Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

52. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Minister of Defense Chavan¹

Washington, June 3, 1964.

Dear Mr. Minister:

I am very pleased that our recent discussions concerning the Indian Five-Year Defense Plan reached general agreement, but the event which terminated them has caused us all great sorrow. Prime Minister Nehru’s sudden death has brought to a close a remarkable career, devoted throughout as it was to the service of India. All of us here join in sending you our sympathy on such a loss.

I know that we are both interested in the momentum of our talks in Washington carrying on. I agree with your suggestion to Assistant Secretary Talbot that we omit from the Memorandum the sentence referring to the Rs. 650 crores level of foreign exchange.² As you recall, at our meeting I indicated my feeling that moving toward the Rs. 650 crores level would constitute a less severe drain on India’s economic development, but I see no necessity to include this in the Memorandum.

I understand that your other point related to the Indian force plans referred to in Article 3 of the Memorandum. Here again I agree with your suggested revision of the Memorandum so that the second and third sentences of Article 3 of the Memorandum read as follows:

“Minister Chavan said that Indian Defense Representatives would determine the specific items in the Plan to be deferred to come within the above-mentioned foreign exchange level and would determine appropriate readjustments in the Plan. Projection by the United States of its military assistance, both grant aid and credit sales, on a multi-year basis will depend on these determinations.”

As you can well appreciate, any multi-year projection of United States military assistance to India must rest on a general understanding between us with respect to proposed defense foreign exchange expenditures, rupee military budget, and force plans which such assistance would go to support. Your Defense Plan, including the force plans, will certainly continue to be a topic of mutual discussions between us.

I hope that these suggestions are helpful in putting the Memorandum of Understanding into appropriate form for execution.³ I am very pleased by the tenor of the discussions which we had over the past few weeks here in Washington on your Defense Plan and I look forward to agreement on longer term arrangements between our Governments in this respect.

Sincerely yours,

Robert S. McNamara ⁴

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, India 381. Secret. Drafted by Solbert. The text of this letter was transmitted to New Delhi on June 3 in telegram DEF 971909. (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425)
2. Both of the changes proposed by Chavan in the language of the memorandum of understanding were explained in a June 3 memorandum from Solbert to McNamara. Solbert noted that Chavan felt that the Rs. 650 crores objective in the memorandum of understanding would be difficult to sell to the Indian Cabinet, and the language relating to force levels would be read by the Shastri government as an unacceptable abrogation of decision-making authority to an external power. (Ibid.)
3. Bowles reported in telegram 3626 from New Delhi, June 3, that Chavan had secured Cabinet approval for the memorandum of understanding, subject to the two changes he had proposed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 US–INDIA)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this signature and an indication that the original was signed.