Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

351. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, June 15, 1966, 0758Z.

3462. Ref: Deptel 2447.²

1. As reftel points out, the US has a major interest in heading off arms race in subcontinent and in containing Chinese threat to both India and Pakistan. The guidelines for discussion with GOI regarding Indian military expenditures and relationship to Paks outlined in reftel impress me as both useful and sound. As previously reported we have been pressing GOI on this subject and will continue to do so.

2. Thus far informal response by GOI officials to proposition that both India and Pakistan should agree to discuss a ceiling on their military budgets has been generally affirmative. Although there is considerable uncertainty in regard to procedures I believe, as a starting point, that GOI would agree to a confidential inquiry by the World Bank to establish the facts in regard to defense budgets of both nations.

3. The critical difficulty would be the development of an acceptable formula for limiting military establishments on both sides. As Indians see it they have four-and-one-half times the population of Pakistan and well over four times the GNP. More than that they face two formidable military threats along a land frontier of over 9000 miles: First in importance are the Chinese who attacked in 1962 and second are the Paks who attacked in 1965 against an obligation [sic] of Chinese ultimatum. Although most moderate Indians agree that Pak fears of an Indian attack on Pakistan may be genuine, they believe such fears to be utterly irrational and hence unlikely to be significantly affected by what Indians may say or do at the negotiating table.

4. In regard to the current flow of Soviet equipment the Indians point out that they turned to the USSR in August 1964 only when it became clear that they could not secure the military equipment they needed from the US. Of the $396 million that the Indians anticipated from US and Western sources in the first three years of the 1964 agreement only $140 million was made available. In a conversation at my home last week, General Chadhury suggested that the difference of $256 million is roughly comparable to the amount that India has since committed for equipment from the USSR. (Chadhury stressed that we had inadvertently forced India to turn to the Soviets which they did not want to do.)

5. There are two steps that might persuade India to cut back on its current defense spending, both of which present difficulties: (a) clear recognition by the US of the Chinese threat to India and a pledge within limits imposed by our Constitution that we would provide all feasible assistance to India in event of another ChiCom attack (possibly as a reaffirmation or extension of the air defense agreement); (b) a statement by GOP that it is prepared to sign a no-war agreement as the first step toward the limitation of respective military establishments. Because both of these assurances appear unlikely under present circumstances, I am not particularly hopeful that India will agree to a further reduction below the levels to which we and they agreed to in June 1964. However, if Paks were willing, it may be possible to work out some reductions in that portion of Indian military establishment for defense against Pakistan in return for reductions in Pak establishment.

6. Despite these difficulties I believe Mrs. Gandhi will continue to seek some kind of dialogue with Paks on all problems of mutual interest; indeed I suspect that this may be the next item on her agenda once devaluation-liberalization program is on tracks and Punjab situation settles down.

Major question within GOI now appears to be appropriate level of the talks. After failure at Rawalpindi Mrs. Gandhi is genuinely anxious to assure forum which will be potentially most productive or, at a minimum, least risky.

7. We have already pointed out (Embtel 3281)³ the damaging impact we will face in India if US provides lethal military supplies to Pakistan regardless of how they may be financed. Further conversations with GOI officials, talks over the weekend with Indian military at Defense Staff College in south India, and widespread evidence of all-out Communist-Mennonite campaign to destroy Mrs. Gandhi because of her growing relationship with US confirm our belief that these forebodings have not been overdrawn. Thus we continue strongly to support conclusions reached in Pindi’s 675⁴ and our 3281.

8. As a consequence of the war last August and September against an American-equipped Pak army and air force we are dealing here in India with an emotional, highly charged, gut issue which will not respond to reason. Even such sympathetic and sophisticated GOI officials as L.K. Jha could not be persuaded that US is serving long-range Indian/US interest by resuming its old role as supplier of lethal military equipment to Pakistan even on a moderate scale. Without exception such individuals are deeply convinced that any US move in this direction would again encourage unreal expectations in Rawalpindi and consequently greater inflexibility on part of Paks, while simultaneously undercutting US relationship with India at a time when they have personally staked their positions within GOI on improved understanding.

9. A large majority of Indian public, prodded by shrewd and far-reaching left wing campaign, would react with the utmost vigor to the resumption of lethal US spares for Pak fighter planes which even our best friends within GOI and press point out can only be [garble—used?] against India. Our loss in public esteem and distrust of US policy and judgment would be massive.

10. Adverse Indian reaction underscored by emotional political attacks and an extremely bad press would create counter reaction in the US with further danger to the excellent relationship developed during Mrs. Gandhi’s visit.

11. At the same time resumption of US lethal military supplies to Pakistan would undermine for some time to come our capacity to foster an accommodating Indian attitude toward Pakistan. An essential element in the delicate exercise of persuading India to consider a limitation on its military establishment vis-à-vis Pakistan is India’s trust in both reliability and good judgment of USG.

12. Another likely casualty of US lethal equipment to Pakistan would be whatever ability we may still have to keep India on non-nuclear path at least long enough to offer some hope of a world-wide non-proliferation agreement. Mrs. Gandhi’s government would never accept credibility of US assurances regarding nuclear threat if we appeared at same time to be joining Communist China in arming Pakistan against India.

13. I agree with Rawalpindi’s 675 on wisdom of our standing aside when Paks seek to buy elsewhere in the West the equipment which they feel they need. There is no good reason why we should discourage these purchases as long as they come within previously acknowledged budgetary limits, hopefully set in agreement with India.

14. I believe that for foreseeable future we must choose between two courses of action regarding arms policy toward India and Pakistan:

A. We can resume a lethal military supply relationship with Pakistan and as a consequence see a sharp deterioration in our position in India which because of its size and political orientation is the only realistic starting point for the building of an indigenous Asian counterweight to China.

B. We can limit our military supplies to both countries to non-lethal categories (if anything at all) and continue to press both India and Pakistan to focus their energies on economic development and to move toward a realistic and tolerable mutual accommodation with regard to their respective military establishments. 15. We are now striving to make B. work. I strongly urge that we continue to do so.

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–INDIA. Secret; Exdis. The Embassy suggested that the cable be repeated to Rawalpindi, Karachi, and CINCMEAFSA as desired.
2. In telegram 2447 to New Delhi, June 10, the Department expressed concern over the Indian Government’s apparent lack of understanding of the impact of its extensive arms procurement program on the military policy of Pakistan. The Embassy was instructed to discover what the Indian Government proposed to do about a situation that could lead to China becoming Pakistan’s major supplier of military equipment. The Department suggested that India should recognize that it would be far better for Pakistan to maintain its existing U.S.-supplied forces from either U.S. or other Western sources of supply. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 3281 from New Delhi, May 31, the Embassy recorded its objections to the resumption of the supply of lethal weapons to Pakistan. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 US–PAK)
4. Telegram 675 from Rawalpindi, May 26, transmitted the Embassy’s assessment that the sale of lethal spare parts to Pakistan would not win enough points with the Pakistani military to counterbalance the anticipated cost to the U.S. relationship with India. The Embassy recommended no direct sales of lethal spare parts or equipment to either India or Pakistan. (Ibid.)