Office of the Historian

223. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas1

Washington, December 27, 1967.

CAP 671186. Herewith a situation report on Cambodia.

1.
U.S. policy toward Cambodia was stated most recently in a note delivered to the Cambodian Foreign Ministry December 4, 1967.2 That note expressed our deep concern over continued enemy use of Cambodia, provided a summary of evidence to explain our concern, and offered our support for a more effective ICC monitoring of border activity or any other reasonable proposal for remedying this dangerous problem.
2.
On December 20, the Cambodian Government flatly rejected our contention that Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces make extensive use of Cambodian territory, publishing its note of reply on December 24. This Cambodian response crossed with our preparation of a second diplomatic note offering helicopters to the ICC, so as to enable that organization to perform more effective surveillance of the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border. Despite the Cambodian Governmentʼs negative reaction of December 20, our offer of helicopters was made to the Indian Chairman of ICC/Cambodia on December 26, following courtesy notification to the Cambodian Government the previous day.
3.
In order to promote the possibility of ICC acceptance of our offer, we have made follow-up diplomatic approaches:
(a)
To the Indian Government, both in Washington and in New Delhi;
(b)
To the Soviet Union in Washington, and a similar demarche is being made in Moscow;
(c)
The Secretary is meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Pearson December 28 to urge that Canada make more active efforts to improve the performance of ICC/Cambodia;
(d)
We are also preparing a letter to Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi for the Presidentʼs signature.3 This letter will emphasize the potential dangers inherent in a passive posture and urge the GOI to make all possible efforts to improve ICC effectiveness, which is a most important element in containing the area of conflict and preserving Cambodian neutrality. The letter will be forwarded for approval under a separate memorandum.
4.
In order not to jeopardize these peace efforts, we continue to believe that it is unwise to approve more militant lines of action, such as blocking the Mekong or Sihanoukville. First, these ports are not significant sources of Viet Cong supplies; second, such actions would be unjustifiable under international law; third, it would create a sharp adverse hue and cry.
5.
The Cambodian reaction to our December 4 note has aroused considerable public and international interest in regard to both the basic problem of enemy use of Cambodia and to U.S. intentions in dealing with the problem.
(a)
The latest review by the U.S. Intelligence Board concludes that the extent of enemy use of Cambodia has probably remained at about the same level as last year, but the strategic importance of Cambodia to the enemy has probably increased.
(b)
Because of the serious domestic and international problems that would arise out of any attempts to resolve the problem militarily or to retaliate by economic warfare measures, the most feasible approach for the present is to persist in diplomatic initiatives which seek to obtain Cambodian cooperation or acquiescence in more effective ICC frontier patrols or in some other means of ameliorating the problem.
6.
We should not expect any immediate indications of improved ICC effectiveness. Even if our diplomatic efforts succeed in impelling the Soviet Union (and consequently the Polish members of the ICC) and the Indian Government to accept our offer of helicopters, it will take a month or six weeks to deliver the helicopters and train crews in Phnom Penh. It will probably take another month to judge whether the ICC can indeed prove itself to be a useful tool in keeping down hostile use of Cambodian territory.
7.
In the meantime, we will carry on planned diplomatic moves:
(a)
We are preparing evidence of specific areas of enemy activity in Cambodia, which can be conveyed to the ICC for use in investigations.
(b)
Part of this evidence derives from cross border intelligence operations whose mission, however, is primarily tactical. In order to avoid explosive reactions that might occur if these operations became known, we wish to restrict them to those which are essential for the immediate [Page 494] defense of allied forces in Viet-Nam and, to the extent possible, to the remote areas in northeastern Cambodia. However, we have very much in mind promptly authorizing additional reconnaissance missions as they become necessary.
(c)
We are also instructing certain posts in the field to provide, on a confidential basis, the essential background of U.S.-Cambodian differences along with evidence of enemy use of Cambodia. By this means, we will set straight the record on the nature of U.S. approaches to the Cambodian Government; and, as a result, we expect to enlist some active third-country support for U.S. policy.
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5E (1)a, 5/66–1/68, Cambodia. Secret. Received at the Johnson Ranch at 8:55 p.m. This was originally a Department of State situation report on Cambodia, drafted by Lacey and Perry and cleared by Habib. Read sent it to Rostow on December 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 CAMB)↩
  2. See Document 212.↩
  3. Text transmitted in telegram 90288 to New Delhi, December 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 CAMB)↩