53. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson1
McNamara’s talks with Indian Defense Minister Chavan went quite well, until interrupted by Nehru’s death. Indians had produced a 5-Year Defense Plan at our request, and we managed to squeeze the key foreign exchange component down $332 million (about 20%) on grounds deleted items were militarily unnecessary and too great a burden on the economy.
In turn McNamara has agreed to $50 million MAP in FY’65 for mountain warfare equipment, communications, and defense production. He has withheld any 5-year MAP promises until he can work over their plan some more, especially on the air side. We did, however, tell Indians they could assume for planning purposes roughly same level in future years.
[Page 117]McNamara also agreed to sell on credit terms up to $10 million in FY’64 and $50 million FY’65 certain items to be agreed. Since the Indians intend to spend some of their own hard currency anyway, this neat device meant that much of it will flow to us rather than to the Soviets or UK.
Both we and Indians regard this exercise to date as successful and want to tape it down in a Memorandum of Understanding (Tab A),2 which McNamara has OKed. Chavan has himself appealed to us to OK it, so that he can run it through Indian cabinet, and we can put out a brief announcement on success of talks, a good gesture in India just now.
The Memo, and proposed bland press release (Tab B),3 fall far short of what Bowles wants (but will be a plus in India even so). For example, it does not include any US jet offer designed to pre-empt Indian MIG deal with Soviets. Bundy and I hope you’ll hear argument on this separately later.
We simply want to give you the final word on this before going ahead.4 It’s only an early stage in a long and painful dialogue with the Indians but both sides are happy with progress to date. Nor will Paks be too unhappy, because we haven’t given much (we’ve kept them clued).
Recommend your early approval. Indians hope to get it so their cabinet can act before it goes Saturday to bury Nehru’s ashes.5
- R.W. Komer
- McG. B.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. II, Cables, 4/64–6/64. Secret.↩
- Not printed. This revised draft, dated May 27, the essentials of which are summarized in this memorandum, was signed by Bowles and Chavan on June 6 as a memorandum of understanding on military assistance. The text of the agreement, as signed, was transmitted to the Department in airgram A–1290 from New Delhi, June 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–4 US–INDIA)↩
- Not printed. The text of the press release was transmitted to New Delhi on June 5 in telegram 2534, with authorization for the Embassy to release it. (Ibid., DEF 19–3 US–INDIA)↩
- Bundy received preliminary approval for the agreement from President Johnson in a telephone conversation the previous evening. (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, Alpha Series, McGeorge Bundy)↩
- President Johnson checked the approval line.↩