisions subject only to the majority rule of the commission itself. Operational procedures determined by the commission, for example random investigations, are in our opinion also within the authority of the commission to determine by majority rule—a procedure which has been the practice. There may be some legal questions raised as to the competence of the Commission to function within these guidelines. It is our view there is nothing in the terms of the agreement to interfere with these functions and that any attempt to block more effective ICC action through restrictive interpretation of the Geneva Accords, will be a legalistic ruse.

17. It has been clear for some time, as the Prince has recognized, that the Polish member of the ICC has restricted the Commissionʼs fulfilling its proper function. We hope that the Government of Cambodia will impress upon all members of the Commission, and other interested parties, its desire for an expansion of the Commissionʼs capability and its expectation that the Commission will function more effectively within broader guidelines than heretofore.

18. It is of particular importance that the Cambodian Government discuss this interpretation of the functions of the Commission with the Indian Government to ensure the necessary support of the Chairman of the Commission. Much depends upon the extent to which the Indian Commissioner is prepared to deal with the practical requirements of a deteriorating situation. The success of these efforts to revive the ICC depends in great measure upon the manner in which the Indian Chairman exercises his responsibilities.

E. Cambodian Efforts

19. Even with the best of facilities and equipment and an improved willingness to exercise its responsibilities impartially, the ICC cannot by itself deal with the problem. It would still be possible, indeed it is likely, for the VC and NVA to violate Cambodian territorial integrity without immediate discovery and without regard to the possibility of public disclosure.

20. It is apparent, therefore, that the Cambodian Government must itself take what measures it can to deal with the problem. We recognize that Prince Sihanouk has mentioned the limited capacity of his government to protect its territory. We do not wish to propose any joint Cambodian-United States military efforts in this regard. We have taken note of Prince Sihanoukʼs reference to the unacceptability of mixed patrols. The U.S. has at no time proposed such patrols nor do we do so now. On the contrary, we would agree that protecting its frontiers is up to the Cambodian Government which could as it desires increase patrols and the number of posts in border areas. We would also point out, however, that when it discovers violators of its neutrality, the Cambodian Government might follow normal international practice in this regard and promptly intern or repel the violators.

21. We have also noted that enemy forces have utilized Cambodian sources of supply and transportation to meet their needs in the border areas and within Viet-Nam. We have noted the Cambodian Governmentʼs contention that supply of non-contraband material is within the rights of a nonbelligerent in accordance with international practice. However, we are also aware of how important this source of supply is to continued VC and NVA operations in Cambodia border areas. One way of reducing VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory would be to cut off their sources of supply in Cambodia. Just as Prince Sihanouk has welcomed the restraint with which President Johnson has responded to demands for U.S. action along the border, so would we hope the Prince or the Cambodian Government would seek to restrain these activities which sustain the VC/NVA war effort.

F. U.S. Operations

22. The United States Government has noted recent statements by Prince Sihanouk both publicly and privately to the effort that he is aware of the possibility that United States forces might find it necessary to deal with VC and NVA elements in remote areas along the Cambodian border. In effect, Prince Sihanouk has indicated his tacit approval of U.S. operations in the particular circumstances where Cambodian nationals are not present or in any way involved. We are interested in determining just what Prince Sihanouk had in mind in regard to tolerable U.S. counteraction.

23. VC and NVA use of Cambodia may, for example, lead to certain consequences: a) it may impose a need on the U.S. commander to conduct reconnaissance across the border with very limited forces as required to protect his forces from the enemy massing its forces or preparing a surprise attack; b) there may arise a situation in which allied forces operating close to the border will be fired upon from within Cambodia and be forced to return that fire; c) U.S. forces may be maneuvered against from across the border and be forced to react tactically to protect themselves by crossing into Cambodia.

24. We have noted Prince Sihanoukʼs remarks concerning the freedom with which U.S. forces can protect themselves in these border areas without provoking Cambodian reaction. He should be fully aware of the difficulty of maintaining secrecy in such operations. If, as is likely, they were to become known publicly the United States would not deny the measures it had taken in defense of its forces. Moreover, it would be difficult to clearly differentiate between inhabited and uninhabited areas. For us to honor the distinction between these areas, more effective measures would have to be found to keep the VC/NVA out of the inhabited areas. However, we wish to make it clear that we do not seek to take military action in the border areas, inhabited or uninhabited. What we do seek is the prevention of enemy use of Cambodiaʼs territory. If this is done through ICC and Cambodian efforts, the question of U.S. action does not arise.

G. Contingencies

Diplomatic Recognition and the Border Problem

25. We must anticipate Prince Sihanoukʼs raising the question of restoration of diplomatic relations. (FYI. We do not wish to raise this ourselves. End FYI.) If, as expected, he does so and couples it with the usual condition—a declaration of respect and recognition of Cambodiaʼs “present borders”—we should state clearly our difficulty with making such a declaration with respect to one state which would not be made with other states. We should make clear our established position of being unwilling to make a declaration governing border disputes between neighboring countries. However, we should as we have said on a number of occasions, assure Prince Sihanouk that we ourselves are not in any sense challenging the validity of Cambodiaʼs frontiers.

26. Depending upon the mood of the conversation and the way in which this subject comes up, we should explore with Sihanouk whether he really wishes a U.S. presence in Phnom Penh at the present time. We should refer to the conversation of last spring which he had with Hamilton Fish Armstrong and say we are inclined to share what we understand to be the Princeʼs feeling at that time that a U.S. presence might be disturbing to the atmosphere in Phnom Penh. We ourselves believe, as we gather Sihanouk does, that there is effective communication through the assistance of the Australians. FYI. We should keep in mind the possibility of intermediate steps that fall short of reestablishment of relations but provide regular contact between the U.S. and Cambodia: One possibility would be the setting up of an “American Interests Section” in the Australian Embassy, with a staff of three or four officers. Another way would be to establish channels for continuing contact between our officials at New Delhi or New York. End FYI.

27. In short, we wish to indicate considerable reserve, but do not wish to appear negative. Basis of our position on border declaration should be spelled out with some care noting that this is part of our world-wide policy not to take or appear to take a position on any border question involving nations with which we have friendly views. We will be supplying other instructions where we have applied this policy, for contingent use as required. In addition, as indicated above, we wish to probe Sihanouk—if he raises this subject—as to whether in fact he really wishes a U.S. presence in Cambodia.

28. Sihanouk may raise the question of claims arising from previous incidents. (FYI. We are not clear as to just how many incidents and what claims are involved. In the past Sihanouk has made excessive demands without any real justification. End FYI.)

29. We should make clear that although we are willing to discuss at a later date any outstanding claims, that payment for such incidents would normally be taken care of by the South Vietnamese Government. We believe the South Vietnamese have made several offers and that they would be prepared to consider appropriate indemnification for established damages.

Mekong River

30. It is possible that Sihanouk will raise the question of interference by the South Vietnamese Government with traffic on the Mekong River. Our position in this regard should be to avoid acting as an arbitrator between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. We believe this is wholly a matter for settlement within the Mekong convention and is a subject for the governments directly concerned.

Further Meeting

31. There may arise a need for subsequent meetings at either this or the technical level. We wish to keep these options open. At the end of the present discussions there should be agreement in principle to reconvene at an appropriate level if further discussions are necessary.

Press Guidance

32. We would hope to avoid daily report to the press during the discussions. We would propose to the Cambodians at the outset that press comment be avoided and that a joint communiqué be issued at the conclusion of the discussions. This may only be a faint hope given the possibility of regular leaks and we will therefore be prepared to do some judicious backgrounding of the press ourselves as necessary.

End of Text.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5E (2)a, 1/68–10/68, Cambodia. Secret; Eyes Only. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw it.
2. See Document 212.