Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

124. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 26, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Cambodian Question

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Soviet Ambassador said that he had asked to see the Secretary under instructions to discuss the Cambodian question. He said that Mr. Khrushchev had received a cable from Prince Sihanouk who asked that steps be taken to convene a conference on Cambodia. Sihanouk had also informed the British that this was an urgent matter. He said that the Government of the Soviet Union expects the Government of the United States to take a positive attitude on this question.

The Secretary said that he assumed that we and the Soviet Union were agreed that Cambodia should be neutral. Dobrynin interjected to say that this was true of the Soviet Union and there was no need for any assumption.

The Secretary continued that the problem in Sihanoukʼs mind is with his immediate neighbors. He said these questions go back a very long time. They were somewhat akin to the type of problem that existed between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, and he pointed out that problems in these relationships existed before Columbus discovered America. He said we were concerned because Sihanouk had raised the matter in antagonistic terms toward his neighbors. The United States was not opposed to international action, but thinks that the first step is for Cambodia to resolve its problems with its neighbors. If Cambodian relations with its neighbors could be settled on the basis of territorial integrity and independence, it would be fine with us, but if we were to go to a conference with no preparatory work, the conference would be like a bear pit. It would be highly inflammatory and the problem might well be worse than it had been before such a conference. He said that we had been trying to lay the basis for a successful solution of this problem. He said we would be glad to discuss the matter with the Soviet Union and would be particularly interested to hear any comments they might have on the British draft.

The Secretary said our only interest in Cambodia was its independence and neutrality. He pointed out that the problem of Viet-Nam has complicated the matter. The Viet Cong operate from Cambodia and infiltrators come down through both Laos and Cambodia. He repeated that our problem with the conference which had no prior preparations was that we did not know how it could move us toward the result that we could agree upon.

Dobrynin asked if we felt there was disagreement on existing borders. The Secretary replied that there was between Saigon and Phnon Penh. The Secretary pointed out that Sihanouk seems to conduct policy through public speeches. There was a possibility that if the two countries could get together, they could settle the matter.

With respect to Thailand, the matter was different. Here it was a question of the formal recognition of treaties imposed by France during the Colonial period. The Thai Government was apparently prepared to accept the borders but not the French treaties. There might be minor questions, but no Thai attempt to seize or claim Cambodian territory. The Thai object, however, to having their noses rubbed into the French treaties. We thought that the British draft took care of this problem. The Secretary said he thought our objectives and the Sovietsʼ were very close, but he pointed out that we did not think we could get the Thais and Vietnamese to come to a conference at this time.

Dobrynin said that Sihanouk wanted a status of neutrality and a guarantee on the basis of the existing border.

The Secretary pointed out that the British draft would do this, but the Soviet Government had said it could not go into these matters except at a conference. He said we were prepared to have a Four-Power meeting, but Sihanouk had now withdrawn this proposal. We thought a Four-Power conference might be a good idea as quadripartite agreement could go far toward reaching a solution. The Secretary emphasized that what he had said was not a formal reply to the Ambassadorʼs remarks but was simply to give him an idea of our position. He said it would be very difficult for us to go to a conference without Saigon and Bangkok being represented, and it was doubtful whether such a conference without them could lead to agreement.

Dobrynin said that if there were no substantial differences on borders, then why was it not possible to meet Sihanoukʼs request?

The Secretary said Sihanouk had postponed his deadline and we knew that all three capitals had some interest in resolving these questions in the neighborhood. He pointed out, moreover, that this would be in line with Mr. Khrushchevʼs New Yearʼs message

Ambassador Dobrynin said he would report the Secretaryʼs remarks to his Government.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 8 CAMB. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL on March 26. The Department of State sent an account of this meeting to the Embassy in Moscow in telegram 2845, March 30. (Ibid., POL 27–14 CAMB)