117. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1
928. Following is Embassyʼs tentative evaluation of March 11 attacks on American and British installations:
- 1)
- March 11 demonstration was approved by RKG in advance, and government officials and organizations participated in advance planning and in actual demonstrations. Evidence for this is conclusive: Presence of high-ranking members of government, official equipment of Ministry of Information, and large numbers of men in khaki uniforms of type worn by low-ranking government personnel; police alerted in advance (but made no attempt restrain demonstration until long after violence had begun); trucks sent out previous night to provinces to bring crowds into Phnom Penh; first announcements over official Cambodian radio mentioned government officials, etc., etc. No demonstration this magnitude and character could have taken place in Cambodia without Prince Sihanoukʼs permission.
- 2)
- Demonstration apparently intended as noisy, impressive, but with only limited violence: Instructions passed around in schools for guidance of demonstrators stressed noise and non-violence; demonstration began in orderly fashion and remained relatively orderly until few small stones thrown by individuals apparently set off uncontrolled reaction among mob; it is conceivable that hard core group (possibly Communist sympathizers) took advantage of situation to increase violence to pitch exceeding original plans.
- 3)
- Police could have controlled demonstration at any time. In early phases police merely stood by and watched. Demonstrators were given sound signals by means of bugles, large bell, and whistles; when police really decided put end to demonstration, they were able to do so with comparative ease merely by blowing whistles and shoving demonstrators back behind barricades. Fact that violence went as far as it did may be due to failure of organizers of demonstration provide proper briefing to police as to precise point at which they were to restrain demonstrators.
- 4)
- Purpose of demonstration as originally planned was to impress US and British Embassies (and anyone else who was interested) with solidarity of Cambodian people behind Prince Sihanoukʼs policies, emphasize resentment against alleged American and British attempts block quadripartite and Geneva conferences, and, possibly, provide emotional outlet for frustrations and resentments among masses of Cambodians as result economic difficulties currently being experienced and for which some Cambodians beginning to blame Sihanouk.
- 5)
- Violence of demonstrations and extent damage brought source of embarrassment to many Cambodians and to Prince Sihanouk himself. Prompt expressions of regret and offers of compensation highly uncharacteristic of Sihanouk and not in accord with legend of peaceful Cambodian people and government under his wise and benevolent direction; at French ballet performance same evening, Sihanouk visibly ill at ease and avoided chatting with Diplomatic Corps as is his usual practice such occasions; many individual Cambodians have expressed regrets to me personally and to British Ambassador. (Ironic that SecState for Agriculture Chau Seng, who was one of principal organizers and directors of demonstrations, was sent by Sihanouk same evening to express Sihanoukʼs regrets to British Ambassador; no corresponding visit made to this Embassy.) Haste on part Cambodian authorities remove shattered vehicles from in front of Embassy and similar haste (thus far rebuffed by British) to remove damaged cars from UK Embassy compound indicate desire minimize evidences Cambodian destructiveness.
We cannot be certain no further acts of violence will occur, perhaps even spontaneously, since four monthsʼ virtually uninterrupted campaign hostility against United States, aided and abetted by fervent “hate American” propaganda of leftist [press?], cannot have failed produce some effect on even politically-passive Cambodians. Nor can we rule out completely possibility further demonstrations with or without violence might be employed by Sihanouk as device force United States and UK take initiative in breaking diplomatic relations. However, we believe likelihood, on balance, is in direction of attempt restore damaged image of Cambodia as peaceful, orderly state, which has been object Sihanoukʼs pride. Moreover, whatever cool heads Sihanouk may have around him at this moment, and perhaps even he himself, must be beginning have [Page 276] some dim glimmerings that uncontrolled mob violence of type which exploded at American and British Embassies Wednesday could on some future date be used against all foreigners, merchants, government, and institution of monarchy itself. First reactions from other foreigners here (including French) and upper class Cambodians indicate their uneasiness concerning this possibility, and inconceivable this uneasiness not communicated in some fashion or other to Sihanouk.
- Source: Department of State, POL 23–8 CAMB. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩