Office of the Historian

353. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

Washington, June 24, 1966, 8:53 p.m.

701. Following is summary memcon. It is FYI, Noforn, and subject to amendment upon review.

1.
Pakistan Ambassador Ghulam Ahmed called on Secretary June 23. Assist. Secy. Hare also present. Ambassador stated he was under instruction to clarify personally to Secretary GOP’s position on question reopening AEDS stations Lahore and Karachi. Cited problems in political, psychological, and military areas which reopening could cause for Pakistan vis-à-vis Soviets; presentation virtually identical Shahi demarche to DCM June 7 (Rawalpindi’s 737).2 Ambassador added that Soviet Ambassador Washington continually questions him about “American bases” near Peshawar; said Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mazurov had raised this specifically with Ayub and said he hoped AEDS stations would not be reopened. All this raised considerable dilemma for Paks, both in context Kashmir issue and in area military supply where Pakistan had no indication US intention resume deliveries and Soviets had at least indicated they willing discuss supply to Pakistan. Added he did not know whether actual talks had begun with Soviets this subject.
2.
Secretary said he was glad to have Ambassador’s clarification. Said some of considerations cited by Ambassador were peripheral to small stations in question which primarily concerned with detection process serving nuclear test ban treaty requirements. Secretary said we would be considering problem further, and would be discussing with Ambassador Locke prior his return Rawalpindi.
3.
Secretary asked Ambassador re prospects for Indo-Pak talks. Ambassador stated he not fully informed; thought talks likely to take place although Mrs. Gandhi’s Moscow visit might delay them a bit. He understood there had been considerable amount US persuasion on both parties to get talks going. Secretary said we hoped very much talks could begin and that there would not be undue delay for discussion agenda. Cited our own experience with Russians where we had found it often useful not have any agenda but simply to start talking.
Ball
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 15 PAK-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Laingen; cleared by Laise, McCracken, and in substance by Spain; and approved by Hare. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to New Delhi and Moscow.↩
  2. See footnote 3, Document 344.↩