Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

190. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 12, 1966, noon.

SUBJECT

• Cambodia

PARTICIPANTS

• Charles Lucet, French Ambassador
• Governor Harriman
• Robert E. Barbour, EUR/FBX

Following his September 8 meeting with the Acting Secretary, Ambassador Lucet called on Governor Harriman at the request of the French Foreign Minister. He assumed Governor Harriman was fully aware of the French attitude toward Cambodia and of the feeling that the government should be supported. In the French view, it could serve as an example for all the Indochinese countries. Governor Harriman interjected that there was no doubt that Sihanouk had the support of his people. Ambassador Lucet said that Couve de Murville was not too pessimistic about long-term prospects for Cambodian-US relations. However, a factor always to be considered was the personality of Prince Sihanouk. He was extremely temperamental and had been infuriated by the statement we issued after the Thlok Trach incident, because this statement had indicated that the two Cambodian villages were on Vietnamese territory.² Sihanouk had now produced some new maps. These dated from the period of Governor Brevie and showed the villages to be on territory that was unmistakably Cambodian. Prince Sihanouk felt that to deny the Cambodian status of the villages in question was to deny Cambodian sovereignty. Couve de Murville felt that prospects for Governor Harrimanʼs projected trip to Phnom Penh would be better when Sihanouk returned to Cambodia from vacation in France. Couve hoped, of course, that there would, in the interim, be no untoward developments like a new bombing of Cambodian territory.

Governor Harriman commented that Sihanoukʼs attitude in the incident had been rather unreasonable. The only maps we had were some he gave us, in March 1964. The two villages were clearly shown on these maps in South Viet Nam, whereas they were in fact under Cambodian administration and control. The Thlok Trach incident was unfortunate. It has been handled badly by us, and distorted by the press. He asked whether there were any French advice as to how to proceed in the months ahead. Should he endeavor to get in touch with Sihanouk while the Prince was in France? Ambassador Lucet thought not.

Ambassador Lucet said that the French position on the Cambodian frontier problem was one of a willingness to recognize Cambodian territorial integrity within the limits of the present borders. In considering the Indochinese problem, General De Gaulle was thinking of a return to the 1954 Geneva Agreements and of a new agreement which would confirm the pertinent frontiers under a guarantee by the five major powers. Ambassador Lucet read from the September 2 French-Cambodian declaration³ the following passage: “France, for her part, reaffirms her respect for the territorial integrity of Cambodia within the limits of its present borders.” He described this as a cautious position devoid of any formal French undertaking, and he asked whether it might not be possible for the United States to agree to similar language.

Governor Harriman reviewed the history of past efforts to solve the Vietnamese-Cambodian border problem and said Sihanouk had been very unreasonable. Obviously, one cannot guarantee borders which are not known. We were ready to recognize the borders as they were internationally understood, but we could not automatically take the Cambodiansʼ side in their disputes with the Thai or Vietnamese. Ambassador Lucet again asked whether the language of the French-Cambodian communiqué might not be acceptable to us. Governor Harriman said we had been prepared to go farther than that at one time. We had talked with the Cambodians for days in New Delhi about the problem, but they had always been unrealistic when it came to the question of a territorial guarantee. If everybody else were willing to guarantee the borders, we would, too. The Vietnamese had proposed various meetings to demarcate the frontier, but the Cambodians had always found an excuse to avoid such meetings. Ambassador Lucet again referred to the French-Cambodian communiqué. Governor Harriman said he thought it would be possible to find acceptable and reasonable language if Sihanouk really wanted to do so. He said we would look into the language used in the Cambodian-French declaration to see if we had any problems with it.

Ambassador Lucet said Couve de Murville regretted the difficulties which had arisen over Governor Harrimanʼs trip to Phnom Penh. Governor Harriman explained how the project for his trip had developed and how it was that Prince Sihanouk was completely wrong when he said Governor Harriman had invited himself. However, he had not replied to this distortion. Nor would he do so.

He asked Ambassador Lucet whether the ICC question had arisen during the French visit to Phnom Penh. Ambassador Lucet said there had been no discussion of this question, and there was nothing new on the situation. Governor Harriman remarked that he assumed the Soviets would continue to refuse to strengthen the ICC, because Hanoi would not like it. He noted a September 12 AFP ticker reporting that Prince Sihanouk had invited a Soviet delegation to Phnom Penh and that the latter had accepted. This was an interesting development. He remarked that it was also interesting that Sihanouk admitted the presence of individual Viet Cong on his territory. We do not believe all the reports of NVN divisions in Cambodia, but we do believe there are local arrangements which permit supplies and armed Viet Cong to flow back and forth across the frontier. Ambassador Lucet said that Prince Sihanoukʼs attitude had not been helped by references to a Sihanouk Trail as a major infiltration route. Governor Harriman agreed this was unfortunate nomenclature. He did not know its origin even though a road did exist.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Barbour. The memorandum is part I of II. The meeting took place in Harrimanʼs office.
2. On August 16 the Department of State released a statement expressing regret for U.S. air attacks of July 31 and August 2 on the villages of Thlok Trach along the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border. The statement noted that although the villages were under Cambodian administration, maps provided to the United States by Cambodia clearly showed them to be on the Vietnamese side of the border. Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 645.
3. The text is ibid., pp. 648–650.