Office of the Historian

368. Memorandum From Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1

Washington, August 19, 1966, 9:20 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Mrs. Gandhi’s letter2 in brief
1.
This rather long letter covers a lot of ground.
2.
It is a dignified, poised effort to resume the dialogue which she must feel was impeded by her slip in the Moscow communiqué.3 (B.K. Nehru has reported it was a staff snafu; even the Foreign Minister didn’t see it before it was published.)
3.
On economic matters, she underlines the high priority on food production, the trickiness of the rains this year, the desire of her government to be economically independent in ten years. She makes no complaint about devaluation but stresses that hard economic decisions are difficult enough before an election—doubly so if “there is the slightest suspicion of external pressure, whether from foreign countries or international institutions. It is very largely for this reason that the decision to devalue was met with such violent opposition, even within my own party.”
4.
Her visits to Cairo, Brioni and Moscow were “very useful.” In October she will receive Tito and Nasser; (and we can expect strong neutralist noises from her guests. But she must receive them well to prove her loyalty to “non-alignment” before the election). New countries require strongly nationalist regimes if they are to have enough popular support to make the necessary economic decisions.
5.
She regrets any misunderstanding there may have been over the Moscow communiqué and hopes her subsequent statements clarified our doubts.
6.
On Vietnam, their policy is to find a way to get from the battlefield to the conference table “where the parties concerned can find a solution in peace.” She believes you and she were agreed on these fundamentals—and she says that Nasser, Tito and Kosygin also agree on this objective. “China, of course, thinks differently.”
7.
India is also in touch with Hanoi. Ho won’t meet on any terms which “could be construed as a sign of weakness.” She believes if we stopped bombing the north, her peace efforts would be strengthened.
8.
She passes on to you Kosygin’s view that if U.S. forces cross the 17th parallel, “it would not be possible to avoid escalation of the conflict into a larger war.”
9.
On Indo-Pak relations, she alleges closer ChiCom relations with the Paks, and a possible second Pakistani try at infiltration and disruption with ChiCom connivance. (Intelligence is checking this again at our request. Previous similar reports have proved highly exaggerated.) Talks with Pakistan are stalled because the Paks “seem still to insist that the question of Kashmir must be settled” first.
10.
Talks on defense expenditures will be on the agenda if talks are begun.
11.
She concludes with a reference to Luci’s “glittering” wedding and how much you will miss Luci. “What a lovely girl she is. Seeing her reminded me how incomplete a family is without a daughter.”
12.
(State is preparing a draft reply which we will have this weekend.)
  • Howard
  • Bromley Smith
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, India, Vol. 1, PM Gandhi Correspondence, 1/11/66–9/12/67. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, “Rec’d 9:45.” A handwritten “L” indicates it was seen by the President.↩
  2. Prime Minister Gandhi’s 5-page letter to President Johnson was dated August 7. (Ibid.)↩
  3. In the communiqué signed on July 16 at Moscow at the conclusion of her visit to the Soviet Union, Gandhi agreed to language calling for an end to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 689–693)↩