74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia 1

278. Department believes Sukarno position reported your 5182 indicates he unable or unwilling recognize that existing situation is different from and far more serious than situation before Indos put forces into Malaya and publicly boasted they had done so. In Bogor meeting with Sukarno or soonest thereafter you should make following points, stating you doing so on instruction if you think this desirable:

By using force against Malaya, boasting about it and anticipating that they would continue (as Sudjarwo had done in SC) Indos have created new situation which they must recognize as such.
Sukarno must be aware that GOM and HMG cannot indefinitely tolerate Indo military action against Malaysia and that Indo actions, if continued, may lead to situation where Sukarno finds himself in real hostilities with Commonwealth. If this happens, given history of situation, [Page 158]he cannot expect USG to help him. (FYI: If you think Sukarno believes we can or will restrain British, he should be disabused of any such idea. End FYI.)
We are glad he is willing resume negotiations, but believe it totally unrealistic expect GOM will be willing or able negotiate in present atmosphere. First essential is that Indos stop military action, and we cannot work to encourage further negotiation until this happens.
On other hand, if Sukarno genuinely wants to settle this issue peacefully he must find way to stop military action. If he does so, we will be glad to resume our previous policy of encouraging solution through negotiation.3

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDON–MALAYSIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Cuthell, cleared by William Bundy and Tyler, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Kuala Lumpur, London, Canberra, Wellington, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. In telegram 518, September 11, Jones reported that Sukarno told him that he wanted a peaceful settlement to Malaysia dispute and would seek to revive quadripartite commission proposal and would again pledge publicly to agree to accept whatever recommendations it made. Sukarno also expressed a willingness to attend another summit if it would be useful. (Ibid., POL 15–1 INDON)
  3. In telegram 542 from Djakarta, September 15, Jones reported that Subandrio told him that there would be no further escalation, there were no plans for additional paratrooper drops, and “it’s up to the British.” (Ibid., POL 32–1 INDON–MALAYSIA) In telegram 549, September 16, Jones reported that Sukarno informed him that, “unless the British start something,” Indonesia had no plans for further military action, and there would be no action against American persons or property during his forthcoming East European trip. (Ibid.)