Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

203. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, April 14, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Discussion of Cambodia with Australian Foreign Minister Hasluck

1. Mr. Hasluck has deferred replying to your message to him about Cambodia in order to discuss it with you personally while he is here for the SEATO meeting (Tab A).² You have a meeting with him scheduled for April 17 at 7:00 p.m., and I believe this offers a good opportunity to stress our deep concern over Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of Cambodia which is becoming an increasingly serious military problem for us.

2. My impression is that the Australians, in particular Ambassador Deschamps in Phnom Penh, do not fully share the seriousness with which we view this situation. You will recall that in your letter to Hasluck prior to Prime Minister Holtʼs recent visit to Cambodia (March 29–31), you emphasized our concern over the problem, which you requested that Prime Minister Holt convey to Sihanouk along with our desire to discuss ways to improve the present situation (Tab B).³ While the VC question and border incidents were discussed by Holt with Sihanouk, Ambassador Deschampsʼ account of the conversation (Tab C)⁴ does not indicate that Holt undertook to convey the full flavor of your message.

3. Hasluck is likely to reflect the impressions which Prime Minister Holt received as the result of his visit to Phnom Penh. These, as reported by a member of Holtʼs party, are:

(a) We should not at this time try to force matters with Cambodia in any direction, whether towards a restoration of relations or towards more determined action against VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory.

(b) In Sihanoukʼs present “anti-American” frame of mind, a visit by Governor Harriman would not be likely to be productive and we should for the time being continue to rely on Ambassador Deschamps.

(c) Sihanouk realistically accepted the inevitability of border incidents, although he intended to continue protesting them for the record and would strongly resist anything that looked like a permanent lodgment of American or South Vietnamese forces on Cambodian territory. (Tab D)⁵

4. I recommend that you stress to Hasluck our strong feeling of the need to find a way to reduce the advantage which Viet Cong and North Vietnamese are now able to derive from use of Cambodian territory. Our intelligence people consider that the ability to use Cambodia offers a psychological and military advantage of considerable value to the enemy and that the use is likely to increase further during the coming year. While we are aware of the limitations of what the Cambodians are able or could be expected to do, we do believe that direct discussions with them at some level could help to relieve some of their apprehensions and establish the base for some form of cooperative action to deal with the problem, at least in some fields. Initially this might possibly take the form of an exchange of intelligence information on VC/NVA activities on either side of the border as well as discussion of ways to improve border controls and reduce the danger of border incidents through further efforts to get an expansion of the Cambodian ICC, use of some other international group or neutral third country, or improvement of Cambodian patrolling capabilities. At a later stage, if a good working relationship were established, we might be able to probe ways in which the Cambodians could be assisted to do more or to countenance certain actions by others which they are themselves unable to perform.

5. In view of Holtʼs feeling that the timing may not be propitious for a visit by Governor Harriman, you may wish to get Hasluckʼs reaction to the possibility of establishing direct contact through a visit by an experienced but lower ranking and less visible official. An alternate possibility would be contact in a third country such as Japan, where the Cambodian Ambassador, Prince Sirik Matak, appears to be intelligent and well disposed as well as to have good contacts with the Lon Nol Government. Depending on Hasluckʼs reaction, you may wish to suggest that Ambassador Deschamps be asked to take some discreet soundings in Phnom Penh regarding the establishment of contact in one fashion or another.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUSTL–US. Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Douglas R. Perry and Ewing of EA/BUC.
2. The tabs were not attached. Presumably Tab A is telegram 6071 from Vientiane, April 3, see footnote 3, Document 201.
3. See Document 201.
4. Tab C is a copy of an Australian telegram reporting on the Sihanouk-Holt conversation of March 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 AUSTL–US)
5. Apparent reference to a copy of paragraph 5 (a) of Tab C.