2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia 1

727. Your 1360.2 Whole question of aid to GOI still under high-level review and guidance to you not likely for several days. FYI. Latest Indonesian actions such as Kalabakan raid, renewed statements GOI intention “crush” Malaysia, Sukarno and Saleh treatment of SVN Liberation Front make it questionable whether we will be able continue existing ongoing aid let alone increase it or take on new obligations. End FYI. In circumstances, you should make it clear that Congressional amendments will make it impossible to continue any aid at all if Indonesia continues to support insurgency activities in North Borneo.

At same time, suggest you get across to Sukarno that correction this increasingly tense relationship almost entirely in his and GOI’s hands. What is needed to let us help Indonesia is not only surface improvement in area relations but clear and lasting indication GOI intends live at peace with its neighbors. We do not challenge GOI’s right try develop its economy apart from Malaysia, but cannot support Indo when it even indirectly engaged in military and political acts of aggressive nature. Without showing you aware Thanat’s latest effort, you might push general idea described Deptel 724,3 and express hope that Sukarno’s meeting with Macapagal will lead to reduction politico-military confrontation rather than its escalation.

In short, Dept does not wish spoil friendly luncheon, but wishes Sukarno be aware that cumulative effect Indo actions in past months [Page 3]has been to bring US-Indo relations to point of crisis which only decent Indo conduct can restore.4

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 INDON. Secret; Flash; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cuthell, cleared by Harriman, and approved by Hilsman.
  2. In telegram 1360 from Djakarta, January 4, Jones asked if he could “hold out some carrot” during a lunch with Sukarno in January. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 724 to Djakarta, January 4, the Department of State informed the Embassy that the British Embassy had learned that Macapagal had agreed to Thanat’s idea of sounding out Sukarno about a 1-month “truce in shooting and propaganda” by all involved in the dispute over Malaysia. (Ibid., POL 32–1 INDON–MALAYSIA)
  4. In telegram 1362 from Djakarta, January 4, Jones reported in detail a half hour frank and private conversation that he had with Sukarno during the lunch. Jones commented the “talk went nowhere except to put Sukarno clearly on notice.” (Ibid., POL 15–1 INDON)