Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

352. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

Washington, June 15, 1966.

SUBJECT

• The Problem of US Military Assistance to India and Pakistan

JCSM-403–66

1. (U) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–23952/66, dated 8 June 1966,² subject as above.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a review of the staff study forwarded by the reference and do not concur in the thrust of the study nor in its conclusions and recommendations except as noted in the Annexes³ hereto.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that there is a segment of international influence which contends that as a result of a more amicable Soviet/US relationship, together with the apparent Soviet/ChiCom ideological split, the US policy should be based on cooperation with the Soviets. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it must be kept foremost in mind, and as the basis of US objectives and policy, that the USSR is still the primary adversary of the United States and that US efforts throughout the world should not encourage or accommodate the Russian design or goal any more than that of the ChiComs.

4. (S) In developing US policy objectives for the subcontinent, it must be recognized that what the United States may consider as illogical or irrational attitudes and policies on the part of India and Pakistan are, in fact, the controlling elements upon which US actions will have to be predicated. These include the following:

a. Pakistan’s fear that the fundamental Indian goal is the conquest of Pakistan.

b. India’s intransigence on the Kashmir issue for fear of losing face before the world (as opposed to acquiring face in accord with its support of international goals for peaceful settlement of issues).

c. Maintenance of armed forces by India and Pakistan in excess of their legitimate needs which neither country economically can afford.

d. Refusal of India and Pakistan to realize the great advantages that would accrue to them (and the world at large) if they both could agree on a policy in the subcontinent which would provide for their national security and economic-sociological development. 5. (TS) The United States also must correlate its role in the subcontinent with other areas. With Pakistan, the United States must consider not only its bilateral agreements, particularly regarding critical, special facilities in Peshawar, but also its position in relationship to CENTO, SEATO, and the Moslem world. With India, the United States must take into account Indian/ChiCom hostility and the attitudes and policies of both India and Communist China in relation to Southeast Asia, to include Indo/Soviet and Soviet/North Vietnam relationships and the positions of each nation toward world peace. A US strategy of assistance to India which results in ChiCom expansion into Pakistan, with a concomitant weakening of CENTO and SEATO and a loss of US special facilities in Pakistan, would be self-defeating. The losses thereby incurred would exceed any anticipated gain to the United States and India—particularly if India should become encircled with a ChiCom-dominated Sino/Pak alliance. It, therefore, is in the national interest of both the United States and India to make every effort to improve relations with Pakistan so that Chinese ingress in the subcontinent may be pre-empted.

6. (S) US national interests are best served by maintaining a stable, economically sound, and secure subcontinent. The military postures of both India and Pakistan prior to the 1962 ChiCom aggression reflected an acceptable military situation from the US point of view. However, significant change now has been induced, and reversion to the status quo ante 1962 is highly improbable. Therefore, a new balance for the subcontinent must be achieved. The most desirable is one wherein:

a. Pakistan maintains its CENTO role and serves as an anchor on the “containment” flank of the West.

b. Pakistan co-exists with India and rejects any close relation with the ChiComs.

c. India rejects closer ties with the Soviets and continues to deter the ChiComs.

d. India achieves a modus vivendi with Pakistan.

7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following military assistance policy be adopted to further US objectives in the subcontinent:

a. Expand the present policy on sale of nonlethal items to permit cash and credit sales of spare parts for US-supplied equipment in both countries without regard to lethality.

b. Offer a grant-aid program of in-country and CONUS training to India and Pakistan.

c. Resume grant-aid selectively on a case-by-case basis for projects which are in the US strategic interest.

d. Attempt to gain, as a long-term US strategy, Indo/Pak agreement on the minimum force structures, military manpower ceilings, defense spending limitations, and foreign exchange diversions. The United States should use all available and potential leverage to promote this strategy.

e. Be prepared to discuss modernization of the forces of both countries in the interest of security of the subcontinent provided India and Pakistan achieve a mutual agreement, as set forth in subparagraph d, above, acceptable to the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Harold K. Johnson ⁴ Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Pakistan 091.3, MAP. Top Secret.
2. On June 8 John T. McNaughton sent a memorandum to McNamara, attaching a study prepared in DOD/ISA on “The Problem of US Military Assistance to India and Pakistan.” McNaughton noted that the study concluded that a policy of lethal sales to either India or Pakistan would produce major disadvantages for the United States and no clear advantages. (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Pakistan 091.3 MAP-MAAG)
3. Annexes A–G are not printed.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.