50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia 1
1284. Embtel 2491.2 As you know, US does not intend play any role in Tokyo meetings which hopefully will take place later this month, and does not wish create impression in anyone’s mind that we are doing so. At same time, we regard these meetings as only foreseeable chance of real progress toward settling Indo-Malaysia dispute, and willing consider any related actions which might help create right atmosphere.
We are aware that visit to US is something Sukarno wants, that he has been aware adverse US public attitude toward GOI and that net result may be to make him more reasonable in Tokyo in hope successful US visit. We also aware Sukarno’s capacity for backsliding after returning home in face PKI and other Indo domestic pressures, and for this reason we are reluctant to recommend to President that he give Sukarno written invitation to visit Washington.
Problem, therefore, is to help move Sukarno toward constructive attitude in Tokyo by holding out carrot of US visit without committing President to receive him as honored guest regardless of outcome of summit meetings. While situation might change if summit dramatically successful, suggest that for present you discuss with Sukarno along following lines:
As Sukarno knows, President regards resolution of dangerous problems in area by negotiation between Asian principals as essential, [Page 112]and hopes that summit meetings will make tangible progress. President also understands that Sukarno wishes make visit to World’s Fair this year, and that he may come to US for this purpose after Tokyo. If he does so, US public reaction to events of past year will undoubtedly cause his public reception to be less friendly than on former visits. But if Sukarno does come, President would receive him in Washington for informal meeting before or after New York visit for discussion US-Indo relations and other problems of common interest. Temper of visit would of course depend on situation at the time. FYI. You should make clear that whole question of Washington phase of visit and to some extent nature of his reception will depend on outcome of talks in Tokyo.
We would anticipate that Washington visit would be handled as outlined paragraph two Deptel 1163.3 We will suggest timing later. End FYI.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDON–MALAYSIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Cuthell, cleared by Green and Komer, and approved by Harriman.↩
- In telegram 2491 from Djakarta, June 2, Jones suggested that “as an additional inducement for Sukarno to be reasonable at summit,” the President should send him a message expressing hope for a peaceful settlement of the dispute with Malaysia and suggesting a date for a Sukarno visit to Washington. (Ibid.)↩
- In the second paragraph of telegram 1163 to Djakarta, April 25, the Department suggested that Sukarno’s visit would have to be “short, informal, and quiet” and on a time available basis. The Department envisioned a stay of no more than 1–1/2 or 1 day with a working lunch. Although the Department might be willing to consider a brief communique at the conclusion of the visit, it could not imply U.S. patience with Sukarno’s anti-Malaysia policies. (Ibid., POL 7 INDON)↩