206. Memorandum From the Country Director for Burma and Cambodia (Ewing) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs (Bundy)1

SUBJECT

  • Statement of Respect for Cambodiaʼs Present Frontiers
1.
Adherence within the past week by the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Liberation Front to the French-type declaration of respect for Cambodiaʼs territorial integrity “within its present borders” is being used by Sihanouk to put pressure on western countries to follow suit. Sihanouk has said, in effect, that he will look upon adherence to such a declaration as a measure to judge friendship for Cambodia.
2.
Both the Australians and the British have informed us that they have been asked officially by the Cambodians to take this action, and the Ambassadors of both countries in Phnom Penh have recommended so doing. In this connection, we have received telegrams from Bangkok strongly opposing any such action and from Vientiane stating Souvanna Phoumaʼs opposition to Laos doing so. Copies of both telegrams are attached.2
3.
In my discussions with both Robertson of the Australian Embassy and Gilmore of the British Embassy, I have pointed out that the previous difficulty we had with this statement, without any accompanying qualification that would protect the Vietnamese, Thai and Lao positions in their border differences with Cambodia, still continues to exist. (We discussed this problem at some length previously with the British last October in connection with the appointment of a new British Ambassador to Phnom Penh and with the Australians this March in connection with Prime Minister Holtʼs visit to Cambodia.) I have indicated that I did not see anything at the present time that changed this, other than the added disadvantage now of clearly following in the Communist wake. Emphasizing that my reaction was a preliminary one, I have pointed out that obviously their adherence to the declaration would make our position more difficult in not doing so, but have not otherwise tried to put pressure upon them not to take such action. I have, however, urged that both consult with both the Thai and the South Vietnamese regarding their intentions.
4.
There is a slight possibility that the Cambodian Government might be prepared to make an official statement to the Australian and/or the British Ambassador to the effect that adherence to the declaration did not prejudice their positions with respect to border differences existing with neighboring countries. Deschamps has reported that Son Sann made such a statement to the Lao Charge and British Ambassador Brown has indicated that the Secretary General of the Cambodian Foreign Office made a similar statement to him. I have suggested to both Robertson and Gilmore that an effort be made to determine whether it might be possible to obtain an official Cambodian statement to this effect, which would make the declaration much more acceptable. Although Deschamps has expressed doubt the Cambodians would agree to give a written statement, I think the possibility of obtaining an oral statement may still be worth pursuing.
5.
At the present time, the matter stands that I have asked both Robertson and Gilmore for the opportunity to consult again if it appears that the decision is likely to be in favor of making a declaration. Robertson is now uncertain what Canberra will do and appears to feel that adverse reactions from Saigon and Bangkok will carry some weight. Gilmore, on the other hand, has asked for our reaction on the assumption that the decision in London will be favorable, which he seems to feel may be the case.
6.
I feel that it would be preferable for us at this point not to go beyond the restatement of our problems with the declaration or try to put further pressure upon either Canberra or London. Hopefully, they will both decide against doing so because of the problems associated with it, without feeling they have done so under our pressure. Should, as may be the case, London decide in favor of a declaration and Canberra against, we would together with the Australians be in a position to make a much stronger case as to the difficulties such a divergence would present for us all.

Recommendation3

1.
That I be authorized to continue my discussions with the British and Australians along the present lines, indicating to the British that it represents the present thinking at the EA level;
2.
That, regardless of the British and Australian decision, we do not at this time ourselves consider adhering to the “present borders” declaration in its present form;
3.
That we continue to pursue the possibility of an official Cambodian statement along the lines reportedly made to the Lao Charge and British Ambassador Brown, which might provide a basis for us to reconsider our position on the “present borders” declaration, in consultation with the Thais and South Vietnamese.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 CAMB. Secret. Initialed by Habib.
  2. Not attached to the source text and not further identified.
  3. Bundy approved, but with the statement that he wanted “a bigger paper on all implications.”