Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

366. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, August 9, 1966, 1930Z.

435. 1. Amb Bowles and I had fine meeting for 2–1/2 hours in Bangkok. We agree such meetings are highly desirable.

2. On Kashmir Amb Bowles and I agree it would be desirable to have secret meetings between trusted emissaries of Mrs. Gandhi and Pres Ayub who might be named at exploratory meeting between these Chiefs of State. Amb Bowles doubts however that actual results will flow from such meetings until India sorts out relations with Kashmiris.

3. Amb Bowles and I agree problem of Indo-Pak relations is broader than Kashmir and discussions should involve other subjects. Perhaps Ayub and Mrs. Gandhi, or their emissaries, could settle on framework for discussing together subjects. We agree I should discuss with Ayub whether and where he will meet with Mrs. Gandhi and his version of modalities of future discussions between the two countries.

4. Amb Bowles and I agree on importance of preventing arms race on subcontinent. To this end it is my belief we should seek to bring about secret discussions on arms limitation between representatives of both countries chosen by their respective Chief of State. I desire to discuss with Ayub his willingness to authorize such discussions.

5. Amb Bowles does not believe GOI will hold meaningful discussions if U.S. provides lethal spare parts for Pakistan and unless (A) Pakistan renounces use of force in regard to Kashmir and (B) U.S. offers some tangible assurance of assistance to GOI in event of ChiCom and/or Pak attack. He believes if we do not furnish spares to Pakistan India might be persuaded as first step to agree to assessment of size of its own and Pak military establishments by World Bank. I believe bilateral discussions between representatives of the two countries probably will be more fruitful. If such discussions cannot now be brought about, I believe we should seek to promote same objective of stable military force relationship through separate discussions between U.S. and each country.

6. Amb Bowles and I do not reach any broad agreement on complex of issues relating to U.S. military policy toward subcontinent. We agree Pak military dependence on ChiComs would be disastrous for India, and one of our prime objectives with respect to India is to prevent Pakistan from growing closer to ChiComs. Amb Bowles believes Indian leaders would agree with this and would also agree China is main threat to India. He indicates that principal fear of Indian leaders is possibility of ChiCom-Pak military combination. However, Amb Bowles considers that (A) Pakistan will not move closer to China even if Pakistan fails to secure lethal spare parts because Ayub and landowners supporting him will not tolerate further closeness to Communism; (B) we can in any event prevent such a development by threatening to shut off economic aid to Pakistan; and (C) ChiComs would not increase military aid to Pakistan to any extent because of their own requirements.

7. On sale of equipment to Pakistan by friendly third countries, Amb Bowles says he will do everything he can, using argument U.S. not responsible for what other sovereign nations do, to manage what he expects will be serious problem to Indian reaction.

8. Ambassador Bowles may have further comments.

9. For my part, with respect to these critical questions of U.S. military policy in this part of world, I remain convinced for reasons I set forth in Washington that course outlined in draft memorandum for President entitled “Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan” is right.² I believe it most important I be able to talk to Ayub along lines of this memorandum shortly after his return from Dacca August 12. The security of India will not be advanced if Pakistan is continually pressed toward China by Indian military weight. In my judgement this vicious circle must be broken.³

Locke

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon for Bowles and to Karachi. Passed to the White House at 7:04 p.m.
2. See Document 365. Locke sent his comments on the memorandum to the President in a memorandum dated July 25. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Memos, 1/66–9/66)
3. Bowles transmitted his comments on his meeting with Locke in Bangkok in telegram 3200 from Saigon, August 11. Bowles stated that Locke’s account accurately reflected the meeting. His only qualification was to note that he had been pressing the Indian Government for a heads of state meeting not, as Locke reported, to settle Indo-Pak differences, but to create a positive atmosphere in which to discuss differences and find solutions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL INDIA–PAK) Rostow sent copies of both Ambassadors’ accounts of the meeting in Bangkok to President Johnson on August 11. Rostow’s advice was that “we ought to move very cautiously about spare parts for Pakistan; but move very strongly via our two Ambassadors and George Woods towards getting India-Pak agreement on the level of their military budgets.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Memos, 1/66–9/66)