You asked Bill Jorden to come up with some new ideas that might be raised
with President Marcos. You asked
him to staff out further the six ideas he submitted. He has done so.
The attached memo and attachments cover the ground—including background
and recommendations.
In sum, four of the ideas have possibilities; two are non-starters. You
will want to consider these in light of the total package of assistance
and cooperation that State, AID and
Defense are now working up.
Attachment
Washington, September 12, 1966.
Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security
Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)
SUBJECT
- New Ideas for U.S.-Philippine Cooperation
In response to a request from the President,3 I submitted some ideas for new forms
of U.S.-Philippine cooperation—ideas the President might want to
take up with Marcos during
the latter’s visit.
The President expressed interest and asked me to staff out further.
Don Ropa and I have done
so—consulting with State, AID,
NASA, and other interested
agencies.
I am attaching separate papers4—including recommendations—on the six
ideas.
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To sum up my conclusions:
(1) Filipino Astronaut:
NASA has been trying to find ways
to bring foreign nationals into our astronaut program. They see more
disadvantages than advantages right now. Among the former are:
resentment of other nations; trouble in finding a qualified
candidate; let-down if man chosen flunked out, etc.
As an alternative, they propose Philippine participation in
satellite, sounding rocket, and ground-based research and
applications programs. This would start with a visit of Filipino
scientists to NASA.
Recommendation:
The President tell Marcos of
our desire to encourage Filipino participation in space-associated
programs.
If Marcos shows interest, the
President could offer NASA
cooperation in developing a program.
He could invite Marcos to send
a team of Filipino scientists and engineers to come to the U.S. to
visit our space facilities. NASA
would act as host and would help develop a program, including
arrangements for training of young scientists under NASA-sponsored fellowships.
Note the Philippines have plans for a ground monitoring station for
weather satellites. The President might encourage them to press
forward and possibly ask if Marcos needs additional technical assistance.
(2) Typhoon Damage Control:
A small joint program is feasible, provided it meshes with regional
plans being developed by ECAFE and
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).
Recommendation:
The President would advise Marcos of our interest in supporting regional
planning in this field under ECAFE/WMO. He could
also express interest in a joint U.S.-Philippine typhoon damage
control center program.
Specifically, he might propose: (a) a small meteorological training
program in the U.S. for selected Filipinos; (b) establishment of a
U.S.-Philippine commission to study specific projects; (c) offer to
conduct a typhoon modification experiment in the Philippines area in
the next year; (d) send a U.S. meteorological team to Manila to make
more detailed recommendations.
(3) Regional Military Defense College:
There is an obvious need for a center in Southeast Asia to conduct
research and to develop new techniques in the field of countering
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subversion and
promoting democratic political and social development. Ultimately,
this could become multinational. At the outset, we should consider
plans for a Filipino center—with them in front and us helping.
Recommendation:
The President could remind Marcos of the Philippine initiative for a SEATO regional military staff college
in 1956. Recall that we opened joint talks with them in 1958, but
nothing came of it. Indicate our interest in reopening discussions
keyed to the present nature of the Communist threat.
If Marcos was receptive, the
President could state his interest in seeing such a Center evolve
through Filipino and Asian leadership, with our support.
He could propose a joint panel of Filipinos and Americans to study
this proposal and recommend a course of action. Suggest that it be a
Filipino-directed enterprise at the outset, with the question of a
tie-in with SEATO to be deferred
until it was a going concern.
(4) Regional Development Institute:
ECAFE has plans underway for this
kind of institute, aiming for a link-up with the Asian Development
Bank. The critical need in the Philippines is for a rational
approach to their own development process. A national development
institute, on the model of Thailand’s National Institute of
Development Administration, might be proposed.
Recommendation:
The President might express our conviction that development planning
can succeed only if it is systematized. He could offer our help in
developing such a systematic institutional approach.
If Marcos were interested, the
President might suggest the possibility of our support in developing
a new institute or in combining existing programs at the University
of the Philippines and in Marcos’ executive office, where he has set up a
small development group.
If Marcos welcomes help, offer
to send a U.S. technical advisory team composed of governmental and
foundation experts.
(5) Manila-Tarlac Highway:
This is a non-starter. We gave the Philippines a highway loan in
1959—and got 17 miles of road built. We need better Filipino
performance—and a well worked out road development plan—before
trying to move on this.
(6) Bridge over the Pasig:
Too low a priority item to draw on scarce Filipino resources at this
time. The main traffic problem, as I understand it, concerns
rights-of-way, bridge approaches and squatters at key crossings.
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Conclusion:
The President might want to raise one or more of the first four
items.5
In a sense, these would be dessert which should be looked at in light
of what State, AID, Defense and
others produce in the form of a main course. If the latter is
substantial, we may want to hold off on the above.
State (Bundy) and AID (Poats) are aware of the general content of the
above.
