186. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Possible Visit by Mr. Eugene Black to Cambodia
How It Might be Arranged
1. The proposed visit might be arranged directly or indirectly. The direct approach would be to inquire, either through the Australian Ambassador in Phnom Penh or through the Cambodian Ambassador in New Delhi, whether Prince Sihanouk would receive Mr. Black as your emissary. An indirect approach might be to have Mr. Black visit Cambodia for discussion of the Prek Thnot Dam Project. He could at the same time go to Saigon for discussion of the My Tuan Bridge Project. Both of these are Mekong Committee schemes recently endorsed by ECAFE for solicitation of funds. It would probably be best to sound out Sihanouk through ECAFE channels (Mr. Narasimhan) if the latter approach is adopted. (A prior decision in principle for U.S. participation in the funding of these projects would be required.)
Concurrent Action Now Under Way
2. In addition to the matters mentioned in my memorandum of June 29, we have since taken two new steps designed to encourage the [Page 408] apparently favorably-developing Cambodian attitude. First we have instructed Ambassador Bowles to make direct contact with Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimny in New Delhi. Nong Kimny was a long-time Cambodian Ambassador in Washington and is close to Sihanouk. Bowles is to explain to Nong Kimny all that we have done to support the Cambodian proposal for expansion of the ICC and to solicit his views as to what further we can do to support them on this.
3. Secondly, the British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, at Secretary Ruskʼs urging, is communicating anew with the Soviet Geneva Co-Chairman, in effect seeking to get Soviet reconsideration of its rejection of the ICC expansion proposal and inviting the Soviet Co-Chairman to meet with him in Geneva (or another place) to consider this matter as well as the more general question of an international conference on Cambodia, which Sihanouk has long desired.
4. Thirdly, Ambassador Thompson is following up on the ICC matter with Dobrynin tomorrow.
Consideration Affecting a Possible Visit by Mr. Black
5. The evidence of a developing shift to Sihanoukʼs position to a more neutral stance is now unmistakeable. This is evident from his speech of June 18, with which I believe you are familiar. It is also borne out by a readiness to push for expansion of the ICC not only with us and the British but also with the Communist side, including the Chinese. Another indicator is the positive reaction he has given to Thai proposals for the sending of a UN Secretary General representative to the area. Finally, there is sensitive evidence that Sihanouk is making direct moves to restore diplomatic relations with Thailand. We think these moves reflect Sihanoukʼs fear that the war might spill over into Cambodia, and very likely that he is beginning to doubt his earlier judgment that the Viet Cong were certain to succeed.
6. We very much feel that, as in the case of Indonesia, we should act with great caution with regard to this evolving situation, being especially careful to avoid actions or statements which Sihanouk might consider as pushing him too far or too fast. We do not judge that he is at the point, or anywhere near it, where he is prepared to take important risks with regard to his relations with the Chinese, in particular, and Hanoi. This is borne out by the anti-American tirade which he delivered on June 20, apparently to balance his statement of the 18th. Sample excerpt:
“The acts of the Johnson/McNamara group, if compared with those of the bellicose German warmongers during World War II, are more savage and inhuman. Actually these acts are unique and are the most cruel and savage acts that one has ever witnessed in world history.”
7. I know you attach considerable importance to Mr. Blackʼs trip to the area this fall, in connection with your program for Southeast Asia. We [Page 409] hope at that time that he might be able to visit Cambodia. If Sihanouk should refuse to agree to a visit by Mr. Black now, and make a public issue of it, on top of his last turn down of a Black visit in April, it would probably rule out a possible Black visit in the fall.
8. If the visit involves a move to restore diplomatic relations, it is virtually certain that we shall be confronted with an immediate demand that we accept Sihanoukʼs prior conditions which include an acceptance of his present frontiers with Vietnam and Thailand, as he defines them; a “guarantee” against future violations of his border; and the payment of indemnities for past violations. There is no reason to believe on past performance that these demands are negotiable, and a failure to meet them could well leave our relations with Cambodia in a worse state than they were before the visit. Acceptance of them, on the other hand, would gravely damage our relations with the Thai and Vietnamese who have, after all, supported us down the line over the years.
9. It seems to me that we now have a situation in which Sihanouk seems to be trying to extricate himself from a predicament which is in part of his own making. We should make sure that all the doors are kept open so that he can get out, but avoid any overt action which might cause him to pull back or even slam the door in our face.
10. A ready opening, through which you can send a message to Sihanouk, should soon be available. The Cambodians have now replied to the latest message of the Vice President indicating readiness to receive a Congressional delegation as soon as they can free themselves, presumably after Congress adjourns. Barring some new development, I believe that this would be better timing for a special communication from you to the Prince. It would also, in our view, be a better vehicle because we would avoid the inevitable suggestion of aid involved in a Black visit—which Sihanouk could all too easily play publicly as an effort to buy him off.
- Source: Johnsonn Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. VIII. Secret. Rostow transmitted this memorandum to the President under cover of a note of July 5, noting that “State argues that we should not push the Black visit to Cambodia now, but leave it for his planned trip in the fall.” Rostow also noted that the Department would “prefer to let the Congressional delegation carry the mail on this round.” Rostow suggested that after seeing what kind of response Bowles had with the Cambodian Ambassador in New Delhi and how the British fared with the Soviets on a wider role for the ICC in Cambodia, then the decision on the Black visit could be made. The President approved the recommendation that Rostow “Report what Bowles gets and seek later instruction.”↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. The original signed copy is filed (mistakenly) ibid., Country File, China, Vol. VI.↩