Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

54. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, June 6, 1964, 1300Z.

3686. Late Friday afternoon I met with Lal Bahadur Shastri for forty-five minutes. The new PriMin was calm, cordial and relaxed. The talk which included some pointed references to military assistance agreement developed along following lines:

1. Shastri opened conversation with an emotional and extended reference to Nehru in course of which he reviewed his 37-year personal relationship, the unique influence that Nehru had on the Indian people, his moral and physical courage, etc. through his efforts a strong national political foundation has been built. The new Indian Govt was determined to build on that foundation and he was personally encouraged by the initial response of Congress Party and Indian public.

2. I stressed world-wide implications of Indian democratic experiment, growing understanding in US of Nehru’s personal qualities and historic role, warm press and public reaction to his own recent election, and continuing determination of USG to back Indian economic development and military defense with greatest vigor.

3. Picking up my last point, Shastri reminded me of our last conversation in which he had expressed view that outcome of Chavan visit to US was of profound importance. He was delighted to hear that negotiations had been successful. Although Chavan had shown him agreement he had been so harried that he had not had opportunity to study it.

4. At his request I outlined main points, stressing need for balance between the economic growth which is essential to national unity and motivation and an adequate force with which to defend Indian borders.

Shastri asked incisive questions about US help for domestic military production, nature of grant aid arrangements, likely magnitude of our assistance plans, prospects for continuing congressional support, etc., and next step in regard to air force negotiations which he understood had not been completed.

5. In regard to latter point I expressed the hope that discussions would soon be resumed and that decision satisfactory to both of us could be reached in near future.

Perhaps more than any other nation we shared India’s concern over long range implications of China’s political objectives and military capacity. Although we felt that Indian Defense Ministry was inclined to overrate China’s present air capacity and to underrate her potential missile capacity, we fully agreed that India needs an effective air defense system with a number of high performance aircraft, and we expressed our willingness to provide such aircraft.

Our difficulties lie along two lines (1) our belief that the Indian defense authorities as in every other govt have failed to balance questions of financial costs against practical requirements and (2) our concern over growing dependence of Indian Air Force on USSR. If in addition to transport planes, SAMs and some MIG-21s this should now be expanded by the addition of a large MIG-21 assembly line, major US assistance to Indian air force would not only be unnecessary but would also create many security problems for us.

While we welcome lessening of tensions with USSR we cannot forget that less than two years ago Mr. Khrushchev’s government had surreptitiously attempted to place forty missiles in Cuba armed with nuclear warheads and aimed at forty US cities. If India could visualize a Chinese attempt to place similar installations in Bhutan or Burma she would understand our reaction.

In any event it is important that the Prime Minister and his key associates understand our view of India’s actual air defense needs based on many years of experience in similar situations. In initial stage we believed that India needs reasonably effective airplane with high rate of climb that could be delivered here quickly and at low cost. Over longer haul India needs a supersonic plane preferably produced or assembled in this country.

In regard to first need we had discussed with Mr. Chavan F6As, a proven plane with fast rate of climb, and an extremely low cost, relatively easy to fly and available promptly.

In regard to second need, we had expressed our willingness during Washington discussions to help India in every practical way to find suitable engine for her HF–24 (Mach II). Naturally the question had arisen: but what if our combined efforts should fail?

The Indian Air Force had expressed an eagerness for US F–104Gs. Although this is an outstanding plane we had stressed that it is extremely costly, hard to fly and prone to accidents. Moreover present assembly lines in Japan, Germany and Canada are likely to be closed down before end of next year.

We had also discussed the F–5 which although not as fast as the F–104 is fully capable of handling Chinese bombers and much less expensive although more so than the F–6A.

In any event the situation was still hanging fire. Indian Air Force like every other air force naturally wanted the best regardless of cost. We on other hand are deeply concerned about unbalancing the defense budget with unnecessarily sophisticated weapons.

If we did decide to backup HF–24 project with supersonic plane acceptable to Indians we would do so on assumption that India would not feel that a major MIG-21 production effort was also required in addition to our contribution plus the expensive Soviet SAMs which we understood had already been contracted for.

6. Shastri listened attentively to this presentation and asked pertinent questions; his final one being “Does Chavan agree with your views?” I replied that although Mr. Chavan had seen all three planes and undoubtedly had formed some opinion he was probably waiting for US decision as to what we are willing to do.

The Indian Air Force was greatly taken with F–104 which we all agreed was an outstanding plane. In the end, however, such decisions as in our own govt would have to be taken by the civilian ministries; in doing so I only hoped they would not forget that the added cost of the Air Force proposals would probably be enough to build two or three new Indian universities or dam over one of India’s greatest rivers.

Although PriMin might assume he was not a military expert I could assure him that he would soon be forced by such situations to become one. He would find that it is a rare occasion when he will be provided by wholly right or wholly wrong alternatives; on questions of defense as elsewhere the available policy choices are bound to be unsatisfactory in one way or another.

7. Shastri then asked me about procedure. I replied that the classified general agreement was all set and in Mr. Chavan’s hands and that as soon as he approved it we would issue joint press statement.

I said that press statement that we had prepared was deliberately in low key and rather vague on key questions because from Indian point of view and our own it was essential not to upset the Pakistanis.

As PriMin himself had pointed out, Ayub Khan had taken moderate and encouraging position in regard to India. If this mood is adequately encouraged we may expect further weakening of the Sino-Pak relationship which will serve our common interests.

Shastri agreed with this and commented that he was glad general agreement had been reached, that he was grateful for my explanation of air force question which he had not previously understood, and that in meantime Chavan had full authority to sign agreement.

8. I closed my end of conversation with remarks on overriding importance of the US-Indian relationship, our heavy stake in India’s economic and political success and in her military defense, and the fact that as India’s new Prime Minister he could count on President Johnson, Dean Rusk, me and everyone else in our govt for understanding and support in good times or in bad.

Shastri replied that he hoped we could talk frequently about many things, that he was particularly conscious of my long interest in Indian development, and that he would like to feel free to discuss with me some special problems in that regard. For instance, he shared my conviction that India’s political future would be determined in her villages, and added that new land reform measures were high on Congress Party agenda and that he hoped to talk with me about them soon.

His final comment at the door was a request that I personally thank Dean Rusk for interrupting his busy Washington schedule to come all the way to New Delhi for Nehru’s funeral.

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 INDIA–US. Confidential. Repeated to the White House, Defense Department, London, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD.