Office of the Historian

438. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas1

Washington, April 15, 1967, 2326Z.

CAP 67295. For the President from Walt Rostow. Subject: L.K. Jha and the NPT.

Against the background of the following letter from Mrs. Gandhi, I had a talk this morning with L.K. Jha,2 one of her closest and most responsible advisors and B.K. Nehru.3 You will see from her letter that she hopes Jha will be able to see you—he leaves town on Wednesday.4 There are three issues:

  • Firstly, Soviet and U.S. assurances to India and others who sign the NPT: He has just come from Moscow where he appears to have made substantial progress in getting out of the Russians the beginnings of an assurance. According to him, the Russians are prepared to make a declaration when the NPT is signed to the effect that the nuclear powers have a responsibility to act quickly through the Security Council if a non-nuclear signatory of the NPT is subject to unprovoked nuclear threat or attack. There would also be language permitting a nuclear power to act in fulfillment of that assurance without waiting for Security Council action, freeing it from a possible delay as a result of a Security Council veto. According to him, they are ready to do it simultaneously with us, even though our respective assurances would not necessarily be identical.

    We do not yet have the formal Soviet text. But Jha has a reputation for care and accuracy. If he is nearly accurate, this could represent a real breakthrough.

    We will be studying a paper5 he has drafted combining our views and Russia’s, as he understands them. He recognizes that we can’t give him anything definitive until we see the Russian text, but he hopes for some sign from us of a serious interest in privately exploring with the Russians an assurance paralleling what he thinks they are ready to declare.

  • Secondly, we discussed briefly our new arms policy toward the subcontinent. They fear that our selling spares to Ayub will make him less willing to reach agreement with them, and make it more difficult for them to hold the line on defense expenditures. I stressed our intention to look at military supply on a case by case basis in the light of particular transactions’ effect upon the level of expenditures.
  • Third, we discussed the problem of at least holding the line, and preferably, reducing arms expenditures. They argued we should force the Paks to reach an arms agreement with them by not selling spares until they agreed (for his part, Ayub wants us to act as middle man, so that we can pressure the Indians on Pakistan’s behalf). I urged them to press forward in all possible ways their effort toward secret talks, preferably between military and financial specialists in both countries in an effort to find a way to prevent a further arms race, which we did not intend to finance. They shouldn’t be discouraged if the Paks didn’t respond quickly—after all, India was by far the larger, stronger country. Pakistan has no arms production and no source of supply like India’s from Russia.

Prime Minister Gandhi leans heavily on L.K. Jha’s judgment. It is important that he go home with a clear knowledge of our interest in his brokerage effort between us and Moscow. He saw Kosygin when there, and before he came here, his government asked if you could receive him.

In view of the possibility that we may be on the verge of a breakthrough on the NPT, and the importance of strengthening his hand in New Delhi against the Hawks who want to go nuclear, I recommend you try to see him on Tuesday or Wednesday.

Have Marv set up an appointment6

Consult with me on this

[Here follows the text of Prime Minister Gandhi’s April 10 letter to President Johnson; see Document 436.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, India, Vol. I, Prime Minister Gandhi Correspondence, 1/11/66–9/12/67. Confidential.↩
  2. Jha visited Washington April 12–19.↩
  3. A memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Rostow, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. 9, 3/67–7/67.↩
  4. April 19.↩
  5. A copy of this undated paper is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, India, Vol. I, Prime Minister Gandhi Correspondence, 1/11/66–9/12/67.↩
  6. Neither option is checked on the telegram. Johnson did, however, meet with Jha on April 19; see Document 440.↩