Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia¹

Washington, February 19, 1964, 9:42 p.m.

551. Sihanoukʼs new proposal (Embtel 804),² while confused and in certain parts unacceptable, suggests he may be seeking a way off the course to which he had apparently committed Cambodia. This may reflect his realization of difficulties in carrying out alignment with Chicoms (although insistence on March deadline indicates he has his threatened timetable in mind). Whatever his motivations, we see the possibility of shifting focus from thorny Geneva conference proposal to more promising negotiation between Cambodia and its neighbors, together with US. Dept. desires exploit opportunity quickly before new events overtake it.

Dept. plans to send within two or three days high-level representative to discuss details Saigon, Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Our purpose in so doing is to insure that if there is any possibility of reaching agreement it not be allowed to slip by.

For Phnom Penh: Harriman has telephoned Nong Kimny expressing US interest. You should seek interview soonest to reinforce. Dept. would favor direct approach to Sihanouk if possible. However leave matter of approach to your judgment. You should commend Sihanouk on his imaginative initiative which appears to be a forward step in resolution of the regional problems which have troubled him for so long. While there are problems and details to be worked out, US is much impressed with basic concept and principles, including recognition Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity as well as Cambodian acceptance of responsibilities of neutrality and commitment to prevent use of its territory by rebel bands. You should request Sihanouk to designate a representative with whom you could work out modalities for a conference.

For Bangkok and Saigon: You should discuss quadripartite proposals soonest with GVN and RTG. State that US thinks all three of us should move quickly and positively, to explore Sihanoukʼs proposal. Inform Thai and Vietnamese that we are seeking further information and details from RKG and that we are seeking to encourage RKG to develop Sihanoukʼs proposal further. Obviously we have no intention of making any commitments until we have further information and until we have consulted with RTG and GVN.

We recognize Sihanoukʼs statement is cast in a tone objectionable to Thailand and Viet-Nam, as well as US, but we think we should ignore the tone and respond positively to the substantive core; i.e., a quadripartite solution of Sihanoukʼs problems. While Sihanouk says a Geneva Conference could “underwrite” quadripartite agreement, it is possible that successful conclusion of agreement would make conference unnecessary.

We think the objectionable parts of Sihanoukʼs proposal should be treated as problems to which we can suggest constructive solutions at the proper time rather than as obstacles to negotiations. This would apply to the question of recognition of frontiers and also to the problem of enlarging the ICC. By working out such positive procedures, we would hope to eliminate such things as Sihanoukʼs “Gentlemenʼs Agreement”.

We urgently request Thai and Vietnamese views on how we can exploit this opportunity. We will inform RTG and GVN of results Ambassador Sprouseʼs inquiry to RKG.

For Bangkok only: In your talk with Thanat it might be useful to refer to his “constructive idea” of a Southeast Asian conference on Cambodia (Bangkok Tel 997 of January 2).³ Sihanoukʼs proposal would seem to provide an opening for moving in this direction.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–13 CAMB. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Hannah; cleared by Harriman, Forrestal, and in substance by Salans of L/FE; and approved by Hilsman. Also sent to Saigon and Bangkok. Repeated to London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Vientiane, Kuala Lumpur, and CINCPAC.
2. On February 19 Sihanouk published in Cambodiaʼs official news bulletin a solution to Cambodiaʼs problems with the United States, South Vietnam, and Thailand that Sihanouk claimed would keep Cambodia neutral without a conference. The solution entailed quadripartite (U.S., South Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia) negotiations leading to an agreement recognizing Cambodiaʼs neutrality and borders. In return Cambodia would observe strict neutrality and prevent “the passage or presence of rebel bands across or on its territory.” The solution envisioned normalization of diplomatic relations and a “gentlemenʼs agreement” by the United States to reimburse Cambodia in farm and heavy construction equipment for Cambodians killed in error by South Vietnamese armed forces. Transmitted in telegram 804, February 19. (Ibid.)
3. Not printed. (Ibid.)