Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

367. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 17, 1966.

SUBJECT

• India-Pakistan Problems

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• His Excellency B.K. Nehru, Ambassador of India
• Ambassador Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Mr. W. Howard Wriggins, National Security Council

At his request, Ambassador Nehru called on President Johnson at 12:30 p.m., August 17. The Ambassador delivered a letter which he had brought back from Prime Minister Gandhi.² The President accepted it without opening it and asked if this was the message which had been mentioned in the newspapers. He then inquired about the monsoons, to which the Ambassador replied that things were all right so far but it was too early to be sure. The President then commented that he understood India has political problems (based on Ambassador Nehru’s conversation with Walt Rostow³) and noted that we did also.

The Ambassador said that he was depressed by what he had observed during his trip to India. There was a prevailing “ugly mood” growing out of frustration, anger and annoyance both inside and outside the Congress Party. It was alleged that Mrs. Gandhi was submitting to foreign pressure, especially on the devaluation issue, in order to get aid. The attitude seemed to be that, if getting aid meant surrender of sovereignty, this was unacceptable. He noted that this was what people say whether or not they mean it. But the way in which they were saying it was very virulent. This was particularly true in the context of devaluation because the rupee was regarded as a strong currency, not like a lot of the Latin American currencies. The Ambassador observed that the brunt of the criticism is falling on Food Minister Subramaniam, Finance Minister Chaudhuri, Planning Minister Mehta and the Ambassador himself.

The President replied that it is the best people who always get attacked. Citing the U.S. situation, he noted that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara are two of the most peaceful men in town, yet they are the ones here who are under the gun. He also recalled the extreme criticism of Lincoln. This made it possible, the President said, for us to understand what the Indians are enduring. Ambassador Nehru noted, however, that our two systems are different. The Indian Prime Minister can be thrown out “at the drop of a hat” whereas the President was in office for an elected term. Reassuringly the President observed that he does not believe the worst will happen. He noted we had the same type of problems and hoped Mrs. Gandhi would come through. He understood that the Indians don’t want to be dictated to and in this context he mentioned the Indo-American Foundation. He told Ambassador Nehru that we would be flexible, but we couldn’t disown the parentage.

Going on to other matters, the President stressed the need to face the population and fertilizer problems and said he admired what the Indians had done. He was sure it would pay off in the end.

But on Pakistan, India should do better. India is the larger country and with that went responsibility. There is no use in telling the Paks to go to hell, they won’t go. The President said he appreciated Tashkent. The need now is to get back to talking and in this context he recognized the difficulties created by the Indian elections. He again drew the parallel to the Vietnam situation, saying we want to talk but the others won’t react. Indicating that he understood that peaceful gestures sometimes are misunderstood domestically, he noted that his own poll of popularity had gone down after the pause in bombing in Vietnam. People just didn’t understand it and regarded it as weakness.

Ambassador Nehru said that India is “desperately anxious” to come to terms with Pakistan but couldn’t yield on Kashmir. The idea of Tashkent was to put Kashmir in “cold storage.” Reading at random from a message he had just received discussing the Pak conditions for talks, he presented a picture of the Pak position as being that no meaningful talks could take place without concrete steps on Kashmir; all other issues were peripheral and these other things could not be settled until Kashmir was settled. The Ambassador stressed that India is ready to get together on everything, including arms, but the Pakistanis keep saying “after Kashmir.”

The Ambassador went on to say that India was hoping for a reduction in the relations between Pakistan and the Chinese. The presence of Chinese advisers, hints of nuclear cooperation following Ghulam Faruque’s visit to China and other such developments give no indication at all of Pakistan moving away from the Chinese. The result is that India is left under double pressure, from both China and Pakistan. At this point Mr. Wriggins injected the observation that conditions prior to conversations are often exaggerated for bargaining purposes and this in itself need not inhibit talking. The Ambassador noted India was ready to talk without conditions, but reiterated that the Paks won’t talk until after Kashmir.

The President undertook to see what we could do and said he would welcome suggestions. After some hesitation, the Ambassador ventured the opinion that he didn’t really know what we could do since he didn’t know about our relations with Pakistan. He went on to add that there were two things that the U.S. could do for India: (1) “Don’t crowd us,” let matters take their own course since democracies are not rational before elections; and (2) give all the wheat possible so people can be fed. Frankly, the importance of wheat is essentially political and short term. In the long term, as he had previously observed to Ambassador Hare, India has to face up to the realization of starvation or the solution of its own problems.

In closing the President said let’s talk things over and see what we can do. The Ambassador promised to follow up with Ambassador Hare.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL INDIA–PAK. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Laise on August 18 and approved by Wriggins on August 24. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 12:35 p.m. at the White House. (Johnson Library)
2. See Document 368.
3. Rostow’s memorandum of his conversation with Nehru on August 12 recorded Nehru’s “well-known gloom about the Indian scene.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VII, Memos and Misc, 1/8/66)