Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

437. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, April 10, 1967, 1430Z.

14747. Dept pass CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, AmEmbassy London, AmEmbassy Rawalpindi, AmEmbassy Tehran. Ref: State 166539² and 168709.³

1. I decided it best convey contents reftels to Foreign Minister Chagla rather than Prime Minister Gandhi since once she took position it would be government policy, whereas we retain some flexibility by making approach to Chagla. I also decided to convey our position in writing and accordingly handed him aide-mémoire at beginning our meeting. Full text aide-mémoire transmitted next following telegram.⁴ While meeting was conducted in polite terms, there was no doubt that Chagla and Bajpai, who was also present, were deeply concerned over effects of our decision.

2. After reading aide-mémoire Chagla stressed that GOI policy is to attempt to prevent arms race which is harmful to both India and Pakistan. GOI is prepared for serious talks. I asked if he had yet had reply to his letter to Foreign Minister Pirzada. He replied in the negative but stated he understood reply was about to be received and Indian HICOM in Pindi was returning tomorrow to Delhi and he expected he would be carrying reply with him.

3. Chagla said the question was how far U.S. policy would contribute to achieving our shared objective of preventing an arms race. He pointed out GOI was worried not merely about arms that the Paks obtained from all over the world but about the arms that were going to Pakistan through Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. in this connection he cited unusual circumstance of Iranian planes recently taking part in Pakistani National Day celebrations. He said he would be going to Tehran in a few days and wanted to have a frank talk with the Shah.

4. Chagla said deep concern would be aroused by resumption of provision of spare parts for lethal equipment in hands of Paks even on sales basis since this would understandably strengthen Pak military capacity. I pointed out that we were simply readjusting our policy so that it would now be consistent with that of other Western countries. He believed new policy strongly favored Paks and reminded me that they had previously told us Paks would use our weapons against India. We had been unable to prevent Paks from using such equipment against India.

5. Chagla was concerned that effect of resumption spare parts supply for Pakistan lethal equipment would inevitably lead to a step up in arms race. It was felt that the timing of our move was “singularly unfortunate” coming immediately before anticipated reply of Paks to Chagla letter. Our new policy it was feared would encourage Pak intransigence. He pointed out that criteria of limitation of military expenditures means that Paks will be able to obtain more equipment within the same expenditure ceiling.

6. Chagla asked if we agreed that the Indians should discuss arms limitations irrespective of Kashmir, and I told him we understood that the Kashmir problem could not be solved first.

7. Bajpai expressed grave concern which Chagla shared that proposed announcement April 12 would have extremely damaging effect not only on Indian public attitudes but also on L.K. Jha’s visit to Washington. They strongly urged that announcement be held up at least a few days.

8. In closing Chagla agreed with my suggestion that the value of this policy would be determined by the manner in which we implemented it and added that if it helped the Indo-Pak dialogue it was all well and good, if not, all India’s efforts to establish a dialogue would be for naught. We agreed that we would again be in touch in a few days after they had had an opportunity to give a thorough study to our aide-mémoire.

9. During meeting I also handed Foreign Minister on separate paper text of proposed press statement. I did not give him text of contingency questions and answers. Bajpai pointed out that the press statement as presently drafted draws major attention to our provision spare parts for previously supplied equipment to Paks and fact India also included as Chagla put it was “SOP with no real meaning”, since we have not in past provided lethal items to Indians on anywhere near scale provided Paks.

10. Effect of proposed press statement he said will be highly damaging our interests in India. (Note: I am sending separate message April 11 containing suggested redraft of press statement which is attempt to place our policy in perspective that would help diminish difficulties here.)

11. Action requested: As Chagla will undoubtedly be calling me back in day or two for further discussion, I would like to be able to assure him catagorically that if Paks give a negative response to Chagla letter⁵ calling for arms limitation, and by negative response I include a reply indicating prior necessity to settle Kashmir, that I be authorized assure GOI in such circumstances we would not proceed authorize sale spare parts for previously supplied lethal military equipment. Anything further I could say to effect Paks agree not go to ChiComs for additional equipment would be helpful.

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. Document 431.
3. Document 433.
4. Telegram 14748 from New Delhi, April 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–INDIA)
5. C.S. Jha told Bowles on April 11 that Pakistan had just rejected the proposal in Chagla’s letter. Jha stated that the Pakistani response would amplify the negative reaction in India to the decision taken by the United States on military supply policy. (Telegram 14899 from New Delhi, April 12; ibid.)