Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

439. Letter From the Deputy Ambassador-designate to Vietnam (Locke) to President Johnson¹

Djakarta, April 18, 1967.

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed is an “Aide-mémoire on the U.S. Government’s Arms Policy For Pakistan and India”² which President Ayub handed me when I lunched at his house April 15. He asked me to send it to you.

The Aide-mémoire discusses not only the military supply policy, but economic aid as well.

With respect to our military supply policy, all government officials with whom I have talked recognize that it is an improvement over the current situation. They do not believe, however, that it adequately recognizes their defense needs. I believe that it does, if properly interpreted and implemented. They agree, but have no confidence in our interpretation or implementation. For this reason it is extremely important that:

1. We handle spare parts requests expeditiously and do not debate for long periods whether they are in “critical need” or contribute to “reduced defense expenditures.” Obviously all spare parts not on hand are “critically needed” and to buy them from us is cheaper than to buy them from gun runners, thus reducing defense expenditures. We should only assure ourselves that the supply of parts requested is of reasonable quality.

2. We handle requests for permission to buy end items from third countries promptly and with understanding. If these items are actually for replacements and to fill in gaps, as claimed, and not for expanded forces, they should be allowed. Requests in this category should be considered as reducing defense expenditures, because these tanks are less expensive than new ones from other countries which would otherwise be bought. The key question should be whether or not the requested tanks are necessary to an adequate defense within existing force levels.

3. We use economic pressure to prevent the Indians from fueling an arms race.

Some of the reasons Pakistan is suspicious of our proper implementation of the new policy are:

1. We appear to them to have bought the Indian “status quo” on Kashmir and to be trying by our policy to force them to accept it. This they will never do.

2. We said when I first came to Pakistan that we were requiring India, like Pakistan, to keep her defense expenditures in line and avoid an arms race; yet the Indian defense budget has gone up, where Pakistan’s has gone down somewhat; and the balance of forces has increased considerably in favor of the Indians since the 1965 War.

3. In November, pursuant to State Department message, I asked President Ayub certain questions with respect to his intentions about arms limitations, talks on all subjects (including Kashmir), and arms sources (especially Chinese and Russian), and left the thought that our degree of responsiveness to his defense needs would depend on our assessment of his answers. His answers, I believe, were satisfactory from our point of view, yet our action was delayed five months, and then given in the form of a policy which on its face does not appear to recognize his needs, although it can be interpreted to do so. (As above stated, our declared policy—properly interpreted and implemented—will properly recognize his needs, and it is this prompt and proper interpretation and implementation that is important.)

The paper’s comments with respect to economic matters are not completely balanced. We cannot be more forthcoming on Tarbela at this time than we have been, and they understand the reason. We have been reasonably forthcoming both as to amount and timing on consortium aid and food, at least as compared with India. It is difficult for Pakistan to understand, however, although I have tried to explain why it takes so long to get a commitment issued on the $70 million loan, after you authorized it some time ago. Also they still feel we should have been more responsive in meeting their request to send 250,000 tons of wheat before the end of the year in response to President Ayub’s personal letter to Secretary Freeman;³ the wheat was eventually committed and sent, but not in time to avoid Pakistan buying more with its own foreign exchange and being forced to suspend the free list. And it is true—as they charge—that they have spent many times per capita more of their foreign exchange on food than India, and India’s greater famine may be principally due to India’s failure to use the same self-help measures as Pakistan. In other words, we have been very responsive to many of their requests, but they have been frustrated and their economic progress has been slowed and liberalization prevented by a combination of slowness in consortium aid and their necessity to spend so much foreign exchange on food grain—whatever the cause.

It is true that if we could be more responsive from a timing point of view on all kinds of aid, we could build more good will without giving more in the total. But of course we have our own problems, and Pakistan has not always been quick in solving some of our minor troubles in Pakistan.

There will be a tendency in reading the enclosed report to be a little aggravated by what appears to be Pakistan’s failure to see our problems and appreciate our help. But we should resist this tendency. We should seek to understand and be sympathetic to their frustrations—whatever the cause. Pakistan’s orientation toward the West is extremely important to us (and to India as well) and we should not be diverted from our major foreign policy goals by emotional reaction.⁴

Faithfully yours,

Eugene M. Locke ⁵

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Memos, 10/66–7/67. Confidential. Ambassador Locke left his post as Ambassador to Pakistan on April 16, and was passing through Indonesia en route to his new post as Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam.
2. The enclosed aide-mémoire, prepared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and dated April 15, laid out a variety of reasons for concluding that “the new U.S. arms supply policy affects Pakistan adversely.” The aide-mémoire also argued that “U.S. policy towards Pakistan in the economic field gives rise to concern.”
3. Not found.
4. Locke expanded his analysis of the Pakistani aide-mémoire in another letter to the President, sent from Bangkok on May 1. He noted that his first reaction to the aide-mémoire was one of anger, for it did not show any appreciation for U.S. actions with respect to Pakistan’s security and food problems. Upon reflection, he decided that the aide-mémoire did not accurately reflect the attitudes of Ayub and his principal advisers. As he saw it, the Pakistani leadership viewed the new U.S. military supply policy as a step forward and recognized the importance of U.S. economic assistance. Locke felt that the Pakistanis did not question the fact that they received their fair share of economic assistance, but had problems with the timing of the assistance. Locke attributed the aide-memoire to pressure from the “China lobby” in the government and in the press. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Memos, 10/66–7/67)
5. Signed for Locke by Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green.