Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, March 9, 1964, 1 p.m.

969. As expected PriMin Souvanna this morning spoke to me at some length in very serious tones about his visit with Sihanouk and absolute necessity that Sihanouk not be rejected by U.S., that he receive guarantees he is asking for and also that Geneva style conference on Cambodia be held. (Here Souvanna noted that Sihanouk accepted British draft.) Thanks to earlier messages and Deptel 710² I was able give Souvanna assurances our good will in this matter and paint favorable picture about probable convening quadripartite conference; Souvanna nevertheless continued emphasize his concern and need for improving situation rapidly, he stressed repeatedly that he had known Sihanouk for long time and well, that he had never seen him more serious or determined and that Sihanouk meant everything he said quite literally.

According PriMin, Sihanouk fundamentally fears dismemberment Cambodia at hands South Viet Nam and Thailand. His resolve above all is maintain integrity nation of his ancestors and if he cannot secure requisite assurances from West (which he would strongly prefer) then he will seek help to maintain Cambodiaʼs integrity from Hanoi and Peking. (Souvanna did not mention Moscow at this point.) Sihanouk would not remain in Cambodia if this should occur and without him left wing forces would promptly take over country. (Souvanna said Sihanouk told him Communist already have military formations.) Sihanouk apparently believes it is intention South Vietnamese and particularly of Thais to drive him to point of seeking help from Communist Bloc so that they can use this as pretext to move in, with U.S. help, and partition Cambodia between them. This is conviction which lies behind Sihanoukʼs assertions Phnom Penhʼs sent Dept 885.³

In Souvannaʼs mind at least Sihanoukʼs fears lie primarily on Thai side and much as I insisted on basis my acquaintance with Thailand that I was certain there was no intention any aggression against Cambodia, Souvanna made clear that not only does Sihanouk not accept this but neither does Souvanna himself. Souvanna demonstrated as he has many times in past his fundamental mistrust of Thais, noting that Thailand was once suzerain over both Laos and large part of Cambodia and cannot forget this. He recalls his time in Bangkok when Thai invariably referred to Laos not as sovereign country but using Thai word for “province”; Souvanna believes Thais have not accepted loss of Champassak or Sayaboury areas on west side Mekong. He also remains bitter about Sarit⁴ labeling him Communist in 1960 following Kong Le⁵ coup and blockade of Vientiane at that time. I cite this all to explain that seen from Souvannaʼs vantage point Sihanoukʼs fears and demands for assurances are reasonable and in keeping with his own estimate of fundamental Thai intentions.

Souvanna says in effect Sihanouk believes he is asking for no more than was accorded to Laos in Geneva Conference 1961–62 and feels it ironic that he has met such continual rebuffs in this regard when he, organizer of that conference, seeks similar reassurances for himself. Souvanna made clear that quadripartite conference will not in itself satisfy Sihanouk and Geneva conference must take place. I referred to disappointments following Geneva Conference on Laos when some of key signatories have failed keep their word and make solution work as it should. Souvanna said if Sihanouk could once be assured on his problem then there would be solid base for setting up area of neutral countries including also Laos and Burma which would provide protection to Thailand, Malaysia, etc. He added that he had discussed with Sihanouk problem faced in Laos because of unquestioned North Vietnamese military interference and said that Sihanouk had pledged do what he could to help Laos with Chinese and North Vietnamese. Souvanna several times returned to theme that if there cannot be a neutral and guaranteed Cambodia and it instead goes Communist, situation Laos becomes untenable and he would have to withdraw. While not accepting this reasoning I did not feel it worthwhile debate the point except to keep before him fact that failure of Geneva Accords in Laos must be laid at door of Communists and that U.S. has demonstrated its complete guaranty to neutrality Laos as it has also fully accepted neutrality of Cambodia.

Souvanna said Sihanouk pressed him to convey his thoughts to Americans and Souvanna would shortly be writing him to say he had talked with me. I asked him also to include mention of points I had just made (see preceding sentence) and he agreed.

I emphasized to Souvanna our desire help Sihanouk and pointed out how difficult he makes it for us, citing among other things his assertions enumerated Phnom Penhʼs reftel. Souvanna acknowledged this but said we must overlook these outbursts. Again drawing on ref Deptel, I assured him we were doing our utmost to find answer to problem. I added that I would also convey what he had said to me to Mr. Bundy whom I expected see evening Bangkok.

Comment: However misguided are Sihanoukʼs views about dangers he faces from Thailand and South Viet Nam, I believe Souvanna is persuaded that we have reached critical pass in relations with Cambodia and West stands to lose severely if we do not find means providing reassurances of sort and in manner requested by Sihanouk.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 8 CAMB. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok for Bundwo, CINCPAC, London, Paris, Phnom Penh, and Saigon.
2. Dated March 8. (Ibid., POL 7 LAOS)
3. In telegram 885 from Phnom Penh, March 6, the Embassy reported that Sihanouk had charged in a speech on March 5 that the United States blamed Cambodia and North Vietnam for its “defeat” in South Vietnam, but because of Chinese Communist strength, dared not strike Hanoi, so instead devised a plan to invade Cambodia with Khmer Serei and South Vietnamese forces. (Ibid., POL 27–13)
4. Sarit Thanarat, deceased former Prime Minister of Thailand.
5. Captain (later General) Kong Le who led a coup against the Royal Lao Government in August 1960.