Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, May 25, 1964, 8:45 p.m.

3058. Re SC Consideration Cambodian-Vietnamese Border Situation. For Ambassador Stevenson. We have considered carefully various alternatives for UN involvement which you discussed with Harlan Cleveland Sunday² night. Subject to any further views you may have, following are our conclusions on how we should now proceed in SC. We should seek to shift debate back for time being to narrow issues of Cambodian-Vietnamese border, now that you have made our main case on Southeast Asia in your speech Thursday.³

1. We should take a firm line that Cambodia, which took matter to SC, can get what it seeks to protect its territorial integrity and political independence and in safeguarding its frontiers through practical and effective UN arrangements rather than through repetition of Geneva exercise. Cambodia will not come to this unless it is convinced it has no possibility of obtaining SC endorsement of Geneva conference on Cambodia.

2. To this end, suggest you press in your informal consultations with other SC members our preference for a resolution for either (a) UN-organized peacekeeping force of effective size; or (b) substantial Cambodian-Vietnamese force augmented by UN observers under SYG.

3. Advantages of consulting on this basis are: (a) it is by far most constructive and effective result of SC consideration; (b) it will demonstrate to Vietnamese we have made more than perfunctory attempt to get effective UN peacekeeping machinery on the border; (c) if majority of SC members see merit and are prepared support either of above proposals it might soften Cambodians negative attitude; and (d) it will prepare groundwork both with SC members and South Vietnamese and Cambodians for fallback position given below which we believe will prove only feasible course.

4. We see serious disadvantages to pressing for a UN observation group of a very modest character (200 to 400). We would strongly prefer no observation group at all rather than symbolic presence which would not be effective re Viet Cong. Such limited group might tend to confirm Sihanoukʼs position because it could not operate effectively. Of equal importance, acceptance such proposal would have serious demoralizing effect on Vietnamese who, as you know, feel very strongly that only peacekeeping mechanism they want is an effective force.

5. If it proves impossible to get agreement on an effective UN border observation mechanism, we should seek a UN commission made up of non-permanent SC members mandated to discuss border situation with Cambodia and South Viet-Nam and to make recommendations. Terms of reference such Commission are important. Original terms of Cambodian request for an investigative commission were limited to past charges of RKG complicity with the Viet Cong. This is inadequate. UN Commission should be empowered to look into entire question of violations of the border between Cambodia and Viet-Nam, past and future, and recommend ways in which problem can be met. It should be free to move in both countries and to examine prisoners of war.

6. A mandate for UN Commission to make recommendations for ways of easing the situation would be helpful in a number of ways.

A. Such a group could, for example, come up with proposals that would ultimately involve an effective UN border patrol of kind you suggested in your speech.

B. Fact there is ongoing activity with regard to this problem would help demonstrate that Geneva Conference is not only means of dealing with Cambodiaʼs neutrality. Latter objective could also be served by including a reference in the resolution calling on all States to respect Cambodiaʼs political independence and territorial integrity.

7. Composition of group would be critical. While a number of combinations of membership could be devised, perhaps most simple, straightforward and acceptable from our viewpoint would be to ask non-permanent members of Council (Morocco, Ivory Coast, Norway, Brazil, Bolivia, and Czechoslovakia) to designate one or two representatives each to serve on such commission. While this means that Czechoslovakia would be represented, balance of membership is strongly in our favor, and we assume that Sihanouk would want Communist participation to demonstrate that group is “impartial.” This might also make it more acceptable to USSR.

8. We are sending USUN in separate tel kind of resolution we have in mind embracing UN Commission idea.⁴ Assume you will wish to discuss with Vietnamese, and depending on their views, subsequently with UK, and SYG before broadening out to other SC members.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 CAMB–VIET S/UN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco and Buffum; cleared by Meeker, William Bundy, Sullivan, and Cleveland; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Abidjan, La Paz, London, Moscow, Oslo, Paris, Phnom Penh, Prague, Rabat, Rio de Janeiro, Saigon, Taipei, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. March 24.
3. See footnote 2, Document 132.
4. See Document 134 for the resolution favored by the United States.